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The decade of the 1990s brought a new experience with
financial  instability.  While  earlier  currency  crises  were
caused mainly by the evident macroeconomic mismanage-
ment (what gave theoreticians an empirical ground for a
construction of the so-called first generation models of cur-
rency crises), during the last decade they also happened to
economies enjoying a good reputation. This new experience
started with the 1992 ERM crisis when the British pound
and Italian lira were forced to be devalued. This was parti-
cularly surprising in the case of the UK, the country, which
went successfully through series of very ambitious econo-
mic reforms in the 1980s. 
At the end of 1994 the serious currency crisis hit Mexi-
co, and during next few months it spread to other Latin
American countries, particularly to Argentina (the so-called
Tequila effect). Although Argentina managed to defend its
currency board, the sudden outflow of capital and banking
crisis caused a one-year recession. Currency crises have not
been  the  new  phenomena  in  the  Western  Hemisphere
where  many  Latin  American  countries  served  through
decades as the textbook examples of populist policies and
economic mismanagement. However, two main victims of
"Tequila" crisis – Mexico and Argentina – represented a pret-
ty successful record of reforming their economies and expe-
rienced turbulence seemed to be unjustified, at least at first
sight. 
Two years later even more unexpected and surprising
series of financial crises happened in South East Asia. The
Asian Tigers enjoyed a reputation of fast growing, macro-
economically balanced and highly competitive economies,
which managed to make a great leap forward from the ca-
tegory  of  low-income  developing  countries  to  middle  or
even higher-middle income group during life of one genera-
tion. However, a more careful analysis as done in this vol-
ume  could  easlly  the  specify  several  serious  weaknesses,
particularly related to financial and corporate sector. Addi-
tio-nally, as in the case of Mexico, managing the crisis in its
early stage was not specially successful and only provoked
further devaluation pressure and financial market panic. 
The external consequences of the Asian crisis became
much more serious than those of the Mexican crisis. While
the later had a regional character only, the former affected
the whole global economy and spread through other conti-
nents. The Asian crisis started in Thailand in July 1997 and its
first  round  of  contagion  hit  Malaysia,  Indonesia  and  the
Philippines in summer 1997. The next wave caused serious
turbulence in Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, and again
in Indonesia in the fall of 1997 and beginning of 1998. Singa-
pore  and  Taiwan  were  affected  to  lesser  extent.  Asian
developments also undermined market confidence in other
emerging markets, particularly in Russia and Ukraine expe-
riencing the chronic fiscal imbalances. Both countries, after
resisting several speculative attacks against their currencies
in  the  end  of  1997  and  in  the  first  half  of  1998,  finally
entered the full-scale financial crisis in August – September
1998. Following Russia and Ukraine, also other post-Soviet
economies experienced forced devaluation and debt crisis.
This  relates  to  Moldova,  Georgia,  Belarus,  Kyrgyzstan,
Uzbekistan,  Kazakhstan,  and  Tajikistan.  Finally,  Russian
developments triggered eruption of currency crisis in Brazil
in early 1999, and some negative contagion effects for other
Latin  American  economies,  particularly  for  Argentina
(1999–2000). 
In the meantime, cumulated negative consequences of
the Asian and Russian crises damaged confidence not only in
relation to the so-called emerging markets but also affected
the  financial  markets  of  developed  countries.  In  the  last
quarter  of  1998  the  danger  of  recession  in  the  US  and
worldwide pushed the Federal Reserve Board to ease sig-
nificantly its monetary policy. However, some symptoms of
the global slowdown such as a substantial drop in prices of
oil and other basic commodities could not be avoided. 
The  new  crisis  episodes  stimulated  both  theoretical
discussion and large body of empirical analyzes trying to
identify the causes of currency crises, their economic and
social  consequences,  methods  of  preventing  them  and
effective management when a crisis already happened. On
the theoretical ground, the new experience brought the
so-called second and third generation of currency crises
models. Both theoretical and empirical discussion started





In  some  extreme  interpretations  the  role  of  the  so-
called  fundamentals,  i.e.  soundness  of  economic  policy,
started to be neglected in favor of the role of collective psy-
chology of financial market players (multiple equilibria, herd
behavior, market panic, contagion effect). However, as the
detailed analysis of the crisis episodes shows it would be
hard to find any convincing case of currency crisis in "inno-
cent" country. Although the role of multiple equilibria cannot
be questioned, they can trigger a crisis only when funda-
mentals are under question. This is convincingly document-
ed in all the country studies presented in this volume. 
The same type of conclusions can be derived from dis-
cussion  on  the  role  of  globalization.  Although  increasing
integration of product and financial markets make all coun-
tries more mutually dependent and vulnerable to the exter-
nal shocks, globalization itself cannot be blamed for causing
crisis in any particular country. 
This volume presents six monographs of currency crisis
episodes  in  two  Latin  American  countries  in  1994–1995
(Mexico  and  Argentine)  and  four  Asian  countries  in
1997–1998 (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Korea). The
Asian part of this volume is supplemented with a short com-
parative note, commenting these four monographs. 
All the studies were prepared under the research pro-
ject no. OI44/H02/99/17 on "Analysis of Currency Crises in
Countries of Asia, Latin America and Central and Eastern
Europe:  Lessons  for  Poland  and  Other  Transition  Coun-
tries", carried out by CASE and financed by the Committee
for Scientific Research (KBN) in the years 1999–2001. They
were subjects of public presentation and discussion during
the seminar in Warsaw organized by CASE on December
21, 2000, under the same research project. 
In the all analyzed cases currency crises were accompa-
nied by other signs of financial turbulence such as (public
and/or private) debt crisis or banking crisis. However, the
limited scope of the conducted analysis forced the research
team to concentrate on the currency crises and refer to
banking and debt crisis only as the background or conse-
quence of the currency devaluation.  
This collection of papers will be followed by another 
volume presenting episodes of currency crises in the Euro-
pean transition economies. 
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1.1. History of the Crisis
In order to put into context the developments that final-
ly led to the currency crisis of 1994/1995, it is useful to go
back  as  far  as  mid-1980's.  In  December  1987,  a  set  of
reform policies was initiated aimed at "remaking the Mexi-
can economy" [Lustig, 1992]. The shift in policies was acce-
lerated after 1988 as they gained support from the newly
elected president Carlos Salinas de Gortari [DeLong et al.,
1996].  The  reform  package  was  successful  and  brought
macroeconomic  stabilisation.  Inflation  was  reduced  from
nearly  160%  in  1987  to  the  range  of  18%  –  30%  in
1989–1991 and further down to less than 12% in 1992 and
8.3% in 1993. At the same time economic growth resumed
reaching 3.5–4.5% pa. in the period 1989–1992. This result
was  quite  remarkable  given  the  record  of  failed  reform
attempts in previous years [Blejer and del Castillo, 1996]. 
The 1989 foreign debt restructuring left Mexico with
relatively  low  and  mostly  long-term  foreign  debt  (it
accounted for some 19% of GDP at the end of 1993) [Sachs
et al., 1995]. Public debt was substantially reduced from
67% of GDP in 1989 to 30% in 1993. From December
1990 onwards, foreigners were allowed to purchase short-
term government peso-denominated debt instruments [Gil-
Diaz,  1998].  After  the  restructuring,  Mexico  once  again
gained access to international financial markets. Private ca-
pital inflows surged to an average of above 6% of GDP in
the period 1990–1993 [IMF, 1995]. 
Economic policies during the period 1990–1993 result-
ed in the implementation of important structural reforms in
various fields. The authorities undertook major domestic
financial  sector  reform  and  capital  account  liberalisation
[Otker  and  Pazarbasioglu,  1995]  and  privatisation.  One
should also note the improvement of the regulatory frame-
work governing economic activity in many sectors, e.g. in
tourism,  means  of  transport,  petrochemicals,  electricity,
telecommunications, etc. [WTO, 1997]. Another important
factor  was  trade  liberalisation.  This  process  had  started
much earlier. In 1985 Mexico formally joined the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The next major
step  was  the  signing  of  the  North  American  Free  Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) in 1992 that stipulated the reduction
in  non-tariff  barriers,  liberalisation  of  investment  laws,
changes in competition law, etc. The NAFTA finally took
effect in January 1994. 
The government followed a path of budgetary discipline.
The operational budget of the public sector [1] was in sur-
plus in the range of 2–3% of GDP in the early 1990's. Sev-
eral social pacts were concluded between the government
and labour organisations as well as business representatives
[Blejer and del Castillo, 1996]. Among the issues agreed
upon was the exchange rate policy that became the central
anti-inflationary  instrument.  The  question  whether  the
exchange rate policy was appropriate and whether it result-
ed in an overvaluation of the peso is one of the major issues
raised in all analyses of the currency crisis of 1994/1995.
This problem will be discussed later.
In 1993, the overall economic situation deteriorated
slightly.  GDP  growth  slowed  to  only  0.6%  and  private
consumption  and  investment  fell  in  real  terms.  These
developments  are  mostly  attributed  to  the  ongoing
restructuring in the manufacturing sector, a tightening of
credit  conditions  by  monetary  authorities,  and  a  credit
squeeze resulting from the deterioration in the quality of
banks' loan portfolio [IMF , 1995]. There was also some
uncertainty about the approval of NAFTA, which was final-
ly resolved in November.
Despite these setbacks, until 1994 Mexico was widely
regarded as an example of a successful economic reform
story. Some other views [Dornbusch and Werner, 1994]
appeared among economists, but were not picked up nor
were they considered important by investors. Suddenly, in
the course of 1994, several events took place that turned
out to be of considerable importance for Mexico's econo-
mic situation. 
January witnessed the peasant rebellion in Chiapas – the
first one of political events of 1994 that later turned out to
have a significant impact on financial stability of the country.
Part I.
The Mexican Peso Crisis 1994–1995
by Wojciech Paczyñski
[1] Operational balance is defined as primary balance plus the real portion of the interest paid on public debt. 10
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In February, U.S. interest rates started to rise. In March the
candidate  in  presidential  elections  Luis  D.  Colosio  was
assassinated. This came as a shock to investors and led to
severe  financial  turbulence.  The  peso  exchange  rate
increased from the bottom of the intervention band [2],
where it stayed before, to the ceiling of the band, which
constituted  a  nominal  devaluation  of  ca.  10%.  This  was
accompanied  by  a  decrease  in  Central  Bank  reserves  of
around 9 billion USD. The monetary authorities followed a
path of a rather loose monetary policy, boosting credit to
the economy in order to prevent interest rate increase and
to support weak commercial banks. Also, in the run-up to
the presidential elections (the output slowdown could had
been another factor) fiscal policy became more expansion-
ary. The actions involved some tax cuts and increases in
social spending [IMF, 1995]. 
In August presidential elections took place that gave a
victory to Ernesto Zedilo. His victory, with a higher than
expected margin, was considered a positive event from the
point of view of foreign investors even though the elections
were not carried out in a perfect way. In September, the
secretary general of the ruling party was assassinated. 
Higher domestic interest rates (around 16% pa. from
April until July as opposed to around 10% pa. in the first
quarter) and the approval of a 6.75 billion USD short term
credit line from NAFTA partners helped to ease the pres-
sures from financial markets. The peso exchange rate stayed
near the ceiling of the band, outflow of capital was stopped
and  reserves  remained  relatively  stable  from  April  until
October. After July, interest rates began even to decline. 
Another policy action implemented by the authorities in
order to increase the credibility of maintaining the exchange
rate rule and to prevent increases in interest rates was sub-
stituting  short  term  peso-denominated  government  debt
(Cetes)  with  dollar-indexed  (but  payable  in  pesos)  short
term  bonds  (Tesobonos).  This  started  after  the  March
events  and  continued  in  the  following  months.  The  out-
standing stock of Tesobonos increased significantly – from
14 billion pesos in March 1994 to 63.6 billion in November.
The whole operation within a very short period dramatical-
ly changed the composition of short-term debt held by the
private  sector.  While  in  the  first  quarter  the  share  of
Tesobonos  in  total  Cetes  and  Tesobonos  stock  did  not
exceeded 10%, it reached almost 60% in July. 
The  current  account  continued  to  deteriorate  in  the
third quarter of 1994 reaching a record level deficit of 7.9
billion USD. In addition, both the stock of Tesobonos and its
share in total short-term debt increased further. Heightened
concerns about the sustainability of Mexico's external posi-
tion  led  to  intensified  capital  outflows.  The  reserves
declined by 4.7 billion USD between October and Novem-
ber and further 2.5 billion USD to 10 billion USD in mid-
December. On 1 December president Zedillo took office
and two days later the unrest in Chiapas intensified. Given
the current situation, the authorities decided on 20 Decem-
ber to widen the exchange rate band by 15%. This move
was accompanied by the announcement of the authorities
to support the peso at a rate of around 4 pesos to the U.S.
dollar. This announcement was, however, not perceived as
credible  by  investors,  who  put  further  pressure  on  the
exchange rate. The Bank of Mexico lost around 4 billion
USD within two days and was forced to freely float the peso
on 22 December.
Inflation was certainly one of the most important prob-
lems that the authorities had to tackle after the devaluation.
It jumped to the level of around 8% monthly, but in the sec-
ond half of the year was reduced to the range 2–4% month-
ly. The peak of 12-month inflation was recorded in Decem-
ber 1995, when it stood at 51.97%. During the first quarter
of 1995, the peso depreciated at a rather high rate reaching
6.82 in the end of March. It then regained some strength
fluctuating between 5.8 and 6.4 pesos to the dollar until
September, to fell further in the last quarter to 7.64 in the
end of December.
The crisis also resulted in a severe recession with GDP
falling by 9.2% YoY in the second quarter and respectively
by 8.0% and 7.0% in the third and fourth quarter of 1995
[INEGI, 2000]. Industrial production dropped sharply and
the unemployment rate increased. In the second part of the
year, the first signs of economic recovery became visible.
These trends intensified in the last quarter, and since the
second quarter of 1996 the Mexican economy returned to a
path of fast growth (YoY rate of GDP growth reached 7.2%
in the second quarter of 1996). The severity of the 1995
recession was caused by several factors, the most important
probably being very high interest rates (lending rate stayed
close to 70% in the first half of the year) that were used as
an anti-inflationary measure. Other factors included a signi-
ficant drop in capital inflows, and sudden reduction in cred-
it  in  the  economy.  Domestic  consumption  was  further
repressed  due  to  debt  overhang  and  possibly  substantial
negative income and wealth effects resulting from the deva-
luation [SHCP , 1995]. Gruben et al. (1997) point at sectoral
fragmentation of severity of recession and the timing and
strength of a rebound. 
During 1995, significant adjustment took place in exter-
nal position of Mexico. Exports surged by 30% in compari-
son to 1994 and imports contracted by around 9%. As a
result, the trade balance improved from a deficit of 18.5 bil-
lion USD in 1994 to a surplus of 7 billion in 1995. The cur-
rent account deficit contracted from nearly 30 billion USD
in 1994 to only 1.5 billion USD. A very important achieve-
[2] Since November 1991 Mexico operated a moving band exchange rate system. This is discussed in more detail in section 1.2.4.11
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ment of the authorities was the elimination of the short-
term debt overhang and consequently regaining access to
international capital markets. In particular Tesobonos were
practically eliminated from the short-term debt stock during
1995. An access to credits from the foreign financial support
package  played  an  important  role  in  managing  the  debt
problem. Mexico used close to 12 billion USD of IMF cre-
dits in 1995 in addition to around 14 billion of other excep-
tional  financing.  A  much-improved  economic  condition
allowed Mexico to pay back these credits, in some instances
ahead of schedule. Since 1996 Mexico has experienced re-
latively stable economic growth.
1.2. In Search of the Causes of the Crisis:
Macroeconomic Factors 
1.2.1. Fiscal Policy
The role of fiscal policy in the peso crisis has not been
emphasised in most of the studies. This is because in the
early 1990's Mexico achieved remarkable successes in near-
ly balancing the public finances. The general public sector
deficit declined from around 16% of GDP in 1986 to about
2% in 1993. In 1994 the result was not much worse – the
deficit reached around 3.9% of GDP [3]. This fiscal perfor-
mance was to a large extent due to reduced interest pay-
ments during the period. One important observation is that
fiscal policy was not tightened, and thus was not used as a
tool for dealing with negative shocks of 1994. On the con-
trary, fiscal policy was rather looser in the election year.
The role of quasi-fiscal operations via development bank
credits in 1994 is not very clear. Very soon after the crisis,
some  authors  presented  the  view  that  fiscal  expansion
through this channel could had played some role in the mix
of bad policies that were implemented in 1994 [World Bank,
1995]. Most of the analyses show however, that develop-
ment banks' credit was not an important factor. Sachs et al.
(1995) argue that most of the activities of these banks do
not  belong  in  an  economically  meaningful  definition  of  a
budget deficit. 
An innovative way of looking at the role of fiscal policy
in  explaining  the  crisis  is  proposed  by  Kalter  and  Ribas
(1999). They point out the role of the increasing magni-
tude of go-vernment operations, rather than the size of
government deficit, in affecting the relative price of traded
to  non-traded  goods  (i.e.  the  real  exchange  rate),  the
financial condition of the traded sector, and interest rates.
They argue that the significant rise in government non-oil
revenue collections measured in U.S. dollars or in terms of
traded goods prices has had an effect on the tradable sec-
tor  analogous  to  that  of  a  surge  in  export  commodity
prices  (Dutch  disease).  The  resulting  deterioration  of
finances of traded goods sector was then passed to com-
mercial  banks'  finances.  While  the  arguments  used  by
Kalter and Ribas (1999) are interesting and certainly add
another dimension to the understanding of fundamental
reasons behind the crisis, they do not provide an explana-
tion for sudden events of December 1994.
1.2.2. Savings and Investment Balance
In the period 1988–1994 Mexico witnessed a notice-
able growth in investment and a decline in savings (see
Table 1-2). Overall investment grew from 20.4% of GDP
in  1988  to  23.6%  in  1994.  Interestingly,  public  sector
investments  remained  relatively  stable  and  were  even
reduced, while the growth was due to the private invest-
Table 1-1. Public sector balances 1986–1994 (in percent of GDP)
Financial balance Primary balance Operational balance
1986 -16.1 3.7 -2.4
1990 -3.3 7.6 1.8
1991 -1.5 5.3 2.9
1992 0.5 6.6 2.9
1993 -2.1 3.6 2.1
1994 -3.9 2.3 0.5
Notes: Financial Balance includes all public sector borrowing requirements.
Primary Balance is defined as Financial Balance less interest paid on public debt.
Operational Balance is defined as Primary Balance plus the real portion of the interest paid on public debt.
Other sources provide slightly different data.
Source: Sachs et al. (1995).
[3] There is no consensus about the size of public sector surplus or deficit. Different authors use distinct measures. For example, Kalter and Ribas
(1999) estimate the overall public sector deficit close to 1% in 1992–1993 and close to 2.5% in 1994.12
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ment  boom.  This  was  accompanied  by  an  even  more
apparent reduction in propensity to save. Total savings fell
from 19% of GDP in 1988 to only 15.2% of GDP in 1993
and 15.7% in 1994. Private savings declined from 17.6%
of GDP in 1988 to 8.9% in 1993 before starting to grow,
albeit modestly, in 1994. This leads to the conclusion that
the  deterioration  in  the  current  account  –  the  deficit
reached 6.8% of GDP in 1993 and 7.9% in 1994 – was
primarily caused by the level of private savings not match-
ing the level of private investment [4].
1.2.3. Private and Public Debt
The  role  of  Mexico's  indebtedness  in  provoking  the
financial  crisis  deserves  a  more  detailed  analysis.  First,  it
should be noted that Mexico had a history of problems asso-
ciated with its foreign debt, including the crisis of 1982. In
contrast to the past, the beginning of the 1990's was marked
by a very significant improvement in this sphere. Public debt
was reduced from some 64% of GDP in 1989 to 35% of
GDP in 1993. Of this, 23% of GDP was foreign debt that as
a  result  of  1989  restructuring  had  a  favourable  maturity
structure  (long  term  liabilities  prevailed).  Domestic  debt
accounted for 12% of GDP [IMF , 1995] [5]. These numbers
were low in comparison to other developing and developed
countries. Moreover, standard debt indicators such as the
ratio of total debt to GDP or to exports or the ratio of inte-
rests on debt to GDP or exports were improving in the
early 90's. This clearly shows that the overall level of public
debt did not play a big role in the loss of investors' confi-
dence in 1994.
What did matter, however, was the maturity and cur-
rency structure of the domestic debt and the level of pri-
vate borrowing. From 1989 to 1992, net credit to the
private sector from the financial system expanded at an
average annual rate of 66% in nominal terms, offsetting
the decline in borrowing of the public sector resulting
from  the  substantially  improved  fiscal  position  [IMF,
1995]. In 1993 net domestic credit of the banking system
continued to expand at an annual rate of around 20%.
Interestingly, this decomposes into a substantial reduc-
tion in credit to the public sector (around 30%) and an
expansion of credit to the private sector of the same
magnitude (see table 1-3). This trend continued through
the first half of 1994, while in the second half public sec-
tor borrowing also started to rise, bringing the 12-month
rate of growth of net domestic credit from the banking
system to around 30%. It is also worth noting the faster
expansion of credit to private sector from development
banks than from commercial banks in 1994. Other inter-
esting  statistics  are  presen-ted  in  Gil-Diaz  (1998)  [6]
which indicate that in the period from December 1988
to November 1994 credit card liabilities rose at an aver-
age rate of 31% per year, direct credit for consumer
durables rose at a yearly rate of 67% and mortgage loans
at an annual rate of 47%, all in real terms.
The above numbers, along with numbers cited in sec-
tion 1.2.2 with regard to private investment and savings,
show  that  it  was  mostly  private  sector  borrowing  that
brought the current account deficit to the levels it reached
in 1993 and 1994 (more than 6% of GDP). Such a level of
the deficit seems quite high but was nevertheless easily
financed in 1993, and from that perspective there were
Table 1-2. Saving and investment levels 1988–1994 (in percent of GDP)
Saving Investment Net saving
Current
account
Public Private Total Public Private Total Public Private
1988 1.4 17.6 19 515 . 4 20.4 -3.6 2.2 -1.4
1989 3.1 15.6 18.7 4.8 16.5 21.3 -1.7 -0.9 -2.6
1990 6.7 12.5 19.2 4.9 17 21.9 1.8 -4.5 -2.7
1991 7.5 10.3 17.8 4.6 17.8 22.4 2.9 -7.5 -4.6
1992 7.1 9.5 16.6 4.2 19.1 23.3 2.9 -9.6 -6.7
1993 6.3 8.9 15.2 4.2 17.8 22 2.1-8.9 -6.8
1994 5 10.7 15.7 4.5 19.1 23.6 0.5 -8.4 -7.9
Source: Sachs et al. (1995)
[4] Sources differ in calculations of the current account deficit in relation to GDP . For example Gurrha (2000) citing official Mexican data estimates
the deficit to account for 5.8% of GDP in 1993 and 7.0% in 1994.
[5] Also in this case different numbers are cited by other authors. For example Sachs et al. (1995) estimate the public debt at 67% of GDP in 1989
and 30% in 1993. According to this source this last number can be broken down to 19% of GDP of foreign debt and 11% of domestic debt. The ave-
rage maturity of domestic debt was around 200 days.
[6] The statistics were provided to the author (a former Vice Chancellor of the Bank of Mexico) by the Economic Research Department of Bank
of Mexico.13
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reasons  to  believe  that  this  could  had  happen  again  in
1994. Firstly, one should note that large capital inflows that
resulted from markedly improved perception of the econ-
omy by foreign investors and that were possible thanks to
capital account liberalisation of 1990 were transferred to a
significant increase of short term debt. The inflow was
sterilised by issuing short-term government debt instru-
ments  (Cetes).  As  a  result  short-term  indebtedness
increased significantly with short term debt to total debt
stock ratio rising from 21.9 in 1992 to 28.1 in 1994 [World
Bank, 2000]. At the end of 1993 the value of Cetes alone
reached  22.9  billion  USD,  i.e.  it  was  very  close  to  net
international reserves of the Bank of Mexico (24.9 billion
USD) (see Figure 1-1). This placed Mexico in a potentially
vulnerable position. On top of that, during 1994 the cur-
rency structure of short-term debt underwent a substan-
tial change.
After the March assassination and resulting turbulence
in the financial markets, the authorities started exchanging
peso-denominated bonds (Cetes) with dollar-indexed debt
instruments (Tesobonos). This action was aimed at uphold-
ing the investors confidence in the exchange rate regime
after the peso depreciated by around 10% reaching the
ceiling of the intervention band. It was also used as a tool
to avoid further increases in interest rates. Werner (1996)
estimates that the substitution from Cetes to Tesobonos
was equivalent to an interest rates increase of around 8 to
11 percentage points. He argues that accounting for the
currency  composition  of  government  debt  gives  more
appropriate  measures  of  currency  risk  premium  in  the
period  before  the  crisis.  The  scale  of  substitution  from
Cetes to Tesobonos was huge. By June 1994, the amount
of Tesobonos and Cetes were roughly equal and in Decem-
ber the amount of Tesobonos was around 5.5 times that of
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Notes: Cetes – three month peso-denominated government debt.
Tesobonos – three month dollar-indexed government debt.
Source: own calculations based on IMF, IFS and World Bank (1995) data.
Table 1-3. Monetary sector – the expansion of credit 1990–1994 (twelve-month rates of growth, end of period)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Broad money (M4) 46.4 30.9 19.9 25.0 17.1
Net domestic assets of the financial
system
22.6 31.6 20.8 15.5 32.0
Net credit to public sector 3.9 -1.6 -31.7 -46.2 25.3
Net credit to private sector 63.2 53.3 57.126.4 31 .9
Net domestic credit of commercial
banks
49.4 48.6 20.9 24.3 …
Net domestic credit of development
banks
-10.0 18.8 23.4 47.4 42.2
Source: IMF (1995).14
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Cetes. Another way to look at the process is to note that
around 15 billion USD of private sector holdings in Cetes
were swapped for Tesobonos from March till November. 
After  the  devaluation  on  20  December,  government
borrowing was clearly not sustainable. Investors rushed to
withdraw  their  investments  and  the  government  found
itself unable to cover short term liabilities that led to a
panic and the severe currency devaluation. Eventually, only
a huge international support package helped to solve the
problem. The shift to dollar denominated short-term pub-
lic debt certainly contributed to the whole set of factors
that provoked the crisis. Interestingly, however, risks asso-
ciated with rapidly growing short-term dollar indexed debt
of Mexico seem to had been underestimated, not to say
unnoticed, by the international financial community until
the  devaluation  took  place.  Sachs  et  al.  (1996)  present
puzzling statistics on international press coverage of Mexi-
co.  The  issue  of  Tesobonos  was  completely  ignored  by
leading international financial papers with only one article
mentioning it being published before December 1994 [7].
The  problem  of  accumulated  dollar  denominated  debt
accompanied by depleted foreign reserves constituted an
important  factor  in  provoking  the  panic  after  the
announcement of devaluation on 20 December (Sachs et
al., 1995, see also section 1.2.5). 
1.2.4. Exchange Rate Policy
In the last decades, Mexico altered its exchange rate po-
licy several times and had a history of several episodes of sig-
nificant devaluations (e.g. 1976, 1982, and 1985). A fixed
exchange rate regime that was introduced in 1988 and later
corrected on several occasions played a major role in the
anti-inflationary strategy of Mexican authorities. From Janu-
ary 1989 until November 1991, a preannounced crawling
peg was in operation (with two reductions of the rate of
crawl),  and  from  11  November  1991  an  exchange  rate
intervention band was used with several changes in the rate
of crawl of both upper and lower bands. From 1991 until
November 1994, the peso steadily and very slowly depre-
ciated in nominal terms. Yet since the level of inflation was
much higher than in the U.S., in real terms the peso appre-
ciated by around 15% if consumer price indexes for Mexi-
co and the U.S. are applied or close to 21% if the compari-
son is based on wholesale price indexes [8].
The question whether the peso was overvalued at that
time brought much attention, especially after the December
crisis. One should note, however, that there were voices
pointing to an overvaluation of the peso and the possible
risks that it posed already in early 1994, the best known
being Dornbusch and Werner (1994). In most analyses of the
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[7] The authors surveyed the Financial Times, the New York Times, and the Wall Street Journal. The number of such articles jumped to 6 in Decem-
ber 1994 and 46 in January 1995. 
[8] In a new study Dabos and Juan-Ramon (2000) estimate the model of the real exchange rate in Mexico. Their results suggest that on the eve of
the crisis the peso was overvalued by a number in the range of 12 to 25 percent. This result is consistent with the majority of previous studies.










































































































































Note: Rer_cons index is obtained using consumer price indexes in Mexico and the U.S., while Rer_prod is based on producer price indexes; 1 is
an average value of respective indexes over the period.
Source: Author's calculation based on IMF, IFS data15
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crisis that appeared after 1994, the view that the peso has
indeed been overvalued seems to gain rather strong support
[World Bank, 1995]. The standard reasoning points to the
fact that the exchange rate-based stabilisation under capital
mobility has led to a large current account deficit and real
appreciation of the peso that at some point became unsus-
tainable and the correction of real exchange rate was need-
ed [IMF, 1995]. It is, however, not clear whether this has
played an important role in determining the crisis. In partic-
ular, some authors concluded that the peso overvaluation is
not at all useful in explaining the crisis [Gil-Diaz, 1998]. Also,
as Sachs et al. (1996) point out, significant reduction in infla-
tion in 1994 and 10% nominal depreciation from March to
April 1994 certainly diminished the overvaluation problem.
On 20 December, the upper limit of the intervention
corridor was widened by 15%, but at that time the devalu-
ation of that scale was widely regarded as insufficient. On
the other hand, it undermined the confidence in the will and
ability of the Mexican authorities to uphold the announced
exchange rate policy. The continued pressure and a lack of
possibilities to support the peso forced the authorities to let
the peso flow freely on 22 December. In later months, the
peso depreciated sharply hitting the rate of 6.82 pesos to
the dollar in the end of March 1995, i.e. nearly twice as
much as before 20 December. It recovered slightly in the
next few months.
1.2.5. Monetary Policy
During the whole of 1993, disinflation continued and
interest rates on short term government papers were on a
downward trend. Interest rates declined from around 17%
at the beginning of 1993 to 13–14% in November. The
approval of NAFTA in that month allowed for a further sig-
nificant decrease below 10% in February and March 1994.
Political turbulence at the end of March resulted in a surge
in interest rates that stayed in the 16%–17% range from
April until July. From August onwards, interest rates started
to fall again and remained stable at around 13.7% from Sep-
tember until November. Exactly the same pattern was fol-
lowed by the real interest rates differential (i.e. real rate on
Mexican papers compared to real rates on American Trea-
sury bills).
As Sachs et al. (1996) point out, such a behaviour of
interest rates is markedly different from the one predicted
by standard first generation crisis models (e.g. Krugman,
1979). This fact is presented as a main argument against the
hypothesis that a speculative attack can be a mechanism
used to describe the peso crisis. This point is perhaps some-
what weakened when one takes into account interest rates
differential adjusted using measures of currency structure of
short term public debt [Werner, 1996]. One of the primary
motives for substituting Cetes with Tesobonos was to avoid
an adjustment via higher interest rates. This policy proved
to be rather short sighted as dollar-indexed short-term debt
very quickly reached high levels (see section 1.2.3). 
The policy of keeping interest rates low had imme-
diate  implications  for  the  level  of  foreign  exchange
reserves  in  1994.  This  basic  yet  important  point  is
stressed by Sachs et al. (1995). Until March 1994, the
Mexican private sector was selling securities to foreign
investors  at  a  rate  that  can  roughly  be  estimated  at
around 20 billion USD yearly. This capital inflow financed
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Note: all numbers are percent per annum.
Source: author's calculations based on IMF, IFS data.16
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the current account deficit. After March, interest rates
demanded by foreign investors increased significantly yet
the monetary authorities responded by trying to fix inter-
est rates using credit expansion. The Central Bank simply
offered  to  buy  securities  accepting  low  interest  rates.
This shows up in the Bank of Mexico accounts as domes-
tic credit expansion to both private sector (mainly banks)
and the government (mainly Tesobonos purchased from
private investors). Such a behaviour did not provide any
incentive to reduce the current account deficit and left no
other way but to finance it from foreign reserves. What
actually happened was that credits (issued in pesos) were
converted into dollars to cover the trade deficit at the
fixed exchange rate. 
Another way of looking at the mechanism is to note the
identity decomposing the change in monetary base into the
change of domestic credit and the change in reserves. With
the monetary base being relatively constant, the expansion
of domestic credit was mirrored by declining reserves (see
Figure 1-4).
The most common way of defending the policies of the
central  bank  was  to  say  that  without  providing  credit,
interest rates would have risen to levels that would se-
riously affect the economy, and that the Central Bank was
forced to act as a lender of last resort to commercial banks
[Sachs et al., 1995; Gil-Diaz, 1998]. Carstens and Werner
(1999) argue that, "in the case of Mexico during 1994 mo-
netary policy had to defend the predetermined exchange
rate, without affecting a weak banking system". Sachs et al.
(1995) recommend, that the credit should be expanded
moderately,  while  indeed  the  exchange  rate  should  be
allowed to depreciate. Still, some interest rates hike with
all the adverse effects on economic growth seems to had
been necessary anyway (and such a solution would proba-
bly be less painful than the adjustment through a crisis).
1.2.6. Foreign trade
Mexico  experienced  a  substantial  increase  in  private
spending and trade deficits in 1988–1994. One should note
that this kind of experience is similar to the one of many other
countries that have undertaken exchange rate based stabilisa-
tion programs. The trade deficit almost reached 16 billion
USD in 1992, was somewhat reduced in 1993 and again rose
to 18.4 billion USD in 1994. A deficit of that magnitude did
not  reflect  weak  performance  of  Mexican  exports,  which
were  growing  at  an  average  annual  rate  of  above  10%
between 1990 and 1994. The prospects for Mexican exports
seemed  to  be  very  promising,  especially  after  the  final
approval of the NAFTA in November 1993. One should note
at that point that the U.S. was by far the most important tra-
ding partner, accounting for more than 81% of exports and
more than 71% of Mexican imports already in 1992. These
shares have increased yet further in later years. 
1.2.7. Balance of Payments
The current account balance that was in surplus in 1987
soon  turned  to  negative  numbers.  The  size  of  deficits
increased  significantly  after  1990.  In  1991  it  accounted  for
4.6% of GDP , in 1992 and 1993 stayed at about 6.5% to
widen still further to around 8% of GDP in 1994. As shown in
section 2.2 this was primarily caused by private sector invest-
ment exceeding its savings rather than imprudent fiscal poli-
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cies. The deficit was financed by high inflows of foreign capital
to the private sector, majority of which was portfolio invest-
ment. With capital inflows higher than the level of the current
account deficit central bank's foreign currency reserves were
gradually increasing from 6 billion USD in 1988 to 25.4 billion
USD in 1993. In order to sterilise capital inflows the govern-
ment issued large amounts of short-term peso- denominated
treasury bills (Cetes) (see also section 1.2.3).
The situation changed markedly after March 1994. The
inflow of foreign capital fell abruptly. The capital account
position from the balance of payment deteriorated from
11.8 billion USD in the first quarter to 3.7 billion in the sec-
ond quarter. In turn, central bank's reserves fell from 29.3
billion USD at the end of February to 17.7 billion at the end
of April, i.e. by 11.6 billion USD. The reserves remained
rather stable at that level until November, when the next
wave of reserve erosion took place. At the end of Novem-
ber they stayed at only 12.9 billion USD. This provoked the
final speculative attack against the peso. 
1.3. In Search for the Causes of the
Crisis: Microeconomic Factors 
In the years leading to the crisis major positive changes
took place in the real sector environment. The economic
program that was implemented starting in the late 1980s
included several structural reforms. Substantial deregulation
and privatisation took place along with trade liberalisation
[Martinez, 1998]. The Mexican privatisation program was
one of the most comprehensive in the world in terms of
both the size and the number of companies privatised [La
Porta and Lopez-de-Silane, 1999]. Privatisation was most
intensive in the period 1989–1992 and by 1992 the govern-
ment had withdrawn from most sectors of the economy
with the exception of oil, petrochemicals and the provision
of  key  infrastructure  services.  This  constituted  a  major
change to the situation from the early 1980s when the state
was intensely involved in the economy through more than a
thousand state-owned enterprises. 
The financial system, that until late 1988 was highly regu-
lated, also underwent a quick and substantial liberalisation
[Gelos and Werner, 1999]. All these factors contributed to a
major improvement in perceived prospects of the Mexican
economy and consequently, given the situation in world finan-
cial markets, resulted in large capital inflows to Mexico in the
period 1990–1993. There is no general consensus concerning
the role of financial and real sector weaknesses in the peso
crisis. Also, this channel is not very often thoroughly analysed,
perhaps due to limited access to relevant data.
It is clear that Mexico experienced a rapid expansion of
credit to the private sector (see section 1.2.3). It is likely
that this was associated with poor screening of borrowers,
and consequently, declining quality of credit [cf. Edwards,
1999]. Such a process is not unique to Mexico. Lidgren et al.
(1996) highlight the problem of a lack of necessary credit
evaluation skills in formerly regulated banks that are there-
fore unable to use newly available resources more efficient-
ly. Also, the notion that banks problems often precedes the
financial crisis (devaluation) has strong support from other
cross-country analyses [e.g. Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1996;
Lidgren et al., 1996]. Gil-Diaz (1998) points to several caus-
es of the rapid debt increase, the speed of which over-
whelmed supervisors, e.g.:
– speedy and not always well prepared privatisation of
banks, sometimes with no respect to "fit and proper" criteria,
either in the selection of new shareholders or top officers,
– lack of proper capitalisation of some privatised banks
and involvement in reciprocal leverage schemes,
– lack of capitalisation rules based on market risk; this
encouraged asset-liability mismatches that in turn led to a
highly liquid liability structure,
– loss of human capital in banks during the years when
they  were  under  the  government;  banking  supervision
capacity  not  meeting  the  requirements  of  increases  in
banks' portfolios.
1.4. Political Situation 
The Mexican peso crisis provides a clear and very inte-
resting example of how political factors can contribute to a
financial turbulence. The series of unexpected events in po-
litics had a visible influence on the behaviour of economic
aggregates and certainly played an important, through hard
to measure, role in triggering the December crisis. 
The first of the series of events started on New Year's
Day 1994 when peasants in the southern Mexican state of
Chiapas began a rebellion by taking over six towns. Even
though  the  uprising  was  rather  quickly  suppressed,  it
remained an issue in internal political life and occasionally
flared up again. Especially before the August elections, the
rebellion was again discussed and was recalled to question
the extent of popular support for the government's eco-
nomic program. On 23 March, Luis Donaldo Colosio, the
presidential candidate of the ruling party, was assassinated.
The causes of this murder were never actually revealed, and
there were signs that it might had been associated with ten-
sions within the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
[World Bank, 1995]. It should be noted that the PRI gov-
erned Mexico since 1929 as a party organised around well
connected political families. The assassination brought se-
rious turbulence to the financial markets with the peso at
the ceiling of the intervention band and sharply higher inte-18
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rest rates. Improper response of authorities to the turmoil
in  the  end  of  March  and  in  April  set  the  stage  for  the
December crisis [Sachs et al., 1995].
The  situation  seemed  to  have  calmed  down  when
another candidate of the PRI, Ernesto Zedillo won the pre-
sidential elections on 21 August. He received above 50% of
votes that came as a surprise to many observers. It is indeed
hard to verify whether the elections were free of fraud. On
the other hand, 1994 elections were perhaps more demo-
cratic and fair than many previous elections in Mexico. The
outcome of the elections was generally considered positive
from the financial stability point of view but may also have
caused the authorities to believe that the worst of the insta-
bility was over. One month after the elections, on 28 Sep-
tember, PRI leader Jose Francisco Ruiz Massieu was assassi-
nated. This murder remained a mystery too with several
high officials of PRI possibly somehow implicated. 
All these developments certainly changed the position of
Mexico's traditional ruling party. The process of reform in
the  political  scene  actually  began  slightly  earlier,  and,  as
Dornbusch and Werner (1994) point out, the rapid embrace
of greater openness has shattered the PRI coherence, so
that the old corporatism became unmanageable. It is thus
clear that during the whole 1994 there were serious ten-
sions within the ruling elite and the uncertainty about Me-
xico's political future was a factor in the foreign perception
of the country's financial stability. 
It should also be noted that the years of presidential
elections  have  traditionally  been  associated  with  financial
turbulence. This fact was recalled in many analyses of the
2000 presidential elections. Also, as many authors agree the
long period between the voting and taking the office by the
president elect has a negative impact on the quality of go-
verning  the  country.  President  Zedillo  took  office  on  1
December and it was followed by the intensified unrest in
Chiapas. 
1.5. Crisis Management 
While the policy mistakes of most of 1994 played an
important role in triggering the December crisis, improper
handling of the initial devaluation on 20 December probably
exacerbated the crisis. 
The devaluation on 20 December was announced after
weeks of assurances that the government was committed to
the previous exchange rate system. The announcement was
made by the Finance Minister on radio and television rather
than through an official channel. As the World Bank (1995)
stresses,  such  a  way  of  publicising  such  a  major  policy
change angered investors. Also, it turned out that business
leaders were consulted before the devaluation, thus having
the  opportunity  to  make  profits  at  the  expense  of  unin-
formed foreign investors [Krugman, 1997]. The devaluation
was widely considered insufficient and the exchange rate
immediately depreciated to the ceiling of the band, i.e. by
15%. The authorities had sacrificed the credibility without
satisfying market expectations. The rush out of the country
continued  on  the  next  day  with  Central  Bank's  reserves
reportedly falling below 6 billion USD [World Bank, 1995].
President  Zedillo  affirmed  the  commitment  to  the  new
band, but on the next morning the government let the peso
float. During the day it depreciated by a further 15%. On 26
December  the  planned  press  conference  by  the  Finance
Minister on the government anti-crisis plan was cancelled at
the last moment. On the next day the peso depreciated to
5.45 pesos to the dollar. The auction of dollar denominated
government  bonds  attracted  almost  no  bids.  Increasing
prices made labour leaders to demand wage negotiations.
On 29 December a new Finance Minister, Guillermo Ortiz
Martinez was appointed, who within a few days announced
a new economic program.
On 3 January, Stanley Fisher, Acting Managing Director
of  the  International  Monetary  Fund,  made  a  statement
expressing  the  Fund's  support  for  this  program  and
announcing the establishment of the Exchange Stabilisation
Fund  of  18  billion  USD  with  contributions  under  the
NAFTA  from  the  monetary  authorities  of  other  major
countries as well as from private investors. The talks on a
stand-by credit from the IMF started a few days later and
an  18-month  credit  of  17.8  billion  USD  was  finally
approved on 1 February. 
The Mexican authorities' program constituted of three
main components: minimising the inflationary pressures of
the devaluation, pushing forward structural reforms to sup-
port and promote competitiveness of the private sector, and
to address short term concerns of investors and establish a
coherent floating exchange regime. To the end of the first
objective, a National Accord was set among workers, busi-
ness and government to prevent wages and prices hikes, the
government spending were to be reduced by 1.3% of GDP ,
and cuts in credits from state development banks were to
be implemented. 
In terms of structural reforms President Zedillo pledged
to propose amendments to the constitution allowing for pri-
vate  investment  in  railroads  and  satellites,  to  open  the
telecommunication sector to competition, and to increase
foreign  participation  in  the  banking  sector.  As  the  third
objective is concerned, the co-operation with investment
banks  in  order  to  address  the  issue  of  Tesobonos  was
announced, as well as creating a futures market in pesos,
and commitment to a tight monetary policy. In the beginning
of March, the finance minister announced a package of fur-
ther measures aimed at strengthening the program. These
included substantial increases in prices charged by public
enterprises, VAT rate hike, and public expenditure reduc-
tions, and were designed to allow the public sector to stay19
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in surplus in 1995. Also, a further reduction of development
banks was declared. 
The Mexican Rescue Plan was supported with what was
then the biggest ever financial support package. The initial
amount of 18 billion USD announced by Fisher at the begin-
ning of January after further intense discussions rose to the
range  of  25–40  billion  USD  in  mid-  January  and  finally
around 52 billion USD of loan guarantees and credits at the
end of February. This package included 20 billion USD of
loan guarantees from the U.S. government, 17.8 billion USD
stand-by  credit  from  the  IMF  (by-then  the  largest  ever
financial package approved by the IMF for a member coun-
try both in terms of the amount and the overall percentage
of quota, 688.4%), 10 billion USD from central banks via
the BIS, and several billion dollars from other American gov-
ernments [World Bank, 1995].
The unprecedented size of the support package brought
about several controversies, especially in the U.S. The Clin-
ton Administration was criticised heavily both for lack of
action before the crisis, and for too much engagement in
co-ordinating  the  support  package.  On  29  March  1995,
Undersecretary  of  the  Treasury,  Lawrence  Summers
defended in closed hearings in the Senate the Administra-
tion's failure to publicise a warnings on the situation in Me-
xico. He admitted that the U.S Treasury lost the confidence
in the peso before the dramatic devaluation took place but
did not want to set off a market run on Mexico by making a
public statement about the situation [Burkart, 1995]. The
main arguments backing the support package pointed to the
fact that Mexican economy was illiquid rather than funda-
mentally insolvent [DeLong et al., 1996]. In retrospect it
seems that this view was indeed right, even though the U.S.
engagement in the package was to a large extent motivated
politically, i.e. by fears of possible political destabilisation in
the neighbouring country [Krugman, 1997].
1.6. Conclusions
The above presentation of several key factors and their
possible role in explaining the crisis shows that there is still
no clear consensus on the issue. Several aspects did play a
role and only their joint impact led to the abrupt events of
end  of  December  1994.  Various  models  were  used  to
describe the crisis. These were both models of the second
generation type, pointing to the role of self fulfilling expec-
tations and the political and economic constraints faced by
the authorities, as well as modified first generation models
stressing the importance of economic fundamentals. With
respect to the causes of the crisis following general points
can be made:
– Private sector savings did not match the level of invest-
ment. Mexico had easy access to credit as a result of the si-
tuation in the world financial markets, and liberalisation of
the economy. Resulting credit expansion was not accompa-
nied by proper credit screening. 
– Mexico was relying too heavily on foreign borrowing
in 1993 and early 1994, having no easy escape route in the
case this inflow would stop.
– The exchange rate rule was perhaps not quite consis-
tent with the developments in other spheres (overindul-
gence  of  credit,  excess  of  funds  in  international  financial
markets, fast growth of short-term debt, financial liberalisa-
tion). The real overvaluation of the peso might also have
played some role.
– Mexico experienced a series of unexpected negative
shocks during 1994 – the rise in U.S. interest rates coincid-
ing with political tensions in the country.
– Mexican politics in 1994 did play an important role in
the crisis.
– Lack of availability of timely and accurate information
on the economic situation in the country might have played
some  role  in  the  abrupt  change  of  investors'  attitude
towards Mexico.
– The policy response to the shocks of early 1994 was
certainly inappropriate (this is an ex post diagnosis). 
– Neither fiscal nor monetary policy tools were used to
adjust the economy to a worsening situation during 1994.
– Allowing for the erosion of foreign reserves of that
extent while building a large and rapidly growing stock of
dollar  indexed  short  term  debt  in  the  period  March-
December 1994 was an extremely risky strategy that did
not work. This set the stage for the December crisis and
then led to very high interest rates and, consequently, harsh
consequences for the real sector.
– Perceived risk of financial collapse played a role in both
causing the collapse and making it very severe.
–  Inappropriate  management  of  the  devaluation  and
improper steps taken in the days following it led to a com-
plete  loss  of  confidence  in  Mexican  policies  and  conse-
quently to more severe consequences.
An interesting feature of the Mexican crisis is the seve-
rity of the recession that was caused by it. On the other
hand, the crisis was relatively quickly overcome and the
economy seems to have overcome its underlying causes.
One  of  the  possible  explanations  of  such  developments
might be that the private sector was indeed heavily depen-
dent on external financing. Then again, a relatively quick
rebound of the economy could suggest that it was funda-
mentally sound, and the crisis exposed it to the liquidity
trap. In other words, given the abundance of credit, the pri-
vate  sector  was  using  it  heavily  and  possibly  sometimes
unwisely, but exposed to the dramatic change in the exter-
nal environment was still able to become competitive again.20
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Appendix: Chronology of the Mexican
Crisis
–  January  1994  –  peasant  rebellion  in  the  Chiapas
province
– February 1994 – U.S. interest rates increase slightly
– 23 March 1994 – assassination of the presidential can-
didate of the ruling party
– end of March – April – severe financial turbulence in
Mexico: exchange rate depreciates by around 10% reaching
the ceiling of the band, Bank of Mexico reserves shrink by 9
billion USD, interest rate rise significantly
– April – December 1994 – government continues the
process  of  substituting  its  short  term  peso  denominated
debt with dollar indexed debt
– 21 August 1994 – Ernesto Zedilo wins the presidential
elections; interest rates fall slightly
– 28 September 1994 – assassination of the ruling party
leader
–  October  –  November  –  capital  outflow  continues,
Bank of Mexico reserves decline by further 4.7 billion USD
– 1 December 1994 – president Zedilo takes office
– 20 December 1994 – Finance Ministers announces the
widening of the exchange rate corridor by 15%
– 22 December 1994 – under pressure from financial
markets the authorities announce free floating the peso
– 29 December 1994 – appointment of the new Finance
Minister, a few days later announcement of the government
economic program 
– 3 January 1995 – IMF expresses its support for the
program, announces the establishment of the Exchange Sta-
bilisation Fund
– 1st quarter 1996 – economic growth (0,1%) resumes
to average at close to 7% during the next three quarters
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2.1. Introduction
This paper presents the economic developments that
took place in Argentina at the time of the 1995 currency cri-
sis. This financial turbulence resulted from the contagion of
the Tequila crisis of the late 1994. And although the country
maintained its commitment to a peg under the currency
board arrangement, the reserves of the central bank were
severely depleted and the consequences for the economy
manifest.
The  study  starts  from  a  description  of  the  economic
reforms of the early 1990s that set the framework for the
monetary  and  fiscal  policies  in  place  when  the  crisis  hit.
There is then a discussion on the macro- and microeconom-
ic climate, followed by the description of policy responses to
the  crisis.    The  paper  concludes  with  the  assessment  of
whether the core factors that drove the crisis have been
properly addressed by looking at the post-crisis situation.
2.2. Overview of Economic Situation
Before and During the Crisis
2.2.1.  Reforms  of  the  Early  1990s  and  Crisis
Developments
The 1980s were marked by a series of economic and
financial problems. One of them was chronic inflation and
periodic hyperinflation which led to widespread dollariza-
tion  of  the  economy.  Moreover,  prevailing  public  sector
deficits were crowding out private sector credit (Garcia-
Herrero, 1997). A banking crisis erupted in 1980, and then
developed into a severe currency crisis a year later.  The
next crisis started in 1985 and ended in 1987. The subse-
quent economic plan aimed at lowering inflation resulted in
its outburst in 1989 and the complete dollarization of the
economy  as  investors'  confidence  weakened.  Two  huge
devaluations took place in the late 1989 and in 1990. After
another bout of financial turbulence, one more stabilization
plan failed. The exchange rate, which under earlier plans
had been pegged, was allowed to fluctuate, and all price
controls  were  removed  (Choueiri  and  Kaminsky,  1999).
The difficulties of the period 1989–1990 – mainly as a result
of hyperinflation – allowed for the general recognition of
the need for reforms.
The changes, that put the country on a sustained growth
path began with the Convertibility Plan of 1991. The Convert-
ibility Law, which is still in operation, established the curren-
cy board arrangement. Financial sector reforms followed.
Argentina also eliminated, by 1993, restrictions on capital
flows, relaxed or abolished barriers on imports and exports
and deregulated trade and some professional services. Until
1994, roughly 90% of all state-owned enterprises was pri-
vatized, bringing considerable gains to economic efficiency
[IMF, 1998]. In 1994 Argentina recorded economic growth
of 8%, managed to lower inflation to 4.2% (from over 10%
in 1993 and 25% in 1992), and kept the budget deficit of the
federal government at the level of 0.5% of GDP . The ban-
king sector recorded growth in credits and deposits. From
the early 1990s, capital started to flow in, as a result of
investors' more favourable perception of the region and rel-
atively high interest rates.
At the time, interest rates in the United States were low,
and net flows of portfolio capital to Argentina amounted to
33.7 billion dollars in 1993 and to 8.4 billion in 1994. These
huge capital inflows led to an explosion of domestic credit,
consumption, real estate and stock market booms, and lack
of diversification of bank portfolios [Choueiri and Kaminsky,
1999]. The current account deficit deteriorated as a result
of real exchange rate appreciation. As the U.S. and world
interest rates soared in 1994, the Mexican peso was deva-
lued in December 1994 and the capital outflows brought
about  balance  of  payment  pressures,  the  rumors  about
abandoning the currency board spread out. The Argentine
banking system suffered from a run on deposits, and the
credit  crunch  followed.  Between  December  1994  and
March 1995, the central bank (BCRA) lost 41 percent of its
international reserves, defending the peso-dollar peg. The
banking  system  lost  18%  of  its  deposits  in  five  months
which generated liquidity problems. A number of prudential
regulations  were  introduced  in  early  1995  in  order  to
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restore confidence in the banking system. By the end of the
1995, the deposits went nearly back to their pre-crisis le-
vels and the monetary authorities managed to restore its
gross  international  reserves  [IMF,  1999].  The  currency
board was defended. However some smaller banks conti-
nued to experience problems, and the crisis resulted in a
severe recession. In 1995, real GDP went down by 4%.
Among  the  core  factors  that  allowed  the  transfer  of
external shocks to the real economy and leveraged the cri-
sis were weak links with world financial markets, relatively
underdeveloped domestic financial markets, labor market
rigidities, systematic crowding out, and real exchange rate
inflexibility  imposed  by  the  currency  board  regime
[Caballero, 2000]. All these factors are addressed in the fol-
lowing sections of the paper.  
2.2.2. Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy
From  1991  Argentina  has  followed  a  currency  board
exchange rate arrangement. The currency board is – after
the classical monetary union – the second most rigid form of
the exchange rate regime. In this orthodox form of a fixed
exchange rate regime the role of monetary authorities is
reduced to issuing notes and coins that are fully backed by a
foreign reserve currency on demand at a fixed exchange
rate.  There  is  a  minimum  of  100%  backing  of  reserve
money by net foreign assets of the central bank, and cur-
rency boards often hold excess reserves to offset against
asset valuation changes. These excess reserves are related
to the net worth of a currency board (Pautola and Backé,
1998), because seigniorage can be earned only from interest
on reserves.
The 1991 Convertibility Law and the 1992 Central Bank
Charter created the basis for the functioning of the curren-
cy board in Argentina. The exchange rate of the Argentine
peso was fixed at one against U.S. dollar, and the central
bank was required to keep 100% of its monetary base in
international reserves. However, since 1995 1/3 of it may be
kept  in  the  safe  dollar-denominated  government  bonds
[Hanke,  Schuler,  1999]  while  holdings  of  these  securities
cannot grow by more than 10% per year. These re-gula-
tions eliminated the possibility of inflationary financing of the
government  deficit.  Moreover,  the  charter  restrains  the
central bank from financing provincial or municipal govern-
ments,  public  firms,  or  private  non-financial  sector  [Pou,
2000]. The central bank became fully independent from the
legislative and executive branches of government, and set its
principle goal at maintaining the value of domestic currency.
As can be seen from the above description, the Argen-
tine currency board is not the strictest form of a currency
board where monetary authorities cannot intervene in the
market, cannot act as a lender of last resort, and where
interest  rats  are  solely  market-determined.  Indeed,  the
Central Bank of Argentine Republic (BCRA) has some room
for discretionary monetary policy, because its international
reserves are not fully backed by the domestic currency and
because  it  can  set  reserve  requirements  for  commercial
banks. This ability to retain some flexibility was used during
the 1995 financial crisis.
The  international  reserves  of  BCRA  started  to  shrink
quickly  in  January  1995  when  the  Argentine  peso  came
under a pressure, and when the bank tried to rescue trou-
bled commercial banks (see Figure 2-1). The reserves hit
the lowest level in March 1995, which was around 2/3 of the
monetary base, the minimum coverage requirement. BCRA
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was  then  buying  dollar-denominated  Treasury  bonds,  in
order to mitigate the effects of the credit crunch. The cen-
tral bank's holding of these government notes increased by
25% from 1994 to 1995, and declined sharply afterwards
[Caballero, 2000]. This decline is reflected in the Figure 2-1
as the high indicators of foreign exchange reserves in 1996.
As the central bank was depleting its reserves, interest
rates rose sharply, reflecting a domestic liquidity squeeze
and rise in the country risk premium. The real interest rate
differential vs. U.S. deposit rate reached above 11 percent-
age points, while during 1994, its value was close to 2. High
interest rates induced the private sector to lower demand
for credit [1] and reduce expenditures. Banks cut their cred-
it lines and refinancing facilities. All these factors contributed
to a decline in the economic activity in 1995 and to higher
unemployment [Catao, 1997].
2.2.3. Fiscal Policy
Through the early Convertibility Plan years, the govern-
ment was running budget deficits. The central government
budget  deficit  averaged  0.5%  of  GDP  during  the  years
1991–1994 – with a surplus only in 1993. The deficit of the
consolidated public sector (including federal budget, provin-
cial government budgets, and off-budgetary funds and pro-
grams) averaged 1.8% of GDP , with 2.5% of GDP in 1994.
The crisis year of 1995 was marked with the 1.5% deficit of
central government budget, and 4.3% deficit of the whole
public sector.
According to the IMF calculations, fiscal policies were
pro-cyclical in the early 1990s, with public sector deficits ris-
ing faster than the cyclically adjusted public sector balance
[IMF, 1999]. During this period (1991–1994), when output
was growing above potential and fiscal impulse was expan-
sionary, the lowering of inflation has been achieved by the
nominal exchange rate anchor and the supply-side oriented
reforms, such as change in the tax system, and elimination of
distortionary tariffs. Only from 1995 onwards, as the coun-
try slipped into recession, did the fiscal impulse start to have
a  negative  impact  on  demand,  thus  contributing  to  the
reduction,  and  finally  to  the  elimination  of  inflation  [IMF,
1999]. 
Tax reform aimed at eliminating some taxes and shift-
ing  the  relative  tax  incidence  from  production  to  con-
sumption  and  incomes  was  implemented  in  the  early
1990s.  Many  distortionary  taxes,  such  as  those  on
exports, bank debits and assets, with a yield about 3% of
GDP , were removed. Some exemptions, mainly from VAT,
as  well  as  subsidies,  were  abolished.  To  improve  labor
market  flexibility,  the  government  significantly  reduced
the employer payroll tax in some sectors (reversed for a
couple of months during the 1995 crisis). There was also
a significant decline in the number of workers employed
by the state as efforts to improve efficiency in the public
sector  were  undertaken  (the  provinces  started  to  be
responsible  for  the  health  and  education  services  [IMF ,
1999]).  New  and  stronger  laws  increased  the  govern-
ment's ability to control tax evasion.
Pension reform, aimed at shifting from the pay-as-you-
go publicly funded system to a system combining public
transfers and private capitalization, started in mid-1994.
The reform resulted in the reduction of future liabilities of
the public sector. However, the immediate costs for the
budget are estimated to be around one percent of GDP
per year, as the government pays the contribution to the
private system for those who voluntarily opted to shift
away from the pay-as-you-go scheme.  In any event, these
costs appeared first in the consolidated budget in 1996,
exactly one year after the currency crisis, and thus the
consequences of this reform for the fiscal sector are not
explored further.
2.2.4. Private and Public Debt
The reforms of the early 1990s allowed Argentina to
return to the voluntarily financing of its external debt, which
was rescheduled under the Brady Plan [Pou, 2000]. The
developments in borrowing from the international capital
markets, both public and private, have moved in the direc-
tion of declining spreads, the lengthening of maturity, and
[1] There were also other factors contributing to the decline of the private sector demand for credit, such as crowding out by government bor-
rowing, which turned to domestic banks for financing its monetary interventions in 1995, such as providing troubled banks with fresh credit.
Table 2-1. Interest rates, 1994–1995 
1994 1995
10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Prime deposit rate 8.27 8.72 9.55 10.65 11.64 19.38 19.07 15.54 10.83 10.24 9.17 9.21 8.92
Lending rate 9.83 10.00 13.56 18.06 19.06 34.05 26.45 22.13 16.19 14.57 13.29 13.26 12.55
Real interest rate
differential
1.94 1.99 2.08 2.17 3.30 11.65 11.36 8.40 4.29 4.07 3.31 3.86 3.73
Source: IFS, own calculations
Note: real interest rate differential is calculated as the difference between real Argentine deposit rates and real U.S. deposit rates26
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the  fixed  rate  nature  of  the  debt  (IMF,  1998).  However,
these developments were for some time reversed after the
1995 crisis.
Total external debt rose sharply in 1995 and in 1996, and
a large part of this change can be attributed to the rise of
short-term debt. The debt of the public sector rose mainly
because more bonds were issued in 1995 and 1996. Out-
standing public debt attributable to the bond issues amount-
ed to $12.4 billion in 1994, while in 1995 and 1996, the
value rose to $14.8 billion and $23.5 billion respectively.
Average maturity of the international public bonds issued in
1995 actually slightly increased in comparison with the pre-
vious year (from 4.8 to 5.0 years).
The sharp fall in the average maturity of bonds issued
in 1995 shown in the private sector, where this maturity
decreased from 4.5 years in 1994 to 2.6 years. The spread
significantly  increased.  As  the  government  was  issuing
more  international  bonds  in  1995,  the  value  of  bonds
issued by the private sector fell dramatically, to less than
$1 billion, and returned to their pre-crisis value in 1996.
However, the relatively small size of total private external
debt suggests weak access to international financial mar-
kets of the private sector. 
2.2.5. Savings and Investment
Typically  for  a  fast-growing  economy,  Argentina  was
dependent  on  foreign  savings  to  carry  out  investments
necessary  in  order  to  sustain  its  economic  growth.
Domestic resource gap, which has been in place during the
1990s,  resulted  mainly  from  low  domestic  savings.  The
rate of investment, although significantly higher than sav-
ings,  was  still  lower  than  investment  rates  for  Central
Table 2-2. Main economic indicators, 1991–1997
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Real GDP growth 5.7% 8.0% -4.0% 4.8% 8.6%
Nominal GDP (millions of peso) 226 847 236 505 257 440 258 032 272 150 292 859
CPI inflation 24.9% 10.6% 4.2% 3.4% 0.2% 0.5%
Unemployment Rate 7.2% 9.1% 11.7% 15.9% 16.3%
Structure of GDP*:
    Agriculture 6.0% 6.7% 6.4% 7.0% 6.9% 6.6%
    Industry 30.7% 32.6% 32.3% 32.1% 32.1% 32.9%
    Services 63.3% 60.8% 61.2% 60.9% 60.9% 60.5%
General Government Balance (as % of
GDP)
-0.2% 0.9% -0.5% -1.5% -2.4%
Public Sector Balance (as % of GDP) -0.5% -0.9% -2.5% -4.3% -4.2%
Broad money (M2) monetization 11.2% 16.3% 19.4% 18.8% 21.1% 24.0%
Population (millions) 33.42 33.87 34.32 34.77 35.22 35.67
Source: IFS, WDI, own calculations based on the IFS and WDI data
Note: * structure of GDP from 1992 is not fully comparable with later data
Table 2-3. Argentine external debt, 1992–1996
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT 68 345 70 576 77 434 83 536 93 841
   In % of GDP 29.8% 29.8% 30.0% 32.4% 34.5%
Total long-term debt 49 855 58 403 66 052 67 235 75 348
   Public and publicly guaranteed 47 611 52 034 55 832 55 970 62 392
   Private non-guaranteed 2 244 6 369 10 220 11 265 12 956
Total short-term debt 16 176 8 653 7 171 10 170 12 200
Total short-term debt (% of total
external debt)
23.7% 12.3% 9.3% 12.2% 13.0%
Source: Global Development Finance, 1998, and own calculations based on IFS and GDF 
Table 2-4. Savings and investment (in percent of GDP), 1994-1997
1994 1995 1996 1997
Gross national savings (% of GDP) 16.3 16.5 15.5 16.3
Gross national investment (% of GDP) 20.0 18.0 17.7 20.0
Source: IMF (1999)27
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European countries in the mid-1990s, or than the invest-
ment ratios of Southern European countries in the 1980s.
It can be seen from the comparison of capital flows
that  the  majority  of  this  domestic  resource  gap  was
financed through foreign direct investment.
2.2.6. Foreign Trade
One of the reforms of the Convertibility Plan involved
the elimination of all tariffs on exports and the majority of
non-tariff barriers on imports. Imports tariffs have been
cut form over 40% average rate in 1989 [IMF , 1998] to
8.4% at the end of 1994, with a zero rate on capital goods
and raw materials. This eliminated distortions in foreign
trade.
Argentina is an exporter of raw materials and some
lightly processed primarily products. These primary and
agro-industrial products account for 70% of all exports,
and are subject to high fluctuations in world prices. Since
1990, there has been a quick rise of manufacturing exports
to  Brazil,  following  the  creation  of  MERCOSUR  (South
American customs union). But still, in 1994 this number
was  below  25%  of  total  value  of  exports.  Generally,
because  of  high  commodity  concentration,  Argentine
exports have been highly volatile. 
Following  the  removal  of  restrictions  and  high  eco-
nomic growth, Argentine imports between 1991 and 1997
was growing more than four times as fast as real GDP .
Catao and Falcetti (1999) estimated that long-run income
elasticity of imports was above 2 during this period, and
that this elasticity showed some pro-cyclical behavior. It
should be noted that between 1991 and 1995, the real
exchange rate kept appreciating, which also explains the
rapid growth of imports at this time, but not as much as
booming economic activity. Over 50% of imports in 1994
came from the US, the EC and Japan.
Trade deficits in place since the early 1990s were main-
ly driven by high dependency on world prices for exports,
soaring domestic demand and incomes, together with real
appreciation toyical or most emerging markets. Trade sur-
pluses  of  1995–1996  were  taking  place  because  world
prices  for  traditional  Argentine  exports  increased,  the
economy stepped into one-year long recession and there
was a fall in the real effective exchange rate during the
Tequila crisis.
2.2.7. Balance of Payments
Argentina  has  been  systematically  running  current
account deficits in the 1990s, which is a typical feature of
an  emerging  economy.  Even  in  the  absence  of  trade
deficits, as in 1995 when imports fell because of the reces-
sion, the negative current account balance was caused by
the outflows of the investment incomes. As 1995 showed,
the current account deficit had to be financed by foreign
borrowing, following changes in the investors' preferences
and the sudden outflow of short-term capital.
It should be noted that there have been large inflows
of portfolio capital during the two years preceding the cri-
sis. Net inflows of short-term capital in 1993 amounted to
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around 15% of Argentine GDP , which was at that time 16
times more than the net inflows of long-term investment. 
However, Foreign Direct Investment inflows have been
growing  systematically  during  the  analyzed  period,
notwithstanding the 1995 decline in real output. The pri-
mary reasons being prevailing international conditions, the
implementation of structural reforms by Argentina, priva-
tization,  and  the  elimination  of  restrictions  on  foreign
investors, as well as the removal of restrictions on capital
transactions in general [IMF, 1998]. Since the beginning of
the 1990s, there have been no capital controls on financial
or commercial operations between residents and nonresi-
dents [BCRA, 2000].
The significant rise in FDI flows in 1995 and in 1996 can
be attributed mainly to the creation of the private pension
funds, and to the sales of private firms to foreign investors
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Table 2-5. Balance of payments (mil. USD), 1992–1997
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Current account balance -5 521 -8 030 -10 992 -4 985 -6 521 -11 954
Trade balance -1 396 -2 364 -4 139 2 357 1 760 -2 123
   Exports of goods 12 399 13 269 16 023 21 161 24 043 26 431
   Imports of goods -13 795 -15 633 -20 162 -18 804 -22 283 -28 554
Non-factor services (net) -2 463 -3 221 -3 692 -3 326 -3 366 -4 178
Investment income -2 393 -2 931 -3 567 -4 529 -5 331 -6 089
Current transfers (net) 731 486 406 513 416 436
Capital and financial account 7 350 20 328 11 155 4 623 11 175 16 826
   Direct investment (net) 3 218 2 059 2 477 3 818 4 922 5 099
   Portfolio investment (net) 4 513 33 731 8 389 1 864 9 727 11 087
   Other investment (net) -381 -15 462 289 -1 059 -3 474 640
      General government -1 343 -10 196 969 1 197 -199 136
      Bank 76 -570 761 2 570 -2 744 -1 615
      Other sectors 739 -697 -1 423 -4 832 -567 2 130
Net error and omissions 54 -1 173 -872 -1 853 -1 316 -1 498
Overall balance 1 883 11 125 -709 -2 215 3 338 3 374
Financing -1 883 -11 125 709 2 215 -3 338 -3 374
   Reserve assets -3 264 -4 279 -685 82 -3 875 -3 293
   Use of IMF credits -73 1 211 455 1 924 367 -38
   Exceptional financing 1 454 -8 057 938 209 170 -43
Source: IMF IFS
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Source: own calculations based on the data from Argentine Ministry of Economy and IMF IFS29
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[IMF, 1998]. Net FDI flows accounted for around 1% of
GDP in 1992–1994 and for 1.7% on average, during the
period 1995–1997. However, there was almost no change
in the aggregate existing foreign investment stock, which
averaged around $3.5 billion per year during the period
1992–1995. Its structure, though, has been changing, indi-
cating faster growth of FDI non-related to the privatiza-
tion opportunities. FDI grew most rapidly in the commu-
nications and manufacturing sectors. Significant privatiza-
tion-related investment flows were recorded also for the
electricity, gas and water and for the petroleum industries.
Around  40%  of  all  FDI  coming  to  Argentina  during
1992–1995 originated in the USA.
Despite the important role of huge inflows of portfolio
investment in 1993, capital inflows (both private and pub-
lic) constituted a relatively small fraction of GDP for a fast
growing  economy.  During  1992–1994,  while  GDP  was
increasing  by  7.8%  per  year,  overall  capital  flows  [2]
amounted to 4.9% of GDP . This suggests that the link of
Argentine financial market with international financial mar-
kets was weak. As it was visible in 1995, this significantly
constrained government ability to use international financ-
ing  when  there  was  an  external  shock.  Official  capital
flows depicted on the Figure 2-3, rose in 1995 supported
by loans from IADB and the World Bank.
2.2.8. Real and Nominal Rigidities
As there was little room for monetary policy, the bur-
den of adjustment during 1995 fell on wages and prices.
Argentina has a European-style labor market with centra-
lized bargaining, high severance costs, and still high – on
average – wage taxes. These rigidities – both nominal and
real – amplified external financial shock by forcing a larger
share of adjustment on output and employment. This was
costly, since unemployment has stayed well above 10%,
even in 1999.
In  addition,  real  exchange  rate  inflexibility,  brought
about the convertibility regime, combined with labor mar-
ket rigidities and limited access to financial markets made
the 1995 fall in output worse [Caballero, 2000].
2.2.9. Banking System
The introduction of the Convertibility Plan markedly
changed the Argentine banking sector. High inflation and
macroeconomic volatility of the 1980s, together with large
capital flight, caused the demand for domestic money to
decline heavily. The ratio of broad money (M3) bottomed
at  6  percent  of  the  GDP  in  1990,  the  overall  sum  of
deposits of the banking system was low, and real interest
rates on deposits were negative. Thus, the banking system
reforms  of  the  early  1990s  focused  primarily  on  the
strengthening of the whole system and on removing obsta-
cles to financial intermediation [IMF, 1998].
The introduction of the simplified system of reserve
requirements began in 1991. The rates on both foreign
and domestic currency transactions were unified, and the
adherence to these requirements was made more effec-
tive.  New  capital  adequacy  requirements,  incorporating
lending interest rate risk factor, were put in place, and
they have been gradually tightened. The loan classification,
portfolio risk rules and provisioning rules were introduced
in 1994. The supervisory role of the financial superinten-
dence was reinforced in order to verify compliance with
all the prudential standards. The overall result of these
regulations was visible in the fall of outstanding central
bank credits to financial institutions [IMF , 1998]. The risk-
weighted capital to assets ratio rose to 11.5% in January
1995, well above the 8% Basle standard [Pou, 2000]. The
reserve requirements averaged 17.5% of deposits [IMF ,
1998].
The reforms of the early 1990s removed the barriers
of entry and increased competition between banks. They
were aimed at ensuring the safety of individual banks and
the whole banking system. They also intended to reduce
moral hazard. These issues were very important, since
under the currency board, the BCRA role as the lender of
last resort was very limited. Basically, the central bank
was not allowed to provide liquidity to the banks in finan-
cial trouble. The BCRA was able to conduct intervention
through  repo  operations,  but  this  was  limited  to  the
smoothing of fluctuations in the interbank market. The
Convertibility  Law allowed  extending  credit  to  financial
institutions in the emergency situation only [IMF, 1998].
2.2.9.1.  Developments  during  December  1994-
March 1995
As the fears about the possible abandoning of the peg,
triggered by the Mexican devaluation, intensified, and as
Argentine debt prices kept falling, banks experienced a
run on deposits. This situation is shown on the Figure 4,
describing effective growth rates of loans and deposits
[3]. As the depositors started to withdraw their funds, it
initially affected wholesale banks, whose loan portfolios
were  composed  mainly  of  government  bonds,  then
spread to the entire banking system. In 1995, the BCRA
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started to use its reserves to provide funds to banks. The
central bank lost nearly 20% of its monetary base cove-
rage [IMF, 1998] [4], which was the limit of the interven-
tion  allowed  as  a  response  to  crisis  situation.  Despite
these efforts, the loss of deposits resulted in a huge cre-
dit crunch. 
It should be noted that an important feature of the
Argentine banking system at the time were the problem
loans, accounting for more than 10% of the total loan
portfolio  in  1994.  Moreover,  they  have  not  been  uni-
formly distributed [IMF, 1998]. This factor was responsi-
ble for some of the changes in the banks' assets that hap-
pened in the early 1995. Another important factor was
the  lack  of  official  deposits  insurance,  which,  coupled
with the restricted role of the BCRA as a lender of last
resort, intensified the perception of deposit risk.
During the early phase of the run of deposits, there
has been a visible shift to quality. First of all, this meant
that depositors started to convert peso deposits to dollar
deposits, expecting the devaluation. This is shown on Fi-
gure 5. While the peso deposits of the whole banking sys-
tem have been falling since December 1994, the dollar
deposits were still growing in February 1995. Then the
fall in the dollar deposits was less pronounced, and after
mid-1995 they quickly started to build up again. At the
same time, peso deposits stayed at a relatively unchanged
level until the end of the year. We can see that the reco-
very of deposits in the Argentine banking system towards
the end of 1995 was attributable mainly to the increase in
the amount of foreign currency deposits. 
Secondly, the non-uniform distribution of the problem
loans meant that small public provincial banks had a dis-
proportionately  bigger  share  of  non-performing  loans
than the larger banks. When the run on deposits started,
these small banks suffered more, as their depositors start-
ed to move funds to the larger banks. Public provincial
banks lost their market share (from 12.8% of total assets
in  1994  to  9.6%  in  1995),  while  private  banks  gained.
While 56.7% of total assets belonged to the private banks
in 1994, the share increased to 58.6% at the end of 1995.
The market share of the large national banks remained
relatively unchanged at around 30% of total assets [Bur-
disso et. al, 1998]. It is claimed that although part of the
small banks market share was lost as a result of privatiza-
tion following the crisis, an important fraction was gone
due to a change in the market perception of their credit
risk.
Another way of looking at the situation of the small
banks during the Tequila crisis is to examine their indica-
tors of profitability. Return on total assets of the 20 largest
banks  remained  relatively  stable  and  generally  positive
during the years 1994–1997, while the profitability of total
retail banking sector was much more volatile, often nega-
tive, and fell sharply during the first months of 1995 [Bur-
disso and D'Amato, 1999]. This situation increased the
contagion, as some banks have virtually found themselves
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[4] Around 30% of usable foreign exchange reserves according to the author's calculations (see Figure 2-1).
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short  of  liquid  assets  what  affected  even  a  number  of
apparently solvent institutions [IMF, 1998]. The full-scale
run on banks started in February 1995.
2.2.9.2. Role of Private, Public and Foreign
Ownership
Although  the  privatization  process  started  in  early
1993, following the remonetization of the Argentine econ-
omy and the redefinition of the role of the public sector,
only after the Tequila crisis did this process gain momen-
tum. Until early 1995, only 3 banks had been privatized
[Burdisso et. al, 1998]. At the end of the 1994 there were
135 private banks – both foreign and domestically owned
– in Argentina. They accounted for over 50% of the whole
banking system assets. 33 public banks were on average
larger: they had 30% (national) and 13% (provincial) of
the market share [Burdisso et. al, 1998].
Following  the  removal  of  restrictions  on  foreign
investment and capital flows of the early 1990s, the num-
ber of foreign banks in Argentina increased. However, in
1994 they still accounted for under 20% of system assets
only [Goldberg et. al, 2000]. When comparing their loan
portfolios to those of the state-owned banks, it shows
that the foreign banks had lower mortgage shares and
higher shares of commercial, government, private and
other  lending.  Foreign  banks  were  similar  under  this
respect to the domestic private banks. However, the for-
eign banks were perceived as generally safer and health-
ier. The loan growth rates of the foreign banks were sub-
stantially higher than the respective rates of the domes-
tic banks in 1994, and they continued to grow faster even
during the crisis period [Goldberg et. al, 2000].
According to the research of D'Amato et. al (1997),
bank "fundamentals" – such as their profitability and level
of interest rates – as well as the overall macroeconomic
situation were very important in driving the dynamics of
deposits. However, there is evidence of contagion effects
in the group of small and medium-sized banks on which
public information was poorer.
2.2.10. Domestic Financial Market
The financial markets in 1994–1995 had tenuous links
with  the  international  markets.  As  already  mentioned,
the relatively small inflows of capital relative to the size
of the economy bear this out. Another argument in favor
of the weak link with the world markets is the fact that
foreign capital focused mainly on large enterprises, and
that  the  smaller  companies  had  difficult  access  to  the
international markets. During the early months of 1995,
the volatility of the stock index for prime companies and
the overall stock index substantially differed. The volatil-
ity  of  stock  index  for  prime  companies  (MERVAL)
increased  significantly,  while  the  volatility  of  the  total
market index remained relatively unchanged [Caballero,
2000]. Notwithstanding volatility, values of both MERVAL
(see Figure 2-6) and total stock market index have been
relatively  low  from  December  1994  until  the  end  of
1995. 
There was also a large spread-premium on Argentine
sovereign bonds relative to the U.S. throughout this time,
which further confirms the country risk-premium and its
weak ties with international financial markets. Moreover,
Argentine markets are still underdeveloped by interna-
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tional standards. The broad money, loans, and the stock
market  capitalization  (see  Table  2-2  and  Figure  2-6)
expressed  as  a  fraction  of  GDP  are  relatively  low
[Caballero, 2000].
Stock  market  capitalization  reached  over  50%  of
GDP in Chile, more than 25% in Mexico, around 40% of
GDP in Spain and Portugal, and about 100% in the U.S.
in 1997. The figure in Argentina was well below 20% of
GDP  during  the  period  of  1993–1996.  Broad  money
monetization, which stayed during the years 1993–1996
at around 19% of GDP in Argentina, had on average val-
ues around 25% of GDP in Brazil and Mexico. Leaving
aside  well  developed,  leading  markets,  Argentine  per-
formed poorly even when compared to other countries
in the region.
The consequences of the weak financial links and the
sub-development of the domestic market became visible
during the 1995 crisis. When the country found itself near
the limit of access to international markets, this hampered
the swift allocation of resources.
2.2.11. Private and Public Sector
Prior to the crisis, the enterprise sector was almost
entirely private, as during 1991–1994 around 90% of all
state-owned enterprises were privatized [IMF , 1998]. This
move increased productivity, brought significant gains in
the reallocation of resources as the public sector shrank,
but also boosted unemployment.
Despite a large and expanding private sector, there were
considerable differences in the growth prospects between
larger enterprises and agricultural producers together with
small industrial enterprises located in the countryside. Diffi-
cult access to bank credit may serve as an example. 
Although the size of the private sector has became more
and more important since the beginning of the 1990s, one
of the problems of the post-crisis period was the lack of
recovery  of  private  sector  credit.  It  is  claimed  that  its
growth has been repressed by huge government borrow-
ings from the domestic market, which took place during
1995.  As  the  government  turned  to  domestic  banks  for
financing its monetary interventions during the Tequila crisis
(Figure 2-7) while facing external constraints, the private
sector credits have been crowded out [Caballero, 2000].
The fast consolidation process in the banking system also
enhanced this trend [5].
2.3. Political Situation and Management
of the Crisis
It is believed that the run on deposits of March 1995
was also caused by the bad perception of the current polit-
CASE Reports No. 39
[5] As many of the local branches of the wholesale and cooperative banks disappeared after 1995, the information concerning their clients' credit-
worthiness was not available (there was no countrywide credit rating system). There is evidence that the surviving banks were unwilling to "screen"
their potential clients and did not want to lend to unknown borrowers from the countryside. Larger share of resources was then used to buy govern-
ment bonds and improving liquidity position [Catao, 1997]. 
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ical  and  economic  policy  related  situation.  There  were
uncertainties  concerning  short-term  fiscal  policy,
enhanced by the incoming presidential elections (on the
May 14th). As the election system changed, the incumbent
president needed over 50% of votes to avoid the second
round. There was no IMF program in place at this time
[D'Amato et. al, 1997].
Towards the end of April, the central bank charter has
been changed slightly to allow a more flexible use of redis-
counts in order to help banks. This move was misinter-
preted  as  a  relaxation  of  the  currency  board  regime.
Moreover, there have been spreading rumors about the
possibility  of  suspending  convertibility  of  bank  deposits
[D'Amato et. al, 1997]. 
The monetary operations of the BCRA linked with the
announcement of the new fiscal package after an agree-
ment with the IMF, stopped the fall of deposits during the
period between March and May 1995. The IMF, as well as
other  international  institutions  promised  a  significant
amount  of  financing  [6]  [D'Amato  et.  al,  1997].  And
indeed, there has been net inflow of $1.9 billion until the
end of the year.
The dynamics of the recovery of deposits after May
1995  varied  according  to  their  types.  First  of  all,  this
recovery can be attributable mainly to the dollar deposits,
as  the  time  was  needed  to  restore  confidence  in  the
domestic currency. Secondly, the quickest response came
from the deposits of the large national public banks, and
then from the foreign banks. These groups of banks were
the first to start regaining their deposits. The cooperative
banks and interior banks still suffered the largest fall in
deposits in mid-1995.
The immediate response of the monetary authorities
to  the  crisis  situation  was  primarily  directed  towards
improving  the  liquidity  of  the  banking  system.  The
authorities lowered reserve requirements and provided
troubled  banks  with  fresh  credits  (thus  depleting  the
reserves of the BCRA in April-May 1995) through swaps
and rediscounts of prolonged maturity. This was allowed
due to the already mentioned modification of the central
bank  charter.  The  BCRA  acknowledged  rediscounts
beyond 30-day window in case of systemic liquidity prob-
lems [IMF, 1998]. Two Fiduciary Funds were created: one
to facilitate mergers and acquisitions within the private
banking sector, and the other to foster the privatization
of both provincial banks and firms [Burdisso et. al, 1998].
The  temporary  safety  net  redistributing  the  liquidity
within the system and controlled by the largest national
banks  was  created,  as  well  as  a  privately  managed
deposit insurance scheme. This deposit insurance system
was founded with compulsory contributions of financial
institutions as a surcharge on deposits. The scheme has
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Source: own calculations based on IFS data
[6] On April 6, 1995, the IMF approved the fourth year extension of the extended Fund facility (EFF) for Argentina. The three-year EFF, approved
initially in 1992, was supposed to support Argentina's medium-term economic and financial program. With the extended program, in April 1995, about
US$1.6 million was immediately available to Argentina, and the rest (US$1.2 million) have been disbursed in three quarterly installments. One year later,
the IMF approved a stand-by credit for Argentina of about US$1 million over the next 21 months, in support of the government 1996–1997 econom-
ic and financial program [IMF, 1995 and 1996].34
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an upper limit per depositor in order to hamper moral
hazard [IMF, 1998]. 
As the confidence in the banking system was restored,
deposits  kept  mounting,  and  the  interest  rate  spreads
started to decline, the government commenced the intro-
duction  of  new  prudential  measures.  Generally,  these
measures were aimed at further raising the liquidity of
financial institutions, capital to assets ratios, addressed still
existing  information  asymmetries  in  the  credit  market,
and improved the existing payment system [IMF, 1998].
In  1995,  the  reserve  requirements  were  still  being
replaced by liquidity requirements, with rates depending
of the residual times of maturity [7] [BCRA, 2000]. These
requirements have been gradually tightened over time by
increasing their rates [8] and extending their applicability
to other types of bank liabilities. The purpose of this move
was to improve the public perception of individual banks'
liquidity position and limit imprudent lending policies as
there  is  evidence  that  the  public  discriminated  against
"good" and "bad" banks on the basis of their perceived liq-
uidity position during the Tequila crisis.
Between  1996  and  1997,  the  authorities  further
strengthened banks' capacity to withstand liquidity short-
ages by the creation of a contingent repo facility between
the BCRA and a group of 13 major international banks.
This agreement allows to swap a collateral – Argentine
government securities owned by the central bank or by
domestic financial institutions – for up to $ 7.3 billion in
cash  [IMF,  1998].  Capital  to  assets  ratio  was  further
increased by the incorporation of a new weighting system
that takes into account market risk factors, as well as by
the increased role of the regulator of banks. There were
also steps towards the improvements in the information
about debtors available to financial institutions (addressing
adverse  selection  problem),  as  well  as  about  individual
banks. There were also significant improvements in the
functioning of the payment system, which today consists
of a real-time gross settlement scheme and three auto-
mated clearinghouses [Pou, 2000].
It is claimed that the "second set" of prudential measures
significantly improved the liquidity of the system, as there
was no system-large run on banks during the Brazilian crisis.
2.4. Post-Crisis Developments
Domestic  financial  markets  have  grown  visibly  since
1994. Some indicators, such as monetization or stock mar-
ket capitalization, show gradual improvement. Neverthe-
less, the rise of private sector credit has been constrained
for a long time. Credit to the private sector has basically
did not recover until only very recently.
The banking system increased significantly, and became
generally  healthier.  Regulations  implemented  after  the
1995 reduced its exposure to external shocks. As a result
of  consolidation  within  private  banks,  privatizations  and
closures, the number of banks declined to 119 in 1999.
Several smaller, provincial banks, which were not trans-
parent and suffered during the 1995 run, have been priva-
tized.  Non-performing  assets  in  the  banking  sector
decreased  significantly.  They  accounted  for  8%  of  total
assets  in  private  banks  and  for  13%  in  public  banks  in
1997.
There is a need for further fiscal adjustment. The sup-
ply-side  rigidities  should  be  addressed,  so  that  external
shocks will not affect the real economy as quickly as in
1995.
The public sector is still running large deficits which is
a problem. It is argued that around 1% of GDP of these
deficits per year can be attributed to the pension reform,
effective since 1996, and thus should improve future effi-
ciency. Nevertheless, as the external conditions hardened
again in 1998–1999, public sector deficits went up to over
4% of Argentine's GDP .
The country risk still remains high and was increasing
during the Asian, Russian, and Brazilian crises. The ratio of
broad money to GDP – although growing over time – is
low by international standards. Similar to the Argentine
country risk, also interest rates were rising in response to
the recent currency crises. Although the increases, which
took place in 1998 and 1999, were significantly lower than
during 1995, the rates stayed high for a long period, and
finally soared in 2000.
The  high  interest  rates  in  the  period  of  1999–2000
reflect significant decreases in consumer and business con-
fidence, and the progressive hardening of the borrowing
conditions  on  international  financial  markets  [9]  (and
hence  the  suppressed  access  to  foreign  borrowing  for
Argentine investors). The slow recovery from recession
affecting  Argentine  economy  since  mid-1998,  has  also
been  attributable  to  the  impact  of  fiscal  tightening  on
domestic demand, the political uncertainties (new govern-
ment  taking  office  in  1999)  reflecting  doubts  about  the
course of economic policy, and the downturn of trading
partner demand.
Argentine GDP fell by 3.4% in 1999, and according to
the preliminary data, by 0.2% in 2000 [IMF , 2001]. There
has been consumer price deflation, and the significant fall in
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[8] To reach 20% of most banking liabilities in 1998; the rate substantially higher than in other countries of the region.
[9] High U.S. interest rates, and reduced access to international financial markets for emerging economies in general.35
The Episodes of Currency Crisis in Latin...
export volume. Trade balance improved in 2000, but main-
ly as a result of suppressed imports. Domestic investment
fell to 16% of GDP , and domestic savings – to less than
13% of domestic production. External public debt reached
32% of GDP in 2000, and public finances deteriorated. To
ease the government financing constraint, the authorities
have secured a financial support package of about US$39
billion, including an augmented stand-by agreement with
the  IMF,  credits  from  the  Inter-American  Development
Bank  and  the  World  Bank,  and  a  loan  from  Spain.  The
authorities plan to enforce a program aimed at promoting
private and public sector investment, ensuring fiscal sus-
tainability, and reduce the public debt burden in the medi-
um term. GDP is projected to grow above 2% in 2001.
On  the  positive  side,  there  was  no  full-scale  run  on
banks during the recent episodes of financial turbulence in
the emerging markets. And, in aggregate, there was neither
a loss of deposits, nor a loss of credits when looking at the
annual data – although their growth has slowed markedly.
Even though these recent crises precipitated the recession,
there was neither international, nor domestic capital flight
from the banking system. The result of a financial stress test
indicates that Argentinean banks appear to be well insulat-
ed from the interest rate risk. In April 2000, they were
found able to withstand a flight of deposits of an amount
twice as large as in 1995 [IMF, 2000].
Coming  back  to  the  Tequila  crisis,  the  main  factors
responsible for spreading out the 1995 crisis seem to be,
in their majority, addressed. However, there is still a need
to further deepen financial markets, as well as to broaden
the role of the private sector. As the developments that
took place in 1999–2000 showed, fiscal-side reforms need
to be addressed, if the country wants to emerge on a sus-
tained growth path while maintaining the currency board
regime.  Similarly,  the  labor  market  reforms  should  be
implemented to allow for more flexibility.
2.5. Conclusions
There is evidence that the 1995 Argentine financial crisis
coexisted with weak credibility of the currency board and
risk-averse investors. A calibration of a model of contagious
currency crisis to Argentine data done by Choueiri (1999)
shows that if we are to believe that investors were sufficient-
ly risk-averse, this financial turmoil could be attributed to the
Tequila effect from the Mexican devaluation alone. Moreover,
the economic fundamentals of Argentine economy did not
matter in triggering the crisis [Choueiri, 1999].
Although there were speculative attacks on the peso,
Argentina did not devalue the currency. Instead, the mon-
etary authorities depleted its exchange reserves, and real
interest rates rose. This situation matches the definition of
a currency crisis given by Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz
(1994). The currency crisis occurred, although there was
no change in the nominal exchange rate. As a result of cur-
rency pressures, the bank runs followed.
The  characteristics  of  the  1995  Argentine  crisis  are
perfectly captured by the second-generation theoretical
models of the currency crises. Speculations about the pos-
sible  devaluation  of  the  Argentine  peso  increased  the
probability of this devaluation. The authorities were then
facing a choice between short-term and long-term eco-
nomic goals. The government had reasons both to aban-
don the peg and to defend it, but the latter only at a cer-
tain cost. Finally, the currency pressure was not directly
related to economic fundamentals.
The interesting question is what would happen if the
monetary authorities decided to devalue the peso. First of
all, it should be noted that Argentina, with its high exter-
nal debt stock, was financially fragile. Large real deprecia-
tion would have surely risen country risk premium. From
this point of view, if the devaluation had taken place in
1995, it would have had destabilizing effects, to the finan-
cial system in particular.
On the other hand, as the real exchange rate was depre-
ciating  gradually  following  the  crisis,  real  interest  rates
stayed high for long, thus adversely affecting investment and
output. It is then tempting to assume that if a country had
decided to devalue, the current output and employment
would not have fall as much as they did in 1995. However,
is it a possible outcome? Firstly, it should be remembered
that when the crisis hit, it aggravated the already existing
problems in the banking sector, and in the whole economy
in general. As the experience of some of the East Asian
countries  indicate,  devaluation  does  not  have  to  be  an
immediate remedy, when the real-economy problems lie in
the lack of transparency of the banking and enterprise sec-
tor, even when domestic financial market is relatively well
developed. There is also a problem of an initial overshoot-
ing. And output may fall as well in such situation. Secondly,
Argentine GDP started to rise during the year following the
crisis, and its growth rate has been impressive. It should be
remembered, that the Argentine economy has been grow-
ing,  on  average,  by  4.7%  during  the  period  1991–1999
notwithstanding two recessions [Pou, 2000].
To sum up, it is hard to believe that the Argentine eco-
nomic performance would have been better if the authori-
ties devalued the currency in 1995. The credibility of the
anti-inflationary policy would have been destroyed and the
country risk would have been much higher, indicating high-
er  vulnerability  to  subsequent  external  shocks.  Besides,
there were positive changes in the Argentine banking sys-
tem brought about by the crisis and by the decision to con-
tinue the existing exchange rate policy. It is also doubtful,
whether the real economy response would be much differ-
ent than it was in 1995.
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Appendix: Chronology of the Argentinian Crisis
December 1994 Devaluation of Mexican peso
December 1994 -
February 1995
International: growing perception about Argentina country risk by international investors;
outflow of portfolio capital; prices of the Argentine debt start falling
Domestic: shift to quality in the banking sector (deposit portfolio reallocation towards
dollar deposits and larger banks); fears that the  fixed  exchange  rate  regime  may  be
abandoned
February 1995 BCRA (central bank) slightly changes its charter to allow more flexible use of rediscounts
to aid banks
End of February 1995 Rumors that the authorities are contemplating suspending convertibility of deposits;
Full scale run on deposits
1-22 March 1995 All banks losing deposits
The authorities more actively helping banks – BCRA losing 41% of its foreign reserves,
reducing the monetary base coverage by 20%
Creation  of  the  two  Fiduciary  Funds  to  facilitate  mergers  and  acquisitions  between
private banks and to facilitate privatization of small provincial banks
April 1995 Amendment in the central bank charter which allows more flexible help in providing
liquidity to troubled banks in an emergency situation
March-May 1995 Agreement with IMF about significant financial support and the announcement of a new
fiscal package
Deposits of largest banks stop falling
May-December 1995 BCRA rebuilds its exchange reserves and introduces new set of prudential measures
Falling interest rate spreads
Mergers and acquisitions in the banking system
Gradual recovery of deposits37
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3.1. Introduction
The financial turmoil that erupted in Thailand in 1997
did not fit into any group of models of financial crises exist-
ing in the economic literature at that time. It is just recent-
ly  when  researches  tried  do  develop  the  so-called  third
generation  models.  The  Thai  experience  is  an  example
which confirms that financial crises occur when macroeco-
nomic as well as microeconomic fundamentals experience
vulnerabilities. 
This paper seeks to explore the country-specific factors
lying behind the Thai financial crisis. It provides analysis of
macroeconomic and microeconomic roots of the crisis. It
shows  that  while  macroeconomic  imbalances  played  an
important role, the close relationship among banks, corpo-
rations and the government created additional problems,
which resulted in many bankruptcies and led to a sharp and
unexpected economic downturn. The financial crisis con-
tributed to a sharp contraction in domestic demand and
activity. Also, the paper describes the sequence of the crisis
and its management. 
Having relatively strong macroeconomic fundamentals
(excluding a deteriorating current account balance, falling
investments and some foreign exchange reserve indicators)
the  Thai  authorities  did  not  face  any  dramatic  external
shock as in the second-generation models. In Thailand, as in
all Asian countries there was a boom-bust cycle in segments
of the asset market (stocks, land prices, and real estate)
preceding the currency crisis.
Starting from the late eighties, prudent macroeconomic
policies have supported a period of rapid economic growth
and price stability in Thailand. However, in recent years the
combination of a fixed exchange rate (which was linked to a
basket of other currencies but with a strong dominance of the
U.S. dollar), an increasingly open capital account, and impres-
sive economic growth, attracted short-term capital inflows.
These inflows were often channeled to over-invested sectors
due  to  weak  prudential  regulations  in  the  banking  sector
enhanced  by  risky  investments  and  poor  corporate  gover-
nance [1]. The huge amount of short-term investments left
the economy vulnerable to sudden shifts and external shocks. 
These began to materialize in 1996 as a sudden drop in
exports led to a high current account deficit. At the same
time,  slowing  economic  activity  and  a  weakening  in  the
financial  position  of  banks  and  finance  companies  led  to
debt-servicing difficulties and an increase in non-performing
loans (NPLs). Starting from May 1997, the Thai currency
market was destabilized by a series of currency attacks of
increasing  intensity.  The  Thai  authorities  attempted  to
defend the baht by increasing short-term interest rates and
intervention in the market. As a result, the Bank of Thailand
reserves were depleted, to significant extent, and the baht
depreciated sharply. 
From  the  beginning  of  the  crisis,  economic  policies
have been progressively strengthened through: suspension
of  unlivable  finance  companies,  expenditure  cuts  in  the
central government budget, and an increase in the central
bank interest rates. Probably the most important action
was a change in the Thai exchange rate regime, effective
on July 2, 1997, from the so-called fixed but adjustable peg
to a managed float. Building on these steps, the govern-
ment developed a comprehensive medium-term econom-
ic policy package, which was implemented with the help of
the IMF. It was focused on the stabilization of the curren-
cy and strengthening of the financial system.
3.2. The Way to the Crisis
Simplifying the classification, the economic fundamentals
can be divided into two broad categories: macro and micro-
economic. At the onset of the crisis, macroeconomic fun-
damentals in Thailand remained relatively sound and did not
show many signs of vulnerability. 
Part III.
The 1997 Currency Crisis in Thailand
by Ma³gorzata Antczak
[1] Recent literature, which emphasizes weak banking and financial sectors as one factor in currency crisis, includes Chau-Lau and Chen (1998),
Chang and Velasco (1998), Krugman (1998), and Marshall (1998).40
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In the mid 1980s, Thailand's economy embarked on a
decade  of  rapid  economic  growth.  From  1981  through
1986 growth had averaged 5.5 percent. But from 1987
through 1995 the growth rate almost doubled, averaging
close to 10 percent per annum. The acceleration of eco-
nomic growth was primarily investment-led and the Thai
economy experienced a significant shift in the composition
of production. Thailand became a more industrial econo-
my while the agricultural share of GDP fell by half from
1980 to 1996. Manufacturing production and non-tradable
sector of construction, finance and real estate offset this.
The expansion of investment provided the counterpart for
these  changes.  In  late  1980s,  investment  growth  rates
exceeded  20  percent  per  annum,  almost  doubling  the
growth  rate  of  the  economy.  In  the  1990s  investment
growth rates were rising more in line with overall GDP
rates of growth and the share of investment stabilized at
the level of 40 percent of GDP . 
In  the  early  1990s,  inflation  measured  by  CPI  was
under control and stabilized at the level around 5.8 per-
cent per annum. The price stabilization led to a gradual
decline in nominal interest rates. Demand for high-pow-
ered money in Thailand was relatively stable and broad
money monetization was increasing (Table 3-1), amounting
to 86 percent of GDP in 1997. The central budget indicat-
ed a surplus of 2.4 percent of GDP in 1996. The unem-
ployment  rate  was  very  low  at  1.1  percent  during
1993–97. Investment and saving rates were high, averaging
at the level above 30 percent of GDP . The exception to the
favorable economic outlook was a deteriorating current
account deficit, which rose to 7.8 percent of GDP in the
years  1995–96  and  was  mostly  covered  by  short-term
portfolio investments. 
The deficit reflected private-sector demand for foreign
capital. In the 1980s Thailand's priority was large net capital
inflow promotion, through tax and institutional reforms (see
below) while concurrently developing its financial markets
[2]. Large positive interest rate differentials and a pegged
exchange rate supported this policy. This regime provided a
guarantee  to  short  term  investors  that  they  can  make  a
quick  exit  at  little  or  no  cost.  Authorities'  measures  to
attract foreign capital included:
– Elimination of restrictions on foreign investments,
– Elimination of most barriers on foreign ownership of
export oriented industries [3],
– Granting tax incentives to foreign mutual funds and
investments in the stock market
– Creation of closed-end mutual funds,
[2] In 1992, the authorities approved the establishment of the Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF), which greatly eased access to foreign
financing and expanded short-term inflows. 
[3] Some limitations on foreign ownership were retained in non-export oriented industries and on the maximum foreign ownership of companies
listed on the stock exchange.
Table 3-1. Basic macroeconomic indicators for Thailand
1981-1994 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Real GDP Growth 8.5 9.9 8.9 5.9 -1.8 -10.0 4.0
CPI Inflation average 3.8 5.1 5.8 5.8 5.9 8.5 5.8
Fiscal Balance to GDP Ratio* -0.6 1.9 3.0 2.4 -0.9 -2.4 -1.1
Private Sector Credit to GDP Ratio 90.9 97.5 100.0 122.5 115.1
Current Account to GDP Ratio 5.3 -5.5 -7.8 -7.8 -2.0 12.7 9.0
Financial Account to GDP Ratio 8.4 13.0 10.5 -11.3 -13.0
Gross National Savings to GDP Ratio 35.5 35.6 33.2 31.9 31.1 30.1
Gross Domestic Investments to GDP
Ratio
41.38 43.3 43.7 33.6 19.0 20.4
Broad Money Monetization**
(in percent)
71.0 72.2 75.4 85.9 99.0
Source: Own calculations on the basis of data from the IMF, The World Bank
* Central budget balance (percentage of fiscal-year GDP)
** Monetization of an economy is defined as a ratio of a measure of money to an annualized value of GDP at current prices.
Table 3-2. Net capital inflow to GDP Ratio (in percent) and nominal interest rate differential in Thailand
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Net Capital Inflow 8.5 8.4 8.4 13.0 10.5 -11.3 -13.0
Differential of Interest
Rate 5 5.5 4 4.5 4.8 3.4 -0.4
Source: Own calculations on the basis of data from IFS41
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– Establishing rules for foreign debenture issues by Thai
companies,
– Reduction of taxes on dividends remitted abroad.
The promotion of capital inflows combined with a rapid-
ly growing economy contributed to very substantial net cap-
ital inflow to Thailand in the range of 9–13 percent of GDP
between 1989 and 1995. Between 1991–1996, net capital
inflows amounted to 85 billion U.S. dollars.
The composition of capital inflows evolved, as a growing
proportion of the net inflows had short-term nature (port-
folio and other investments), reaching 95 percent of the
total in 1995 (Figure 3-1). Net direct investment inflows
played a bigger role at the beginning of 1990s reaching its
peak in 1993 at the level of 15 percent of total inflows.
However, net portfolio inflows became more important in
1994, as a result of the mentioned subsequent reforms of
the Thai stock markets and the large interest rate differen-
tial. The contribution of foreign direct investments to a total
capital  inflow  stabilized  at  the  level  of  5–7  percent  in
1994–1996. The continuation of short-term capital inflow
kept the overall balance of payments in surplus helping to
fuel investments and economic growth. Net capital inflow
used  to  be  partially  sterilized.  In  practice,  the  sterilized
intervention maintained high domestic interest rates and a
large wedge between domestic and international interest
rates. It attracted foreign capital even more.
3.2.1. Macroeconomic Signs of Vulnerability
There  were  already  signs  of  Thailand's  vulnerability
before the crisis. The main macroeconomic indicators sig-
naling  a  crisis  were:  the  level  of  official  international
reserves, deterioration in investment, high current account
deficit and excessive credit expansion.
Although the official foreign exchange reserves increased
by 183 percent between 1990 and 1996, they were not suf-
ficient to protect against speculative attacks in the context
of  an  increasing  current  account  deficit  and  short-term
external debt payments.
Traditionally, three months of imports' coverage is con-
sidered a minimum threshold of official foreign exchange
reserves.  The  East  Asian  countries,  apart  from  Korea,
recorded  relatively  safe  reserves  to  imports  ratio  in  the
1990s  (Table  3-3).  This  relates  particularly  to  Thailand.
Although the level of reserves did not indicate the danger of
a currency crisis,  the reserves to short-term debt ratio was
much less favorable. In this respect, Thailand represented
one of the weakest records [Jakubiak, 2000], with interna-
tional reserves below the country's short-term debt obliga-
tions. Three months before the crisis, the ratio of reserves
to short-term external debt indicated the 1.1 coverage of
short-term obligations, two months before the crisis it fell
below 1, and in July 1997 it amounted only to 0.7. The value
of this indicator in Thailand showed that reserves did not
exceed official and officially guaranteed short-term debt in
the pre-crisis period. 
Another important indicator is the ratio of international
reserves to base money. Thailand recorded relatively safe
levels of backing in the years prior to the crisis, but substan-
tially lower during the last months preceding the crisis. The
ratio of reserves to base money was falling from about 2.5
in July 1996 to 1.5 in the time of crisis in July 1997 what indi-
cated the increasing financial fragility of the economy.
Over-investment  and  excessive  capital  accumulation
accompanied the years of rapid growth in Thailand. In 1996,
investment growth slowed, falling to little less than 7 per-
cent compared with an average of more than 10 percent
growth per annum during the previous five years. Private
investment grew by only 3 percent, reflecting signs of excess
capacity and earlier over-investment. In 1997, the overall
investment to GDP ratio declined to 33 percent from 43
percent of GDP in the previous year. The declining invest-
ment  contributed  to  the  output  contraction  during  the
onset of the crisis.   
An excessive expansion of the non-tradable sector, par-
ticularly in the real estate and construction activities played
a crucial role in the investment break down. In the pre-cri-
sis period all sectors of the economy were growing rapidly.
Private  investment  in  construction  grew  rapidly  during
1990–94 ant it took up to 50 percent of total fixed invest-
ments. The public investment in construction grew at 25
percent on average, twice higher than the private invest-
ment in construction.  Much of the office construction in the
commercial sector was built not by professional property
developers, but by companies itself and for their own use. 
In the pre-crisis period, overall private credit was grow-
ing rapidly (Figure 3-4). In particular, this related to loans to
the real estate and housing projects carrying out by financial
companies. Many of these loans were turn to non-perform-
Table 3-3. Reserves in months of imports in Asian Countries
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Indonesia 3.3 3.0 2.4 2.6 3.1 5.5 5.4
Korea 1.9 2.0 1.7 2.0 2.4 3.1 4.1
Malaysia 3.3 3.4 4.3 3.3 3.3 4.3 3.7
Thailand 4.5 4.1 4.0 4.8 6.8 8.0 6.8
Source: Own calculations on the basis of data from IFS42
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ing, and financial companies lost their solvency, what indi-
cated clear evidence of over-expansion of property sector
credit.
In the period of 1985–95, Thai exports grew on average
by 23 percent per annum. For much of this time, the growth
exceeded the average of its regional competitors (Indonesia,
Korea,  Malaysia,  and  the  Philippines).  However,  rapid
export growth came to an abrupt halt in 1996 – it was a seri-
ous warning that the Thai economy was vulnerable to a dis-
ruption. Export growth rates declined sharply and turned
negative in both value and volume terms. The main external
factors behind the fall in exports in 1996 were declining
competitiveness, slower demand growth in partner coun-
tries, and real exchange rate appreciation starting in early
1995. The appreciation of CPI based real exchange rate of
baht versus U.S. dollar was not very much visible, because
of the peg to a dollar and CPI inflation in Thailand was not
significant in the pre-crisis period. 
In 1996, however, the yen depreciated strongly in nom-
inal terms against the U.S. dollar while Japan played a major
role  in  Thai  trade  (first  place  in  imports  and  second  in
exports). Thus, the baht appreciated by 8.5 percent in real
terms  between  end-1994  and  end-1996  against  the  yen
which reflected a loss in international competitiveness in the
major export market. The result was sharp contraction of
Thai exports and a further increase in the current account
deficit, to almost 8 percent of GDP in 1996. 
However, structural (internal) factors also played a role
in the export slowdown, including slow adjustment toward
more capital-intensive and high-tech products. Thailand lost
market share in labor-intensive products, such as garments
and footwear, to lower-wage countries, including China and
India. The labor-intensive exports declined by 21 percent in
1996. Meanwhile, high technology products such as com-
puters, electronic motors faced increasing competition of
Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Hong-Kong, show-
ing greater convergence in their export structures. Export
volumes of these goods fell by 8 percent in 1996. 
The large current account deficit, coupled with changes
in the export structure, and the perception that a currency
is overvalued led to a balance of payments-type crisis. 
The industrialization strategy implemented in Thailand
fuelled by the financial system liberalization and massive cap-
ital inflow resulted in rapid increases in private sector bor-
rowing. Most loans were short-term and denominated in
foreign currency. The Thai borrowers preferred borrowing
in U.S. dollars at short-term interest rates, even to finance
long-term projects because it was cheaper than borrowing
in baths. Thailand's foreign debt rose to the level of 50 per-
cent of GDP , of which 80 percent was private-sector bor-
rowing. The public sector borrowing played a minor role.
From 1995 to 1996, the growth rate of private credit
averaged well above 15 percent, or twice the rate of real
GDP  growth.  In  the  middle  of  1997,  the  private  credit
expansion accelerated, reaching its pick in January 1998 of
25 percent per annum. 
The fact that raised loans were invested in the risky busi-
ness of declining rate of return (for discussion on efficiency
of investments and profitability of the corporate sector –
see the next section) led many of them to become non-per-
forming, putting an extraordinary burden on the banking
sector. 
3.2.2. Microeconomic Signs of Vulnerability
Apart from macroeconomic indicators, the weakness of
both the financial and corporate sectors appeared to be cru-
cial in determining the crisis development in Thailand. 
The  difficulties  faced  by  Thai  corporations  have  their
roots in the over-investment that took place in the years
leading to the crisis. From 1987 to 1995, growth of real
fixed investment averaged almost 16 percent, as compared
with a real GDP growth rate averaging 10 percent. As noted
in the previous section, the acceleration in investment took
place  in  the  late  1980s  when  investment  growth  rates
increased  at  the  rate  of  20–30  percent  per  annum.  The
result was a rise in the investment-to-GDP ratio to around
40 percent. In the first-half of the 1990s, investment growth
moved in line with a real GDP growth. However, with the
capital-output ratio steadily increasing, it became inevitable
that diminishing returns to capital would put under question
the  sustainability  of  this  particular  investment-led  growth
strategy.  One  clear  symptom  of  this  was  the  decline  in
capacity utilization before the crisis.
This picture of over-investment and declining real rates
of return could also be seen in the financial statements of
Thai corporations. From 1994 to 1997, the value of assets
grew significantly in non-tradable sectors such as construc-
tion, communication, and property development. However,
Table 3-4. Performance of non-financial private corporations in Thailand
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Q2
Total Loans of Firms Billion Bahts 776 1038 1333 2092 1816 1780
Profits* over Interest Expenses (%) 6.1 4.4 3.5 1.0 1.3 1.9
Profits* over Liabilities (%) 24.3 18.9 15.3 7.4 9.5 13.6
Debt to Equity Ratio 1.5 1.7 2.0 4.6 2.8 2.9
Source: Stock Exchange of Thailand. Merrill Lynch
* Profits are defined as earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation, and amortization.43
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the growth in asset values was not accompanied by equiva-
lently high growth of earnings. The return on assets fell by
roughly one-third from 1994 to 1996, and as a result stock
prices started to go down in the second half of 1996. 
The consolidation of companies' ownership in Thailand
was very strong. In the ten largest non-financial private sec-
tor firms, the top three shareholders owned on average as
much as 45 percent of the outstanding shares. The desire of
the  owners  to  retain  control  of  their  conglomerates  led
them to use debts to finance their expansion. Large capital
account liberalization facilitated this expansion, by increas-
ing the supply of funds to corporations. As a result, by end-
1997 the corporate sector held debts of approximately 153
billion U.S. dollars (more than 150 percent of GDP), where
123 billion U.S. dollars was financed by domestic banking
system, and 30 billion U.S. dollars from abroad [4]. The
result of this debt-financed expansion was an increase of
debt-equity ratio of corporations from 1.5 in 1994 to more
than 2 in 1997. 
Several years of strong economic growth – underwrit-
ten by rapid credit expansion and large capital inflows –
exposed underlying structural weakness of the banking sec-
tor,  especially  under  a  poor  regulatory  framework.  The
financial sector grew rapidly in the 1990s, driven by expan-
sion  of  finance  companies  and  the  banking  sector.  The
investment-led  growth  of  the  Thai  economy  was  largely
debt financed, which was reflected in the rapid growth of
banks' assets. Simultaneously, softening of licensing require-
ments for finance companies contributed to their expan-
sion.  Finance  companies  tended  to  focus  more  on  con-
sumer and real estate financing, while banks leaned more
toward investment financing, particularly in the manufactur-
ing sector. Banks recorded high profit and their share prices
boomed in the period of 1993–97. The interest rate spreads
averaged about 6.3 percentage points in this period, which
supported bank profitability with return on assets averaging
1.6 percent in this period. 
However,  belying  this  positive  picture,  indicators  of
underlying weakness in the finance sector started to appear.
Both banks and finance companies were heavily exposed to
the property sector but the exposure was most acute in the
case of finance companies. In 1996, investments of finance
companies in real estate and construction amounted to 35
percent of the total credit, while commercial banks invest-
ed around 20 percent of their total credit in real estate and
construction. This was particularly worrisome in light of the
increasing evidence of over-investment in the property sec-
tor.  Additionally,  substantial  share  of  finance  companies'
credit was being channeled into the stock exchange, leading
to a rapid growth of risk. 
Already in 1996, finance companies started to exhibit
liquidity  problems,  illustrated  by  increasing  strains  of
accrued  interest.  Although  the  level  of  overall  non-per-
forming loans was relatively low (12 percent of total at the
end of 1996), accrued interests in several banks were high-
er than average and growing, suggesting that the true NPLs
were actually higher and increasing.  The first clear sign of
trouble occurred in March 1997 when the Bank of Thailand
and  the  Ministry  of  Finance  announced  that  ten,  as  yet
unknown, finance companies would need to raise capital. 
In early 1997, more severe liquidity problems emerged
as the economy slowed. Public confidence in finance com-
panies eroded as solvency problems occurred. In May 1997,
the Bank of Thailand suspended 16 insolvent finance com-
panies and announced that its creditors are expected to
bear  part  of  their  losses.  During  the  spring  of  1997  the
finance  sector  began  to  experience  a  large-scale  deposit
withdrawals, which lead to massive and secret liquidity sup-
port from the authorities to 66 finance companies. This sup-
port peaked in August 1997, reaching altogether about 10
billion of U.S. dollars (about 8 percent of 1997 GDP). The
deposit withdrawal represented a flight to quality by house-
holds  and  businesses  moving  their  savings  from  finance
companies to large commercial banks. 
The  banking  sector  in  Thailand  also  started  to  show
weaknesses.  Bank  capital  was  substantially  overstated,
reflecting reliance on collateral of uncertain value. Anecdo-
tal evidence suggest that banking practices focused heavily
on "name" based lending, relying on personal guarantees
and  collateral  to  secure  loans.  These  transactions  were
mostly valued not by independent appraisers what had its
picture in bank balance sheets and income. Indeed, while
reported  NPLs  of  banks  amounted  to  11.6  percent  of
assets, this figure largely included loans that had been non-
performing for one year and over, and did not capture the
most  recent  deterioration  in  asset  quality.  Many  private
market analysts estimated NPLs to be at least 15 percent of
total banks' loans at that time. 
The subsequent deterioration of the corporate balance
sheets and adverse effects of the depreciation led to a rapid
CASE Reports No. 39
[4] These numbers exclude debt instruments such as bills of exchange and commercial papers, and are calculated using an end-1997 exchange rate
of 1 U.S. dollar = 47 Bahts
Table 3-5. Non-performing loans at domestic commercial banks 1995–99 (percent of total loans)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999Q2
N P L s 8 1 02 24 85 1
Source: Thailand: Selected Issues. IMF Staff Country Report No. 00/2144
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build-up  in  non-performing  loans  and  decapitalization
throughout the whole fragile financial system. 
3.3. The Crisis
In 1996 economic growth, exports and investment dete-
riorated in the face of an appreciating real exchange rate.
The current account was in deficit, interest rates were high,
and inflation was increasing. Moreover, serious weakness
appeared in the financial system due to exposures to the
property  sector  and  inadequate  loan  provisioning.  High
interest rates to counteract capital outflows aggravated the
solvency and liquidity position of many banks and finance
companies and resulted in intervention by the authorities to
support the financial system. 
In early 1997, the baht came under pressure as traders
began to doubt the viability of its peg to the dollar. The Thai
currency was subject to several speculative attacks in the
first-half of 1997 and the central bank intervened actively on
foreign exchange markets and imposed capital controls in
May 1997. As a result, the official international reserves fell
by almost 13 billion U.S. dollars in the first eight months of
1997 (by 38 percent). The fall was continued and the low-
est  level  was  recorded  in  February  1998  when  reserves
reached the 1994 level. 
On July 2, 1997, faced with a banking crisis, a run on the
currency,  and  large  reserve  losses,  the  Bank  of  Thailand
floated the baht. The currency fell 10 percent immediately
and  then  weakened  further.  The  bath  depreciated  by  an
additional 22 percent against the U.S. dollar during July.
On July 28, 1997 Thailand formally sought IMF assis-
tance. On August 20, 1997 the IMF announced an assistance
package  of  4  billion  U.S.  dollars  and  established  a  list  of
reforms that the country was obliged to implement [5].  
3.3.1. Managing the Crisis. The IMF Intervention
in Thailand
On  August  20,  1997,  the  IMF's  Executive  Board
approved a 34-month Stand-By Agreement with Thailand,
amounting to 4 billion U.S. dollars (equivalent of SDR 2,900
million or 505 percent of quota). The adjustment program
was aimed at stabilizing the exchange rate and reducing the
current account deficit through control of domestic credit,
and limiting the rise in inflation. Key elements of the policy
package included fiscal policy measures, and financial sector
restructuring, including closure of insolvent financial institu-
tions, consolidation of banks, and non-performing loan man-
agement.
The program provided for three reviews to be complet-
ed  during  the  first  year  (program  targets  for  September
1997, December 1997 and June 1998). Thereafter, the pro-
gram was to be subject to two twice-yearly reviews (pro-
gram targets for end-December 1998, end-June 1999, and
end-December 1999). Upon approval of the program, Thai-
land drew 1.2 billion U.S. dollars from the IMF and received
a further 4 billion U.S. dollars from bilateral and multilateral
sources.
Additional financing was pledged by the World Bank and
the Asian Development Bank (2.7 billion U.S. dollars), which
also provided extensive technical assistance. Financial sup-
port by Japan and other interested countries (10 billion U.S.
dollars)  was  pledged  at  a  meeting  in  August,  hosted  by
Japan. Bilateral financing has been disbursed in parallel with
the purchases from the IMF. Total official financing of the sta-
bilization program amounted to over 17 billion U.S. dollars
(Table 3-6).
In the second half of 1997, the baht continued to depre-
ciate as the contagion in Asia began. While macroeconomic
policies  were  on  track  and  nominal  interest  rates  were
raised, market confidence was adversely affected by delays
in the implementation of financial sector reforms, and poli-
tical uncertainty.  
By the time of the review under the special emergency
procedures (on October 17, 1997), there were also signs
that the slowdown of economic activity would be more pro-
nounced than anticipated. And in fact it was. The further
depreciated exchange rate put pressure on increase in inter-
est rates, and it resulted in a much sharper decline in private
investment and consumption than originally anticipated. 
A new government took office in mid-November 1997.
The new economic team headed by Prime Minister Chuan
reconfirmed the commitment to the adjustment program.
To help stabilize the foreign exchange market, the program
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[5] A detailed chronology  of the crisis in financial sector is given in the Appendix 1
Table 3-6. Official financing of stabilization program
Billion U.S. dollars Percent of GDP
IMF 4.0 3.0
Asian Development Bank and World Bank 2.7 2.0
Other 10.5 7.0
Total package 17.2 12.0
Source: "IMF-Supported Programs in Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand. A Preliminary Assessment". IMF, Washington DC 199945
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was strengthened at the first quarterly review (on Decem-
ber 8, 1997). The new government was determined to take
a number of additional measures to support the policy pack-
age. With weakening economic activity, constraining rev-
enues,  additional  fiscal  measures  were  introduced  to
achieve  the  original  fiscal  target  for  1997/98.  Reserve
money  and  net  domestic  assets  of  the  Bank  of  Thailand
were to be kept below the original program limits. As a
result, indicative interest rates were raised and a specific
timetable for financial sector restructuring was announced. 
In early February 1998, the baht began to strengthen
against the U.S. dollar as improvements in the policy setting
revived market confidence. Growth projections, however,
were marked down further. Contracting domestic demand
helped to keep inflation under control and contributed to a
larger-than-expected adjustment in the current account. 
The stabilization program was revised significantly at the
time of the second quarterly review (on March 4, 1998).
Under the revised program, monetary policy continued to
focus on the exchange rate, with interest rates to be main-
tained at high levels until evidence of sustained stabilization
emerged. Fiscal policy shifted to a more accommodating
stance.  In  addition,  the  program  included  measures  to
strengthen the social safety net, and broaden the scope of
structural reforms to strengthen the core banking system
and promote corporate restructuring. 
The third quarterly review took place on June 10, 1998
and a marked strengthening of the baht during February-
May 1998 was noticed (some 35 percent vis-a-vis the U.S.
dollar from the low in January). The revised program was
on track, but with real GDP projected to decline 4–5 per-
cent  in  1998  and  inflation  subdued,  further  adjustments
were made to allow for an increase in the fiscal deficit tar-
get for 1997/98 from 2 percent to 3 percent of GDP . Mon-
etary policy continued to focus on maintaining the stability
of the baht. While the reductions of interest rates since late
March 1998 was viewed as consistent with exchange mar-
ket  developments,  it  was  understood  that  interest  rates
would be raised again if necessary. Additional measures to
strengthen the social safety net were planned, and the pro-
gram for financial sector and corporate restructuring was
further specified. 
The  exchange  rate  weakened  during  June-July  1998
amid  growing  concerns  about  the  growth  outlook,  and
renewed signs of strains in the financial sector, where grow-
ing difficulties in the corporate sector complicated restruc-
turing of financial institutions. Fiscal and monetary policies
had been tighter than programmed, economic activity was
weaker than expected, and exports had failed to pick up.
The large adjustment in the current account (projected to
amount to over 10 percent of GDP) reflected a sharp con-
traction of imports.
The fourth quarterly review (on September 11, 1998)
focused on adapting the policy framework to support the
recovery without sacrificing stabilization gains. With output
now projected to decline by 6–8 percent in 1998, efforts
were stepped up to utilize the scope of fiscal easing provid-
ed under the program. Foreign exchange market conditions
were relatively stable (in spite of the Russian crisis), provid-
ing room for further lowering of interest rates. The pro-
gram for financial and corporate sector restructuring was
broadened significantly, and the structural reform agenda in
other  areas  (privatization,  foreign  ownership,  and  social
safety net) was strengthened.
As of October 19, 1998, 12.2 billion U.S. dollars from
the total financing package for Thailand (17.2 billion U.S.
dollars) had been disbursed, including 3 billion U.S. dollars
from the IMF and 9.2 billion U.S. dollars from other multi-
lateral (World Bank and Asian Development Bank) and bilat-
eral sources.
During  1999  there  were  several  additional  quarterly
reviews  of  the  stabilization  program.  All  of  them  were
focused  on  revitalizing  of  domestic  demand  and  on  the
social safety net. The overall public sector deficit was grad-
ually set at the higher level (5 percent of GDP in the fiscal
year  1998/99  and  7  percent  in  the  fiscal  year  1999/00.
These fiscal targets accommodated reductions in revenues
(of about 0.5 percent of GDP in 1998/99 and in 1999/00)
from the impact of lower-than-expected nominal GDP . The
flexible use of interest rate policy to maintain baht stability
was reaffirmed, monthly interest rates were lowered and
inflation was falling. Growing confidence has allowed inter-
est rates to fall below pre-crisis levels without compromis-
ing exchange rate stability. The overall balance of payments
outcome was stronger than expected, as a higher current
account surplus, reflecting weak domestic demand, carried
over to higher than projected reserves.
On May 8, 2000 the Executive Board of the IMF com-
pleted the ninth, and final review under Thailand's Stand-By
Arrangement. To date, under 17.2 billion U.S. dollars official
financing package, Thailand has drawn 14.3 billion U.S. dol-
lars from bilateral and multilateral contributors, including
3.4 billion U.S. dollars from the Fund. 
3.3.2. Macroeconomic Environment after 
the Crisis
The persistence and widening of the current account
deficit, over-investment, declining rates of return on capital,
and the over-expansion of the non-tradable sector pointed
on macroeconomic reasons of the crisis and the need for
deep adjustment in exchange rate. In the aftermath of the
crisis, Thailand's real effective exchange rate depreciated by
35 percent in the second half of 1997, but subsequently
recovered. As of end-1999, the cumulative real exchange
rate depreciation was 25 percent. After depreciation Thai-
land's external current account balance shifted from a deficit
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of eight percent of GDP in 1996 to a surplus of more than
12 percent of GDP in 1998. Due to the fall in Thailand's
terms of trade and falling dollar export prices, export vol-
ume growth exceeded 8 percent per annum in 1997–98.
Conversely, import volumes fell dramatically by more than
40 percent from 1996 to 1998, reflecting the weakness in
domestic demand and the relative price effect of the deval-
uation.
Once  the  full  extent  of  the  weaknesses  in  Thailand's
economy became known, including the underlying problems
in the financial sector and the collapse of Thailand's interna-
tional position, financial market confidence vanished. Thai-
land's pre-crisis problem of persistent and excessive capital
inflows was transformed into one of managing major capital
outflows,  with  creditors  refusing  to  rollover  short-term
debt. As indicated before, investment was falling sharply [6]
in the first quarter of 1997 what influenced output contrac-
tion. In 1998, the recession widened and real GDP declined
by 10 percent. Private consumption also fell markedly. Con-
sumer durables were particularly hard hit, with car sales
falling to around one quarter of their pre-crisis levels. As a
result of high interest rates and the reduced availability of
credit, consumption fell by 13 percent in 1997 and 1998.
Another factor responsible for decline in consumption was
lowering  personal  incomes.  With  the  general  collapse  in
domestic  demand,  unemployment  increased  and  wages
declined. 
Since January 1998, the rate of private credit growth
(adjusted after correcting for changes in valuation due to
exchange rate fluctuations) declined steadily (Figure 3-4).
Later the growth of credit continued to decrease and was
even negative at the rate of 10 percent per annum in Janu-
ary 1999. In 1999 the situation started to improve. And in
the end of 1999, the credit started to grow at the rate of 5
percent per annum. However, the volume of credit was still
20 percent below the peak reached in late 1997. This sug-
gests two possibilities. First, that credit-intensity of firms has
fallen as firms started to rely increasingly on retained earn-
ings and other sources of non-bank financing or, second,
that there has been a shift in the allocation of credit [7]. 
After the sharp contraction in 1998, the recovery start-
ed in 1999. Manufacturing production, which had already
bottomed out by the middle of 1998, grew at double-digit
rates through much of 1999, and by September 1999 it had
surpassed its pre-crisis peak. On the demand side, lower
interest rates and improving recovery prospects have stim-
ulated private consumption. This trend was supported by a
temporary VAT reduction, which took effect in early 1999.
In 1999, Thailand's economy reached the growth rate of 4
percent, which was much more modest than in the past. In
2000, the recovery was strengthened and real GDP was
expected to increase by 4–5 percent.  If 2000 trends con-
tinue, Thailand will recover pre-crisis levels of output and
consumption per-capita by the end of 2002 (the IMF esti-
mates). The major contributors to growth continued to be
exports (6.3 percentage points) and private consumption
(3.4 percentage points).
Total factor productivity (TFP), which began to decrease
well before the crisis, became negative in 1996, and bot-
tomed out in 1998. However, since 1999 TFP appeared to
start to grow again, helped by structural reforms and cycli-
cal bounce back, and was estimated to grow from 1 to 1.4
percent in 2000 (the IMF estimates).
Exports have done well and have been a key driver of
the recovery. In 1999, they grew by close to 9 percent, and
were set to grow by 6.8 percent in 2000 (IMF estimates).
The U.S. and EU markets contributed to the pick-up in Thai
exports. More recently, the exports to Japan and ASEAN
countries recovered, and accounted for over 30 percent of
total exports in 1999. Nonetheless, there were concerns
regarding the competitive weakness of the Thai industry.
Skill-intensive activities complained of shortages of high level
skilled  manpower,  and  technology-intensive  activities
remained  largely  confined  to  the  final  assembly  stage  of
operations.  More  recently,  technology  intensive  exports
have  increased.  Recent  data  suggest  that  the  growth  in
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[6] While investment fell across the board, investment in construction was especially badly hit, its share fell to 35 percent of the total investment
from 50 percent before the crisis.
[7] Some firms have suspended servicing their loans, thereby "obtaining credit" by generating NPLs.
Table 3-7. Contribution to economic growth in the year 2000 (percent)
Growth Contribution to Growth
Real GDP growth (%) 4.5 4.5
Private consumption 6.4 3.4
Public consumption 4.9 0.5
Private investment 11.0 1.2
Public investment 4.5 0.5
Exports 11.0 6.3
Imports 17.0 -7.5
Source: World Bank. Thailand Economic Monitor. June 200047
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imports has started to slow down. Imports fell by 17 per-
cent between December 1999 and January 2000 (IMF esti-
mates).
Given projected growth rates of imports and exports,
the current account balance was expected to generate a
surplus of 7.7 billion U.S. dollars in 2000 (5.3 billion US$ of
the  trade  balance  surplus).  On  the  capital  account  side,
repayments  by  the  private  sector  were  expected  to  fall
from 15.5 billion in 1999 to 9.5 billion U.S. dollars in 2000.
This created a cushion to support potential weakness in
portfolio flows and foreign direct investment. Gross official
reserves increased to 34 billion U.S. dollars at the end of
1999.  But  in  the  middle  of  2000,  the  country's  foreign
reserves stagnated at around 32 billion U.S. dollars [8]. This
level was sufficient to cover more than three times the cash
in circulation at that time (which approximated 9 billion U.S.
dollars  and  about  400  billion  Thai  bahts).  This  level  of
reserves was an equivalent to 200 percent of debt maturing
in the next 12 months, and 6 months of imports. 
A second key driver of recovery was private consump-
tion. In 1999, total private consumption grew by 3.5 per-
cent, recovering from sharp contraction in 1998 (-12.3 per-
cent). This growth was broadly consistent with a return of
consumer confidence, reflected in an increase in aggregate
disposable income resulting from rising wages and higher
levels of employment. Inflation remained under control in
1999 and did not create a risk for the economy. The gov-
ernment set an inflation ceiling of 3.5 percent for the year
2000, what was possible to reach.  
However, employment data show that the recovery is
still fragile. The crisis did not appear to have affected the
trend  in  a  significant  way.  After  the  onset  of  the  crisis
employment was expanding gradually but the unemploy-
ment rate was falling at a very slow pace. The February
unemployment rate fell from 5.4 percent in 1999 to 4.8 per-
cent in 2000. While the unemployment rate appeared to be
modest when compared to European countries, Thailand
has no unemployment insurance system and welfare impact
can be severe. However, a review of the adjustments in the
labor market showed that wage reductions among less edu-
cated workers were less severe compared to the educated
workers, suggesting that labor markets protected the less
well off (WB Monitor). 
Looking back over the two and half years under the
Fund-supported program, the successful implementation of
macroeconomic policies can be observed. All above-men-
tioned indicators show that the main objectives of the pro-
gram have been met. Over the medium term, the key chal-
lenge will be to sustain economic recovery in the context of
a heavily indebted corporate sector and continued weak-
ness  of  financial  system.  The  results  of  corporate  debt
restructuring are not satisfactory and this process still has
some way to go. In order to complete reforms in the finan-
cial sector, the speeding up of corporate debt restructuring
process is also necessary. 
3.4. Conclusions
The  reasons  for  the  Thai  financial  crisis  were  almost
exclusively  internal  [9].  The  Thai  experience  shows  that
financial crises can erupt not only when macroeconomic but
also when microeconomic indicators express vulnerabilities.
The Thai crisis can be classified as representing a kind of
third generation model, which theoretical backgrounds is
still questionable [10]. In early 1997, Thailand faced a canon-
ical balance of payments crisis when a structural misbalance
between the deficit in current account and capital and finan-
cial account (sources of financing) occurred. In the second
quarter of 1997 the authorities defended the baht and inter-
national reserves diminished what together with microeco-
nomic  problems  led  to  a  currency  crisis.  Once  the  full
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1995 6.2 1.0 1.7 8.9
1996 5.4 1.8 -1.8 5.4
1997 3.4 2.7 -7.9 -1.7
1998 1.8 1.3 -13.0 -10.0
1999 1.8 1.4 0.8 4.2
2000 1.9 1.6 1.0 4.5
Medium term 2.0 1.6 1.4 5.0
Source: World Bank. Thailand Economic Monitor. June 2000
[8] Chase, International Fixed Income Today, 13 September 2000.
[9] The important external factor of the crisis was yen/U.S. dollar exchange rate developments.
[10] Antczak (2000)48
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extend  of  the  weakness  in  Thailand  economy  became
known, including underlying problems in the financial sector,
excessive capital account liberalization led to massive with-
drawal and to full-fledged financial crisis.
The Thai crisis led to a contagion effect in Asia. These
developments changed investors' perception of the Asian
Tigers of early 1990s. It contributed to external shocks and
the  Asian  flu  infected  Korea,  Philippines,  Malaysia,  and
Indonesia. The second broad conclusion from this analysis is
a fundamental need for an integrated approach to capital lib-
eralization and financial sector reform. 
The Thai stabilization program was successful and the
economy recovered. The authorities have made progress
toward resolving the problems in the financial sector. Banks
have  raised  substantial  amounts  of  new  capital,  the  core
banking system remained in private hands, and foreign entry
should  stimulate  competition  and  improvements  in  the
technology  and  service.  But  despite  the  positive  changes
there is still a lot to be done, especially in the area of struc-
tural reforms.
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Direct investments Portfolio investments Other investments
Source: own calculations on the basis of data from the IMF IFS
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Figure 3-5. Commercial Bank Profitability, 1993–98 (percent)













Source: Thailand: Selected Issues. IMF Staff Country Report No. 00/2152
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Appendix 1: Chronology of the Thailand's Currency Crisis
March 1997
First explicit sign of trouble. BoT and MoF announce that 10 as yet unknown
finance companies would need to raise capital.
March-June, 1997
Public confidence in finance companies erodes. Deposit withdrawals. Massive and
secret liquidity support from the authorities to 66 finances companies.
June 1997
BOT suspends 16 finance companies and announces that their creditors are
expected to bear part of companies’ losses.
July 2, 1997 The baht is floated, then it depreciates by 32 percent against U.S. dollar during July.
In the context of IMF program negotiations, BoT and MoF issue a joint statement
detailing measures to strengthen confidence in the financial system.
Additional 42 finance companies have their operations suspended (altogether 58
out of 91 finance companies) and are given 60 days to present rehabilitation plans
to the authorities.
August 1997
Government announces blanket guarantee to banks and remaining finance
companies backed by unlimited FIDF support (in baht).
August 14, 1997 First Thailand’s IMF Letter of Intent.
August 20, 1007 The IMF Executive Board approves a three-year Stand-By Arrangement, amounting
to 4 billion U.S. dollars (505 percent of quota).
October 17, 1997 Emergency Financing Procedures by the IMF.
November 25, 1997 Second Thailand’s IMF Letter of Intent.
MoF announces a closure of 56 finance companies.
December 1997 BoT intervention at Bangkok Metropolitan Bank - capital of existing shareholders is
written down, management is changed, and the bank is recapitalized by authorities
vie debt-equity swap.
December 8, 1997
First quarterly review of the policy package. Strengthening of the program,
implementation of additional fiscal measures. Indicative range for interest rates is
raised, and a specific timetable for financial sector restructuring is announced.
First Bangkok City Bank and Siam City Bank are intervened and dealt with the same
fashion as BMB in the previous month. These three banks account for about 10
percent of banking system deposits.
A new state-owned commercial bank, Radanasin Bank, is established in order to
take control over  the higher-quality assets.
January 1998
A majority stake in Thai Danu Bank is acquired by foreign investors (Development
Bank of Singapore).
Baht begins to strengthen against the U.S. dollar as improvements in the policy
settings revived market confidence. Contracting domestic demand helps to keep
inflation in check and contributed to larger-than-expected adjustment in the
current account.
February 24, 1998 Third Thailand’s IMF Letter of Intent.
February – May 1998 Strengthening of baht.
Agreement on compensation reached with creditors of 42 finance companies under
rehabilitation program. March 1998
Cautious reduction of interest rates viewed as consistent with exchange rate
developments.
March 4, 1998
Second quarterly review of the policy package. Under the revised program,
monetary policy continues to focus on the exchange rate stabilization, with interest
rates to be maintained high until evidence of a sustained stabilization emerged. The
program includes measures to strengthen financial sector.
March – April 1998
Banks start to recapitalize with many foreign deals. New loan classification and
provisioning rules are introduced.
May 1998
Additional 7 finance companies are intervened and merged with KTT (a large
government owned finance company).
May 26, 1998 Fourth Thailand’s IMF Letter of Intent.
June 1998 Bank of Asia acquired by ABN-AMRO Bank.53
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June 10, 1998
Third quarterly review of the policy package. International reserves strengthen in
the larger-than expected scope, but recession deepens. Adjustment in fiscal policy
allows for an increase in the fiscal deficit target for 1997/98 from 2 percent to 3
percent of GDP.
June –July 1998
The exchange rate weakens. Fiscal and monetary policies have been tighter than
programmed, activity is weaker than expected, and exports fail to pick up. The large
adjustment in current account reflects a sharp compression of imports. Growing
difficulties in corporate sector.
Union Bank of Bangkok and Laem Thong Bank are intervened.
Laem Thong Bank is merged with Radanasin Bank.
Union Bank of Bangkok together with 12 intervened finance companies merged with
Krung Thai Thanakit (KTT), the state owned finance company and subsidiary of the
state-owned Krug Thai Bank (KTB).
First Bangkok City Bank is merged with KTB.
August 1998
Introduction of financial sector restructuring package..
August 25, 1998 Fifth Thailand’s IMF Letter of Intent.
September 11, 1998
Fourth quarterly review of the policy package. Foreign exchange market conditions
are relatively stable (in spite of the Russian crisis), provide room for interest rates
lowering to pre-crisis level.
October 19, 1998
As of this date, 12.2 billion of U.S. dollars of total financing package for Thailand (17
billion of U.S. dollars) has been disbursed, including 3 billion of U.S. dollars from the
IMF and 9.2 billion of U.S. dollars from other multilateral and bilateral sources.
December 1, 1998 Sixth Thailand’s Letter of Intent.
March 23, 1999 Seventh Thailand’s Letter of Intent.
April 1999
Establishment of Bank Thai from merger of Union Bank of Bangkok and 12 finance
companies.
May 1999 Siam Commercial Bank raises over 1.5 billion of U.S. dollars in new capital.
July 1999 Nakomthon Bank is intervened.
August – November 1999
Auctions and further asset of finance companies sales to the state owned Asset
Management Company.
September 1999 Nakomthon Bank is sold to Standard Chartered Bank.
September 21, 1999 Eighth Thailand’s Letter of Intent.
November 1999
The sale of Radanasian Bank to United Overseas Bank of Singapore is finalized.
May 8, 2000 The IMF completed Final Review of the Thai stabilization program.54
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4.1. Overview
4.1.1. Introduction
Malaysia,  a  country  in  Southeast  Asia  situated  in  the
Malaysian Peninsula, gained its independence from Britain in
1957. Since then, the main political force in the country –
the multiethnic National Front (Barisan Nasional) – has won
all 10 elections. The key component of the National Front
is the United Malays National Organization led by Mahathir
Mohamad, who has also been a Prime Minister since 1981.
The population of Malaysia, standing at 23 million is 60%
Malay, 30% Chinese and 10% Hindu by origin. The econo-
my and politics of Malaysia operates principally along racial
lines. The Malays have monopolized the country's politics,
they occupy key posts in the administration, military, police,
constitutional bodies etc. Chinese descents have dominated
the country's economy and exercise control over 40% of all
the nation's economic wealth [1]. The Hindu population is
predominantly visible in the labor force. After some dra-
matic  racial  tensions  in  the  1960s,  the  authorities  have
introduced so called New Economic Policy (NEP) – its pri-
mary goal has been "accelerating the process of restructur-
ing Malaysian society to correct economic imbalance so as
to  ...  eliminate  the  identification  of  race  with  economic
function...  and  the  creation  of  a  Malay  commercial  and
industrial community... Within two decades, at least 30 per-
cent  of  the  total  commercial  and  industrial  activities  ...
should have participation by Malays... in terms of ownership
and management" [2]. 
Uniform political leadership and social consensus grant-
ed Malaysia a stable environment and allowed it to enter the
track of rapid economic growth. The government has been
involved actively in large infrastructure projects and other
Part IV.
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[1] Foreigners control over 30% - based on ownership of share capital of KLSE listed companies.
[2] At the times of the formulation of this strategy Malays controlled around 10% of national wealth. The strategy proved partly successful, in 1997
the Malays' share increased to around 20%.56
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public  enterprises.  Industrialization,  export  growth  and
investment  have  been  promoted.  In  the  late  1980s,  it
became clear that purely state-owned enterprises were not
efficient enough for further growth – they have been there-
fore privatized by "corporatization", listing on Kuala Lumpur
Stock Exchange and by selling large parts of government
shares. Foreign direct investment inflows have been suc-
cessfully encouraged – between 1989 and 1995 they aver-
aged around 7% of GDP .
Fast growth was possible thanks to the impressive rate
of investment, one of the highest in the world – in 1997
43% of GDP was invested [3]. The rate of savings was also
remarkable – in 1997 it amounted to 39% of GDP , private
and public saving had more or less equal shares in total sav-
ings. In 40 years time, Malaysia managed to transform itself
from an underdeveloped, third world commodity exporter
to a modern and industrialized country. The share of prima-
ry sector (agriculture, mining, fishing, etc.) in GDP was only
19% in 1997. Secondary sector (manufacturing, construc-
tion) had a share of 40%, while tertiary sector (services)
constituted 41% of GDP .
4.1.2. The Public Sector
In Malaysia, the (non-financial) public sector consists of
the federal government, 13 state governments (+2 federal
territories), 148 local governments as well as statutory bod-
ies and non-financial public enterprises. The federal govern-
ment is endowed with revenue collection power over its
most important sources (corporate, petroleum and person-
al income taxes and custom duties) and with expenditure
responsibilities over strategic domains (state expenditures,
infrastructure, etc.). As a result it acquires over 80% of all
public revenues and spends around 60% of all the expendi-
tures. Local (and state) governments have narrowly defined
responsibilities, i.e. provision of essential civic services to
local communities. It derives financing from agricultural and
urban taxes, non-tax revenues (like asset sales), and trans-
fers  from  federal  government.  The  size  and  influence  of
rather inelastic local government on fiscal situation is negli-
gible compared to the federal government, which is the only
body responsible of implementing fiscal policy objectives. 







1960 1965 1970 1980 1990 1995
Agriculture etc. Industry Services
Source: IMF
[3] There are suggestions that official measures of investment rate are likely to be upward biased, because part of investment in Asian economies
is actually a disguised form of consumption. 
Figure 4-3. Malaysia: Domestic demand componentes in 1996
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Generally speaking, the public sector is relatively small.
In 1997, the federal government raised 24% of GDP and
spent 21.4% of GDP . For the broad public sector (general
government), these figures are 28.7% of GDP and 25.3% of
GDP respectively. Direct taxes provide 40% of revenues,
the same amount comes from indirect taxes, remaining 1/5
are derived from other sources. On the expenditure side,
the budget is divided into current (operative) and develop-
mental  parts.  Total  direct  development  expenditures  in
1997 amounted to 25% of the total budget or 6% of GDP .
The importance of public sector in the economy is obscured
by widespread use of off-budget accounting, through which
significant part of government investment is done – espe-
cially in the case of big infrastructure projects. Data related
to  such  actions  is  limited.  In  1998  off-budget  spending
amounted to around 1.1% of GDP , for 1999 this figure was
1.8% of GDP . Government engagement in large firms (usu-
ally  previously  state-owned)  effects  in  other  quasi-bud-
getary activities like tax concessions and exemptions, lend-
ing  on  favorable  terms,  etc.  with  rather  unclear  conse-
quences for public finance.
Until the mid-1980s, the main purpose of fiscal policy
was the implementation of government development objec-
tives. The government became extensively involved in many
large-scale non-financial public enterprises – infrastructure
projects, industrial investments, etc. This resulted in exces-
sive budgetary deficits that eventually became unsustainable
(reaching as much as 16.6% of GDP) and led to the eco-
nomic crisis and recession in 1985. Afterwards, the conduct
of fiscal policy was altered, with emphasis placed on macro-
economic stability and sustainable growth promotion, and
more attention paid to short-term aggregate demand man-
agement. Expected budgetary revenues started to be calcu-
lated realistically what resulted in somehow strange perma-
nent record of revenue and overall balance underestimation
[4]. As a result of the economy overheating from 1992–93,
the authorities adopted a rather conservative fiscal policy in
order to try to slow down and stabilize domestic demand
arising from large capital inflows. As a consequence, from
1993 till 1997, public sector consecutively recorded sizeable
budgetary surpluses. 
Thanks to consecutive surpluses, the Malaysian authori-
ties succeeded in containing domestic debt – its volume was
steadily falling in years preceding the crises. In 1996, federal
government debt stood at decent level of 32% [5] and was
held primarily in government securities. The broad public
sector debt was somehow larger and totaled around 50%
of GDP . The external debt of federal government was rela-
tively small at end-1996, and amounted 4.1 billion USD, or
around 4% of GDP . 







1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Source: IMF
Table 4-1. Federal Government Debt  end-1996 (% of GDP)
Domestic Foreign Total
31.7 4.2 35.9
out of which Gov. securities  25.1 Market loans  2.1
Source: IMF, Malaysian authorities
[4] For 1990 the budget deficit has been overestimated by 1% of GDP . The same figures for 1991–1994 stand at 2%, 4%, 5% and 3% of GDP .
[5] As a memorandum: central government debt amounted to more than 100% of GDP in 1987.58
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Around half of this came from international institutions
and foreign governments, half from market loans. To get a
clearer picture of general government external liabilities the
non-governmental public sector debt of 11.5 billion USD
must be also be included – a considerable part of this debt
carried federal government guarantees. All the public debt
has been medium or long-term.
4.1.3. Monetary Policy and the Financial Sector
In  the  1990s,  the  short-term  operational  target  of  the
Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), i.e. Malaysian central bank was
the one-month interbank rate. At the same time, central bank
was monitoring money and credit growth and the exchange
rate  of  Malaysian  currency,  the  ringgit  (MYR).  The  main
instruments used were reserve requirements, direct lending
and borrowing from the interbank market and sales of Bank
Negara  bills  (introduced  in  1993).  Measures  taken  by  the
BNM were successful in containing inflation. In spite of rising
aggregate demand, inflation stood below 4% in the years pre-
ceding the crisis. Interest rate policy was rather liberal and
remained in line with the corporate sector needs for low-cost
financing and authorities' objective of fast development and
economic  growth.  In  1994,  the  nominal  interest  rate  was
around  4%,  which  means  that  the  real  interest  rate  was
about 1%. From 1994 until 1997, the nominal interest rate
was steadily rising up to around 7% – it was a response to a
large  credit  expansion.  Nevertheless,  the  liquidity  of  the
banking  system  remained  high.  The  BNM  has  also  been
responsible for exchange rate management. As the interna-
tional trade constituted a very large portion of the Malaysian






































































































































































































































































































































































































The Episodes of Currency Crises in Latin...
economy, the primary objective was to maintain exchange
rate stability in order to eliminate unexpected fluctuations
and  exchange  rate  risk.  Although  direct  foreign  exchange
market interventions were not an instrument in the conduct
of the monetary policy, this goal was achieved: in the 1990s
(up to the financial crisis in 1997) the ringgit exchange rate
stood always in the vicinity of 2.5 MYR/USD.
The financial sector in Malaysia consisted of three types of
institutions authorized to take deposits: commercial banks,
finance companies, and merchant banks. Commercial banks
were engaged in retail and wholesale banking and were the
only institutions that could accept demand deposits. Foreign
banks had a long tradition in Malaysia. Despite regulation lim-
iting foreign ownership in the banking system, in 1999 foreign
banks controlled around 25% of assets of all the commercial
banks. Finance companies offered lending and other types of
credit to consumers and small business deriving funds mainly
from  time  and  saving  deposits.  Merchant  banks  were
engaged in other, usually fee-based activities such as loan syn-
dication,  corporate  advisory  work,  securities  underwriting
and portfolio management. In recent times, merchant banks
turned as well to the provision of loans and deposit taking,
but the BNM tried to discourage such activities.
In  addition  to  the  above-mentioned  institutions,  there
were other participants of the financial market, like pension
and  insurance  funds  and  stock  brokerages.  The  Malaysian
financial system was characterized by the relative importance
of non-bank financial intermediaries – the combined assets of
the BNM and all commercial banks constituted, in 1996, only
about 53% of total financial system asset. Another feature of
the system was a high leverage of financial enterprises. Over-
all, the 1992–96 average debt-to-equity ratio amounted to
239%,  and  for  insurance  companies  and  stock  brokerages
592% and 452% respectively.
Since the late 1980s, the Malaysian authorities pur-
sued a policy of financial system liberalization. The mea-
sures included liberalization of interest rates, reduction of
credit controls, enhancement of competition and efficien-
cy, and deregulation of a banking system. In 1989, the bar-
riers between different types of financial institutions were
removed, finance companies were allowed to participate
in the interbank market. In 1991, lending rates were lib-
eralized (being previously pegged to lending rates of two
main banks). As the result of authorities' effort to deepen
the  financial  market,  the  interbank  money  and  foreign
exchange market developed rapidly.
The 1989 Banking and Financial Institution Act placed
all banking entities under the BNM supervision and oblig-
ed them to meet tight prudential regulation such as disclo-
sure requirements, limits on large exposures, loan classifi-
cations, capital adequacy ratio, and other responsibilities
based on the Basel capital framework. Indeed, Malaysia
had a well-developed supervisory and regulatory frame-
work – one of the best in the region. As a result, the qual-
ity of assets in the financial system, according to the BNM,
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Table 4-2. Banking system indicators, third quarter 1997




% of total banking system assets
(1999)
Commercial banks 31.7 11 74     (dom:57, foreign:17)
Finance companies 22.8 10.6 20
Merchant banks 31.9 13.3 7
Source: IMF, Malaysian authorities
Table 4-4. Financial system indicator ("leverage" and short term debt), 1996
debt/equity ratio % of short term debt
Financial system 239 90.6
Commercial banks 154 98.8
Finance companies 202 94.6
Insurance 592 62.2
Stock brokerage 452 95.9
Source: IMF
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was  relatively  good.  The  proportion  of  non-performing
loans in total loans outstanding was 4.1% (end-1996). The
risk weighted capital ratio of 10.6% was also reasonable
comparing to 8% minimum requirement.
The side effect of liberalization was the emergence of a
large number of small and undercapitalized banks. To reme-
dy this problem, the BNM actively encouraged mergers in
the banking system. The banking sector took advantage of
the liberalization and engaged in rapid expansion of lending
activity, which in years preceding the 1997 crisis took a form
of a lending boom. The domestic credit growth averaged
about 25% per annum. As a percentage of GDP , lending
amounted to about 160% – one of the highest intermedia-
tion level in the world. 
Lending to the broad property sector, against equity
and other assets, thrived – the share of loans to this sector
in total banking system portfolio (risk exposure) exceeded
30% and was the highest among merchant banks. The col-
lateral valuation was also very high – ranging from 80 to
100% – which in the presence of real estate price inflation
added much risk to this portfolio.
Together with financial sector deregulation, the authori-
ties pursued a policy of capital account liberalization. For the
highly open and emerging Malaysian market, this liberalization
was an important way of facilitating international trade and
providing investment capital. In the years before the crisis, the
capital control regime could be described as liberal. The ring-
git was externally convertible – was allowed as a currency of
trade  settlements,  which  relieved  resident  importers  and
exporters  from  the  need  to  hedge  against  exchange  risk.
There were relatively few restrictions on the ringgit transac-
tions with nonresidents.
As a consequence, the system of external accounts [6] and
offshore market for the ringgit developed, mainly in Singapore.
There were no restrictions on the source of funds placed in
the external account as well as on the transfer of funds into or
out of the external account. Malaysian banks were allowed to
provide  forward  cover  against  the  ringgit  to  nonresidents.
Over-the-counter trading of the Malaysian stocks and bonds
took place in Singapore and Hong Kong. Borrowing abroad by
authorized dealers as well as their foreign exchange lending
activities were only subject to prudential regulations. Foreign
currency borrowing by residents was allowed, provided the
applicant could prove its earning in foreign exchange. Portfolio
capital  inflow  was  unrestricted  into  all  Malaysian  financial
instruments.  FDI  inflows  were  actively  encouraged  (e.g.,
through tax exemptions); repatriation of nonresident invest-
ment and profit was completely free.
This policy, together with a stable, growth-oriented envi-
ronment and wide investment opportunities effected in con-
stant  inflow  of  foreign  direct  investments,  which  in  1997
amounted to 6.7 billion of USD. On the other hand, a favor-
able MYR-USD interest rate differential and remarkable stabil-
ity of exchange rate could not go unnoticed by the short-term
investors. In response to a surge in capital inflow, that began to
get out of hand in 1994, the authorities decided to introduce
temporary inflow controls on portfolio transactions – these
restrictions were indeed soon lifted. Short-term inflows quick-
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[6] External account is defined as a ringgit account maintained with a financial institution in Malaysia, where the funds belong to a nonresident indi-
vidual or corporation.61
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ly rebounded and in 1996 totaled over 4 billion of USD. As a
result of these inflows, foreign reserves of the BNM increased
steadily.
4.1.4. The Corporate Sector
During the 1990s, Malaysia witnessed a rapid develop-
ment of the capital market. The stock market expanded sig-
nificantly – fuelled by the privatization and listing of large
state-owned  companies,  establishment  of  the  Securities
Commission (1993) and credit agencies, improvement in
trading and settlement system as well as strict prudential
supervision. The capital market became a major source of
funds  for  the  corporate  sector  –  in  1997  the  total  net
amount raised there by the private sector equaled to 30.4
billion MYR (around 10 billion USD): half in new shares, half
in debt securities. In 1997 Malaysia had the biggest per capi-
ta market capitalization among ASEAN-4 countries (more
than  3  times  its  GDP).  Following  the  brief  downturn  in
1994, there was a strong upsurge in stock prices. At the end
of 1996, annual increase of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Index
(KLSI) exceeded 25%. However, in the first quarter of 1997
the trend was reversed and the KLSI started to decline.
Equity price increases were not the only stock exchange
phenomenon, there was also general asset price inflation –
most  notably  and  importantly  in  the  property  and  real
estate sector. This happened primarily due to large capital
inflow and domestic credit expansion.
The corporate sector in Malaysia was characterized by
rapid growth. In the 1990s and before the crisis, a number
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Figure 4-10. Malaysia: Net funds raised by the private sector in
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of listed companies grew by average 14% per annum, and
total market capitalization of companies from main and
second board by 40%. Since the late 1980s, the evolution
of corporate sector was boosted by the privatization of
large state-owned companies and big investment projects.
Another reason for private sector expansion was the sta-
ble  macroeconomic  situation  and  growth-oriented  fiscal
and monetary policies encouraging investment and capital
inflows.
For financial enterprises, the average growth rate of
assets amounted to 40% per annum between 1992 and
1996,  for  non-financial  enterprises  it  averaged  31%.
Growth was financed mainly through debt issues and bor-
rowing, however, equity also became a significant source
of  fund  rising.  The  important  feature  of  private  sector
financing was a heavy dependence on short-term debt,
which constituted 90% of the total debt of financial insti-
tutions and 60% in the case of non-financial enterprises.
Fortunately for Malaysia, the corporate debt was primar-
ily domestic. Resident companies were banned from tak-
ing foreign exchange denominated loans unless they could
prove hard currency revenues. The corporate sector also
became  highly  leveraged  due  to  a  long  period  of  high
growth and a policy aimed at rapid asset accumulation and
sales expansion. Malaysian corporations had a rather com-
plicated  interdependence  structure  such  as  cross-hold-
ings, "double leverages", pyramid structures, etc. 28% of
market capitalization was in 1997 controlled by 15 fami-
lies, which was a very high degree of ownership concen-
tration. Many large companies, especially those created as
a  part  of  industrialization  strategy  or  previously  state-
owned, had close links to the government.
Total external debt of the broad private sector at the
end of 1996 amounted to 23 billion USD, 60% of that
medium and long term. Remaining 40%, i.e. about 10 bil-
lion, was short-term owed mainly (6.7 billion USD) by the
banking sector. Non-bank financial institutions and corpo-
rate sector accounted for 1/3 (3.2 billion USD) of total
short-term  debt.  There  was  a  rather  rapid  build  up  in
short-term private debt in 1996 – it rose more than 50%
from  1995  level,  compared  to  15%  increase  between
1994 and 1995. Total external debt of an economy as a
whole amounted to 38.6 billion USD, or about 40% of
GDP . 74% of this debt was denominated in USD.
4.1.5. The External Sector
The Malaysian economy is the most open in Southeast
Asia. The measure of openness, i.e. average cross-border
trade ((export+import)/2/GDP) amounted 110% in 1997.
The  once  popular  import  substitution  was,  since  the
1970s, gradually abandoned and switched to export pro-
motion. This process gained momentum in the mid-1980s
when Malaysia embarked on the process of gradual liber-
alization of trade and exchange regime designed to boost
the export-oriented manufacture sector. Measures were
taken to promote export competitiveness (like the nomi-
nal ringgit devaluation) and facilitate the import of essential
capital  goods  and  intermediate  inputs.  Rapid  economic
development and industrialization sifted Malaysia's export
from commodities to manufactured goods. The share of
rubber in export fell from 55% in 1960 to 2% in 1997.
The  share  of  manufactured  goods  in  export  rose  from
16% in 1960 to 80% in 1997. 
Malaysia's  outward  orientation  intensified  during  the
1990s. Non-tariff barriers were gradually eliminated in line
with Malaysia's commitment under the WTO. The effec-
tive import-weighted tariff rate was lowered from 11.2%
in 1992 to 9.4% in 1997.
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Singapore was the major Malaysian trade partner in
1997 (20% of total export), followed by the US (19%),
European Union (15%) and Japan (13%). Trade links with
other ASEAN countries were not as close as one would
expect  given  their  geographical  proximity.  The  most
important item in commodities' export in 1997 was palm
oil (3.8 billion USD), crude petroleum (2.5 billion USD)
and rubber (1 billion USD). Total major commodity export
made up about 15% of the total export. The main com-
ponents  of  manufactured  export  were  semiconductors
(14.5  billion  USD),  electronic  equipment  (14.2  billion
USD), and electrical appliances (13.6 billion USD) amount-
ing together to around 55% of total export. Intermediate
goods (51 billion USD) and capital goods (15 billion USD)
dominated Malaysian import. Consumption goods (5 bil-
lion USD) constituted only 6% of total imports. The over-
all trade balance was usually positive through the 1990s.
Service  settlements  –  primarily  freight,  insurance  and
investment  income  payments  –  decided  about  negative
current account balance.
In  the  analysis  of  external  sector  development  in
Malaysia before the 1997 Asian financial crisis, there are
two  important  issues  that  have  to  be  addressed:  real
exchange rate overvaluation and current account deficit.
There  are  well  known  problems  with  measuring  real
exchange rate misalignment but there is a consensus that
prior to the crisis the Malaysian ringgit was overvalued at
least 5% (CPI-based). Other methods (PPI-based, export-
unit-value-based) produce figures around 20–25%. Nom-
inal  exchange  rate  was  kept  in  rather  narrow  range  of
2.4–2.8  MYR/USD.  This  virtual  peg  to  the  USD  was
expected to facilitate external financing of domestic pro-
jects and promote international trade.
The  real  overvaluation  of  the  ringgit  emerged  from
two sources. First, the sharp appreciation of the US dollar
relative to Japanese yen and to European currencies led to
deterioration of cost-competitiveness in Malaysian trade
with these countries. Second, the surge in private capital
inflows – notably portfolio and foreign direct investment –
that took place in the 1990s led to continuous upward
pressure on the ringgit: from 2.73 MYR/USD in early 1994
it appreciated to 2.48 MYR/USD in 1997. Real apprecia-
tion led to a current account deficit – movements of the
real exchange rate were, to high degree, correlated with a
current account balance. The other factor worth mention-
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ing was the fall in demand for semiconductors – the main
Malaysian  export  product  –  in  the  years  preceding  the
1997 crisis. On the other hand, the above trade balance
explanation might not be sufficient – most of the current
account  deficit  originated  in  service  account,  notably  in
investment income payments. 
The surge in foreign direct investment resulted in a
rather inelastic demand for intermediate and capital goods
import. This would point to large long-term capital inflows
as a principal reason of current account imbalances, and
suggests that these imbalances had a structural character.
However, Malaysia had a good record of current account
financing  –  it  was  in  almost  100%  covered  by  foreign
direct  investments.  Nevertheless,  Malaysian  authorities
took steps to contain this deficit – mainly through restric-
tive fiscal policy. To some extent, they proved to be effec-
tive:  from  a  record  10%  of  GDP  in  1995,  the  current
account deficit decreased in 1997 to 5%.
4.2. The Crisis
4.2.1. Introduction
The direct cause of the Malaysian financial crisis was
the  contagion  effect  from    Southeast  Asian  neighbors.
The mechanism of crisis development has been similar to
these countries. A gradual deterioration in the macro-
economic situation was making international capital mar-
ket anxious about further profitability of investment in
Malaysia. Some short-term capital was withdrawn, the
downward pressure on currency confronted the authori-
ties with the necessity to take one of the alternative deci-
sions. 
First, if the authorities have sufficient foreign reserves
they  can  defend  the  currency  through  raising  interest
rates. Such a measure has a well-known shortcoming – it
slows down the economy. This could be acceptable as a
temporary response – longer debt maturities are usually
not affected. It becomes more serious if a large portion of
domestic  debt  represents  short-term  maturity.  A  pro-
longed period of high short-term interest rates can force
some cash-short companies to postpone investments. This
means a danger of recession. Some companies being very
cash-short may default on their obligations. One default
can cause another default – the economy will experience a
credit crunch with serious contractionary consequences.
Matters can become much more serious if companies are
highly leveraged – they not only become insolvent but they
can go bankrupt. That happens more often if they invest in
assets  such  as  stocks  or  real  estate,  as  prices  usually
decrease substantially in the crisis. 
The second option is letting the exchange rate depre-
ciate. However, if the economy has a large stock of exter-
nal debt, especially in the private sector or if firms borrow
in foreign currency, getting their receipts in domestic ones
(and remaining usually unhedged after a prolonged period
of exchange rate stabilization) companies can default with
all  the  above-described  consequences.  Additionally,
defaults on external debt damage the country's interna-
tional  reputation.  Moreover,  after  devaluation  the
increased price of import puts pressure on domestic price
level, inflation accelerates which in turn fuel depreciation
expectations and the vicious circle will close.
If there is a conjunction of negative factors such as a
large  stock  of  short-term  debt,  excessive  leveraging  of
companies and large unhedged external debt (combined
with other ingredients like shortage of foreign reserves or
political instability), the authorities might have no degree
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of  freedom  to  maneuver.  Such  situation  falls  under  the
term "vulnerability". When this becomes common knowl-
edge, speculators join capital outflow and sell the domes-
tic currency short. At this point, it is virtually impossible to
end the crisis without paying a high price.
Malaysia  was  not  an  exception  to  the  mechanism
described above. However, the extent of the crisis was
moderate  compared  to  Indonesia,  Thailand  or  Korea.
Malaysia managed to avoid the widespread bankruptcies,
bank runs, social unrest, and downward spiral of inflation
and recession. The key questions are: was Malaysia "vul-
nerable", if yes – why, and why matters did not go such a
disastrous way as in other Southeast Asian countries?
4.2.2. Malaysian Vulnerability Analysis
We start the analysis of Malaysian "vulnerability to cur-
rency/financial crises" in the end of 1996 with a review of
the academic research findings related to currency crisis
predictions. The most popular approach is called "early
warning system" and is based on the fact that usually some
macroeconomic  indicators  (called  "leading  indicators")
endowed  with  above-average  predictive  power  exceed
their usual values and, therefore, issue a warning signal on
the possible crisis. The main drawback of this system is
that after each crisis researchers revise the set of leading
indicators and come up with the new ones that seem to
have a better predicting power. Afterwards, a new crisis
unfolds and a new revision takes place. However, there is
a  consensus  [see,  for  example,  Edison,  2000]  that  the
most useful indicators are as follows: real exchange rate,
level  of  foreign  reserves,  current  account  balance,  the
level of short term debt, domestic credit growth, fiscal and
monetary expansion, short-term capital flows as well as
other, hardly measurable features like the extent of moral
hazard  ("the  incentive  structure  of  financial  system"),
exposure to contagion, etc.
Essentially  all  the  currency  crises  in  the  1990s  had  a
short-term capital outflow and currency speculation as their
direct cause, and so were with Malaysia. From the point of
view  of  short-term  international  investor  holding  ringgit
assets, the most important parameters were the expected
MYR/USD exchange rate and domestic interest rate. 
In order to defend a currency against speculative pres-
sures the central bank needs to have the sufficient inter-
national  reserves.  Malaysian  foreign  exchange  reserves
stood at 27.7 billion USD at mid-1997. 
The first question is whether the debtor had enough
foreign currency to pay the interest and amortization due.
Total external debt service in 1996 amounted to 6.4 billion
USD or 23% of the international reserves, so they were
sufficient to service the debt. In fact, Malaysia had the best
position in the region with respect to this issue. Sometimes
the debt service is presented as a ratio of export – again the
ratio of 8.2% was the best indicator in the region. 
The second question is: once all short term creditors
would like to withdraw their funds at one moment, would
reserves  be  sufficient  enough  to  meet  their  demand?
Again, the ratio of the total external short-term debt plus
external debt service to foreign reserves stayed at 70%,
the best among ASEAN-4 [7] countries plus Korea. 
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[7] Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines.








































































































































However, there was some confusion about the defini-
tion  of  short-term  debt.  The  above  used  data,  coming
from the BNM, revealed (as mentioned above) that 27%
(around 10 billion out of 38.6 billion USD) of the total
external debt had a short-term character. When we take
into account the data of The Bank of International Settle-
ments whose members controlled 26 billion USD (2/3) of
the total Malaysian debt the picture looks somehow differ-
ent and less comfortable. In the BIS debt sub-sample the
proportion of short-term debt to total debt amounted to
about  50%.  Hence,  all  the  above  indicators  should  be
adjusted (almost twice) accordingly.
International  investors  can  also  be  afraid  that  in  the
case of financial panic they will not get their hard currency
back. From the theoretical point of view, they can feel
secure when central bank liabilities (reserve money) are
covered by international reserves. So the ability of the cen-
tral  bank  to  completely  cover  its  liabilities  with  foreign
exchange reserves is a good sign for the solvency of the
system. The ratio of reserve money to official reserves at
end-1996 equaled exactly 134% [8]. However, BNM acted
as a lender of last resort to the banking system. So, in the
event of financial panic all liquid money assets could poten-
tially be converted into foreign currency. Hence, the ratio
of M2 to foreign reserves was another leading indicator of
possible distress. In Malaysia this ratio amounted to 480%,
which could be regarded as potentially dangerous but still
it was the best among ASEAN-4 [9]. On the other hand,
the informative content of this indicator is not very clear,
as M2/FX ratio is, to large extent, country specific and
reflects rather the development of domestic banking sys-
tem. Malaysian system in the 1990s was always character-
ized by a high degree of financial intermediation. 
The  importance  of  external  short-term  debt  was
already  discussed  above  –  Malaysia  had  actually  a  very
decent record with respect to that. Almost equally impor-
tant was the share of short time debt in private sector
financing. The overdependence of the Malaysian corporate
sector on the equity market and short-term debt securities
pointed to the underdevelopment of long-term loan mar-
ket. The high share of short-term liabilities meant that the
authorities would restrain as much as possible from inter-
est rate hikes in the event of capital outflow and increased
pressure on the foreign exchange market. Instead, they
would seek to sterilize these outflows by direct interven-
tions on the interbank money market. The BNM policy of
stabilizing  the  interest  rate  meant  that  facing  possible
devaluation expectation the central bank would hesitate to
compensate  (with  high  interest  rates)  investors  for  the
devaluation risk.
Devaluation  expectations  could  possibly  come  from
concern about overvaluation of the the real exchange rate.
The exchange rate was assessed to be overvalued about
5% based on CPI-measure [10]. Based on a real-export-
unit-value, the real exchange rate was overvalued by about
20–25%.  Still  this  could  reflect  a  temporary  decline  in
semiconductors and commodities prices. Although differ-
ent sources proposed different estimates there was a con-
sensus that the Malaysian currency was over its parity in
1996.
The prime source of concern in 1996 was a wide cur-
rent account deficit (around 10% in 1995 and around 5%
in 1996). All through the 1990s, the balance was perma-
nently negative giving rise to anxiety about its sustainability
[11].  The  notion  of  "sustainability"  is,  however,  hard  to
define – what is sustainable today can become unsustain-
able tomorrow. The principal issue is CA deficit financing. 
In the case of Malaysia, it was covered through inflows
of capital, notably FDI. The inflows of FDI in the 1990s was
just sufficient to cover the current account deficit. But in
the years preceding the crisis, FDI/CA deficit ratio was
rather on the long-term decline, and there were expecta-
tions that this trend might continue.
One  way  to  make  "sustainability"  operational  is  to
introduce non-increasing foreign debt to GDP ratio. The
current account is sustainable if it doesn't cause an exces-
sive build-up of foreign debt. By taking an arbitrary 1%
difference between long-run interest rates and long-run
growth rate, Corsetti, et.al. (1998) show that a "sustain-
able"  current  account  in  case  of  Malaysia  equals  about
2.3% of GDP . In practice, the external debt/GDP ratio
stood almost unchanged since 1993 till the crisis. 
Generally,  there  is  nothing  wrong  with  a  current
account deficit as long as it reflects a consumption smooth-
ing process. Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1996), argue that
Malaysian deficit development matched this pattern rather
closely. But the consumption smoothing theory predicts
that at some moment in future there will be a switch into
trade surplus. From a political and economic point of view,
the deficit will be "sustainable" if it can be reverted into
surplus without a crisis or drastic policy change. However,
in 1996–97 the current account imbalance seemed to have
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[8] The money(M1)/foreign reserves indicator was 145%.
[9] It is worth to notice, that in November 1994, just before Mexican crisis M2/foreign reserves has been 9.1 in Mexico, and 3.6 in Brazil and
Argentina.
[10] This method has, however, many drawbacks. First, inflation is usually closely monitored by authorities and they attempt to contain the increase
in the price of the most weighted components – so a change in inflation do not necessarily reflect the same change in competitivenes. Second, the so-
called Balassa-Samuelson effect should be taken into account – due to faster productivity growth in the tradable goods sector the exchange rate seems
overvalued (in CPI-terms) while it is actually not.
[11] The authorities were perfectly aware of the problem and tried to cool down the economy and reduce CA deficit in 1997 budget.67
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a structural character. The perspective of its financing was
closely  connected  to  a  "sustainability"  of  capital  inflows
which, in turn, was connected to growth sustainability and
investment opportunities.
Malaysia's economy grew at the average rate of 8% per
annum in the 1990s. It was possible thanks to sizeable cap-
ital inflows, and vice versa the capital was attracted by the
expected high rates of growth and investment opportuni-
ties. However, the abundance of capital, high investment
rate and development promotion by the authorities wors-
ened the quality of investment projects. The government
engaged itself in "mega-projects" and massive infrastructure
constructions [12], many of them reflecting political or pro-
pagandist considerations, rather than efficiency justification.
Private sector, also facing increased supply of capital turned
to more risky projects. Indeed, the incremental capital out-
put ratio increased from 3.7 in 1987–92 to 4.8 in 1993–96,
indicating a sharp decline in investment efficiency and prof-
itability [13].  In such a situation it would be overoptimistic
in  early  1997  to  hold  expectations  that  in  short  future
Malaysia would sustain 8–9% rates of growth without some
adjustment or structural reforms.
The signs of overheating were evident in end-1996 and,
eventually, optimistic growth expectations was revised in
early 1997 when the data revealed a sharp fall (60%) in
investment from both foreign and domestic sources. The
economic slowdown seemed inevitable, for what Malaysian
growth-oriented companies with ambitious fund rising aspi-
rations  were  not  prepared.  The  authorities  denied  the
overheating  problem  pointing  to  low  inflation.  However,
rapidly expanding domestic credit fueled not only consumer
prices [14] but the asset market too.
The asset market development seems to be the main
factor of Malaysian vulnerability. Facing diminishing returns
in  corporate  sector  investment,  the  banking  system
switched from lending to manufacturing (growth in lending
fell from 30% in 1995 to 14% in 1996) to lending for equi-
ty purchases (and growth in loans granted for share pur-
chases rose to 20%, from 4% in 1995). Such loans were
granted mainly by finance companies and merchant banks.
As a result of such a policy and the wide availability of
property loans, asset prices (shares, real estate) increased
rapidly. A surge in the asset market was consistent with
(speculative) overinvestment story described above. The
KLSI gained about 25% in 1996 and a property and equity
related sector index rose over 50% [15]. 
The BNM made an effort to slow down the domestic
credit expansion by rising reserve requirements and intro-
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[12] Some examples included: huge dam in remote Borneo, which rationale was questionable, new national airport, costing 9 billion US$ (almost
10% of GDP), etc.
[13] The issue of capital productivity is closely linked to ongoing and yet unresolved debate about the causes of Asian miracle, namely whether the
fast growth of Asian countries resulted just from abundance of capital and labor force or from productivity growth. The first view was advanced by
Yong in the beginning of the 1990s and popularized by Krugman (1994, 1998). They argue that the total factor productivity in East Asia was significant-
ly lower (sometimes even close to zero) than the rate of GDP growth. There were also studies that contradicted this view. Sarel (1997) found that TFP
in Malaysia in 1978–1996 grew on impressive rate of 2% per year, while Claessens et.al. (1998) remarked that the return-on-assets indicator increased
in Malaysia from 5.5% between 1988–1994 to 6.3% in 1995–1996.
[14] It is worth mentioning that prices of some most weighted consumer goods in the CPI were effectively regulated and controlled in order to
keep "inflation" down.
[15] Sarno and Taylor (1999) conduct a formal test and cannot reject the hypothesis that asset prices took divergent (bubble) path in Malaysia before
1997.68
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ducing controls over consumer lending for cars and hous-
es in October 1995. It was also gradually raising interest
rates. In March 1997 the BNM tried to halt the asset mar-
ket bubble by placing restrictions and ceilings on property
and  equity  lending  [16].  But  this  intervention  probably
came too late.
Recognizing  that  these  measures  and  BNM  attitude
would eventually put an end to the property and stock
boom, investors started to withdraw their funds. This only
reinforced the downward trend on KLSE and on the prop-
erty  market,  which  already  started  in  the  beginning  of
1997. Few days after the restrictions were announced the
index was 17% lower than its heights month before. In the
first-half of 1997, the capital market witnessed some spec-
tacular failures in fund raising and initial public offerings.
Many  companies  were  forced  to  suspend  their  invest-
ments.
Still,  there  were  no  crisis  expectations  at  the  time.
Economists and analysts were only talking about a "slow-
down".  The  Malaysian  economic  fundamentals  seemed
strong, and the BNM had a good reputation. In mid-May
the ringgit came under speculative pressure but a few days
of high interest rates (overnight rose as high as 18%) was
sufficient to counter this pressure and fend off the specu-
lation  with  virtually  no  impact  on  the  exchange  rate.
Malaysian securities had a high rating -rating agencies failed
altogether to anticipate the crisis.
4.2.3. Crisis Development
Malaysia encountered serious problems on July 2, 1997
when the Thai baht peg to the USD collapsed. Immediate-
ly, market confidence to Southeast Asian economies was
reassessed – unexpected devaluation of the baht meant
that any country with similar economic structure, compa-
rable state of fundamentals and export structure was like-
ly to give up its exchange rate policy under similar circum-
stances. A prolonged period of fierce speculative pressure
has started. The yield curve inverted dramatically. On July
8, 1997, the BNM was forced to heavily defend the ringgit.
Short-term rates reached the level of 50%. On July 11,
1997, the Philippines gave up supporting its peso. The ring-
git collapse was a matter of days. After the weekend, on
July 14, the BNM abandoned its ringgit peg to the USD.
Ten days after, Prime Minister Mahathir publicly blamed
"rogue speculators" as responsible for the crisis. Later on,
on several occasions, he suggested that currency specula-
tion  should  be  banned.  Such  statements  further  under-
mined investors' confidence in Malaysia. On September 4,
the ringgit broke the psychological barrier of 3 MYR/USD
and continued to depreciate. In January 1998 it hit his bot-
tom ever of 4.5 MYR/USD.
The actual direct cause of the crisis was a rapid rever-
sal of short-term capital flows that finally turned into finan-
cial panic. Malaysia, which in 1996 experienced inflows of
over 4 billion USD and expected billions more in 1997, lost
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[16] The restrictions introduced limited further loans to 15% (30%) for commercial (merchant) banks and ceilings on existing outstanding stock
of loans, which actually was lower than the proportion of property loans in banks portfolio. That implicitly meant that banks have to contract their lend-
ing, cease to roll-over pending credit, so new loans wouldn't actually be granted soon.
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4 billion USD in 1997 and about 5 billion in 1998. The equi-
ty and property asset bubbles burst. KLSI in 1997 lost 50%
of its value, while its property sector subindex lost almost
80%. Vacancy rate in central business district rose from
10% in June 1997 to 17% in June 1998. Prices and rents of
office and residential property fell.
The crisis brought a 7% decline in Malaysian GDP in
1998 (instead of 8% growth as expected). It affected the
Malaysian economy via the following transmission channels.
The stock exchange crash was a shock in a country with
such a heavy reliance of the corporate sector on the capital
market. Many projects had to be halted, companies had to
postpone their investments. There was also a widespread
uncertainty about the direction of the economy that con-
tributed to the investment slowdown. This sharp decline in
investment activity was the major source of a drastic fall in
aggregate demand, which in turn became responsible for a
recession. Private investment demand fell by 58% in 1998. 
Rapid depreciation of asset prices brought massive nega-
tive wealth shock. Individuals and the economy as a whole
postponed their consumption. Private consumption, a second
major  factor  in  aggregate  demand  decline,  contracted  by
12%. As explained below, the overall contribution of public
sector to aggregate demand change was also negative.
A sharp ringgit depreciation brought a rapid improve-
ment in the current account balance. From a deficit of 5%
of GDP in 1997, it turned to a 13% surplus in 1998. As
export and service balances held steady, all the current
account  adjustment  happened  by  a  squeeze  in  imports
which declined by 18%. The positive net external demand
partially (in half) offset domestic demand contraction, so
the overall aggregate demand fall by 25%.
Exchange rate depreciation triggered inflationary pres-
sures  in  the  economy.  From  the  end  of  1997,  inflation
started to rise and at its peaks reached about 6% in mid of
1998. Afterwards, however, thanks to the stabilization of
the exchange rate, inflation began to fall and reached pre-
crisis level in the beginning of 1999. Inflation was substan-
tially lower than expected [17]. The consumer price index
revealed only a part of a price increase process – a large
[17] Malaysian authorities estimated that 1% of exchange rate depreciation would have the impact of 0.176% on inflation. Given around 40%
depreciation of the ringgit, inflation should have risen at least the additional 6–7 percentage points.
Table 4-5. Domestic demand collapse components
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part of the impact of ringgit depreciation was not passed
on to consumers but instead  absorbed by firms.
As  opposed  to  other  countries  in  Southeast  Asia,
Malaysia did not have a large burden of private sector
external debt. Its vulnerability to exchange rate deprecia-
tion was therefore of less concern and did not pose a seri-
ous threat to the economy. Movement in exchange rate
also had little impact on banks portfolio quality because of
BNM strict prudential supervision over foreign currency
borrowing.
The collapse of asset prices caused heavy losses of
usually highly leveraged financial institutions engaged in
stock market gambling, real estate lending, or other col-
lateral-based  credit  activities.  The  banking  system
became  insolvent,  the  ratio  of  non-performing  loans
soared, and the economy entered a credit crunch. The
main  source  of  concern  became  merchant  banks  and
financial companies – exposed the most to asset market
risk.
The  banking  system  portfolio  quality  deteriorated
slowly during 1997. After a crash of the stock and prop-
erty markets this process accelerated rapidly. The pro-
portion of non-performing loans in the total credit vol-
ume increased from 6% in December 1997 to 24% in
March 1999. The worst was the situation of merchant
banks, which had 37% of their total assets in non-per-
forming status. In 1998, the banking system reported 2.2
billion MYR pre-tax losses, in sharp contrast with 7.6 bil-
lion MYR profit in 1997. Losses belonged only to finan-
cial  companies  and  merchant  banks,  as  commercial
banks  managed  to  maintain  positive  return  on  assets
[18]. Despite losses the capital base of the banking sys-
tem increased by 1.2 bln MYR in 1998 but only thanks to
4.6 bln MYR injection of fresh capital provided by the
authorities. As a result of an asset meltdown through
1998, at the end of this year 9 out of total 78 financial
institutions ceased to meet minimal capital criteria and
other basic regulatory requirements. In addition to bank-
ing sector problems, there were also widespread prob-
lems in the shortly indebted corporate sector. Most of
the companies' short-term debt was to domestic banks,
establishing the link between financial sector problems
and  corporate  sector  distress.  Some  companies  went
insolvent or illiquid because their banks were unable to
roll over their short-term debt. Similarly, the lack of cap-
ital  and  falling  asset  prices  caused  many  corporate
defaults, increasing the proportion of bad loans in the
financial sector.
4.3. Response to the Crisis
4.3.1. Introduction
Hostile  towards  international  institutions,  as  well  as
those who tolerated currency speculation which suppos-
edly  caused  the  financial  crises  in  sound  and  solvent
emerging markets, the Malaysian authorities rejected the
help of the International Monetary Fund (together with its
restructuring and reform directives), and decided to cope
with the crisis themselves.
4.3.2. Fiscal Policy Response
The  1998  budget  presented  in  October  1997  was
designed to deal with large current account imbalance and
overheating through further fiscal contraction. The fiscal
surplus of 3% of GDP was planned, up from over 2% of
GDP in 1997. In addition to these measures, the Prime
Minister finally postponed several multibillion construction
and infrastructure projects. 
In November-December 1997, it became obvious that
Malaysia was going to experience a significant slowdown
and the authorities announced dramatic policy tightening
(fiscal and monetary as well) to counteract the crisis. Bud-
get spending were cut by 18% (partly to avoid a possible
deficit), regulation of big import was introduced. Projec-
tion of budgetary surplus was revised down to 1.5% of
GDP in anticipation of lower tax revenues. These steps
came far too late as the crisis spread to other parts of the
economy. The authorities realized this in the beginning of
1998 and decided to stimulate the economy. From March
1998,  the  policy  stance  was  gradually  changed  to  the
expansionary one. In March 1998, the fiscal package of 3
billion MYR (1% of GDP) was announced. At the same
time a drastic revision of federal budged projected the fis-
cal deficit of 2.6% of GDP . In July 1998, the additional fis-
cal package of 7 billion MYR (2.5% of GDP) was declared.
New funds were to be spent on development projects.
Some  of  previously  suspended  undertakings  were
resumed. The fiscal expansion continued in 1999 with an
expected deficit of about 5% of GDP .
Despite this effort, and despite the fact that due to con-
secutive budget surpluses in the 1990s Malaysia was pre-
pared for a period of fiscal expansion, the federal govern-
ment  response  failed  to  provide  the  expected  stimulus.
Actually,  the  public  sector  contribution  to  domestic
demand was negative – public consumption and investment
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fell, compared to 1997, by about 3% and 10%, respec-
tively. Actual deficit of the federal government of 1.5% of
GDP occurred to be smaller than planned. Tax revenues
were  underestimated  [19].  Also  expenditures  fell  0.5%
GDP short of what was expected – a result of "institution-
al and operational obstacles". Because the authorities relied
on inert infrastructure projects spending as an instrument
for reviving the economy, the fiscal stimulus got delayed
and spread to 1999–2000.
4.3.3. Monetary Policy Response and Capital 
Control
There were many phases and policy stance changes in
the central bank's response to the crisis. In July 1997, BNM
engaged in the heavy support of the ringgit, As a conse-
quence  of  its  interventions,  short-term  interest  rates
remained very high for some time and foreign exchange
reserves were sharply falling. After realizing that continuous
pressure on the ringgit and capital outflow was not going to
ease soon and that high interest rate was likely to damage
fragile financial system and after depleting 4.9 billion USD or
20%  of  its  reserves  in  fruitless  market  intervention  the
BNM gave up its direct support to the currency.
It started to focus on domestic money aggregates and
financial market stabilization, thus opting to sterilize the
capital  outflow.  As  a  result,  domestic  interest  rates
returned  to  their  usual  levels,  the  monetary  base
remained virtually unchanged (it actually rose slightly), as
well as M1 aggregate – but a spread emerged between
offshore and domestic interest rate encouraging further
capital  outflows  [20].  In  an  attempt  to  interrupt  this
process, controls were imposed on banks to limit non-
commercial-related offer-side swap transactions to 2 mil-
lion MYR per foreign customer. Short selling of stocks on
KLSE was also prohibited.
The BNM turned to the domestic market overlending
problem. It established guidelines aimed at reducing annu-
al credit growth to 25% by end-1997, to 20% by end-
March 1998, and to 15% by end-1998, put restrictions on
financial companies consumption lending and on all bank-
ing sector property projects.
Relatively loose monetary policy continued for some
time. The measures taken did not meet their aim – capi-
tal outflows were not stopped, reserves continued to fall,
and the ringgit was permanently depreciating at a very
stable pace. These developments increased the burden of
public and private external debt, increased the price of
essential import items, and most notably, set off inflation-
ary pressures in the economy. The inflation-depreciation
spiral became a real threat.
From November-December 1997 through February
1998, the BNM changed its policy stance to a contrac-
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[19] Income tax is based on the income received during the preceding year. The direct tax revenues were 8% larger than planned.
[20] Spread emerged because the domestic interest rates were kept artificially low relative to market sentiments. At the same time, ringgit funds
were needed for currency speculation, driving offshore interest rate high. The important source of speculative ringgit funds for nonresidents were offer
side swaps.





































































































































































tionary one, increasing several times its intervention inter-
est rate to as high as 11% but at the same time lifting
some lending restriction as domestic banking sector con-
dition deteriorated. The monetary policy remained tight
until August 1998 leading to a sharp contraction in mone-
tary base followed by decrease in M1 aggregate money. In
the meantime, the current account sharply improved and
inflation, which prospects were in the beginning overesti-
mated, was successfully subdued [21]. But the tight mon-
etary  policy  contributed  to  further  weakening  of  the
economy while, after a short break, the ringgit was again
started its downward descent. BNM analysts could hardly
see  any  stable  correlation  between  interest  rate  and
exchange rate [22]. The offshore-onshore interest rate
spread  reached  20%,  constraining  the  effectiveness  of
domestic monetary policy and causing capital outflow to
continue. In this environment, the Malaysian authorities
decided to impose severe capital account controls on Sep-
tember 1, 1998.
The main objective of capital controls was to regain
monetary independence [23] and to terminate capital out-
flows which was to be achieved by the effective elimina-
tion of offshore market and insulating domestic interest
rates from external developments. Restrictions eliminated
practically all legal channels for the transfer of the ringgit
assets abroad, required the repatriation of the ringgit held
offshore to Malaysia within a month, prohibited the repa-
triation of portfolio capital held by nonresidents for 12
months, and imposed tight limits on the transfer of capital
abroad by residents. Residents were prohibited to grant
ringgit  credit  to  nonresidents.  However,  payment  and
transfers for international trade and FDI was not subject-
ed to restrictions. All import-export transactions had to
be  settled  in  foreign  currency.  All  transactions  with
Malaysians assets (stock, securities, etc.) could only be
concluded and registered through authorized institutions
like KLSE. Securities had to be repatriated to Malaysia –
some 170.000 investors had their portfolios totaling 10
billion MYR frozen.
In such an environment the BNM could easily exercise
monetary policy and regain control over foreign exchange
market. The ringgit has been pegged to the dollar at 3.8
MYR/USD  and  remains  stable  at  this  level  until  now
(November 2000). Monetary policy swung from contrac-
tionary to expansionary and central bank became engaged
in providing liquidity for the domestic market. Rapid cuts
of interest rates from 10 to 6% followed what was wel-
comed  by  the  domestic  corporate  and  financial  sector.
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[21] Not only was inflation smaller than expected, unemployment did not become a serious problem, increasing from 2.6% in 1997 to 3.9% in
1998. The main burden of labor market adjustment was absorbed by migrant workers. Right after the emergence of crisis the government canceled
the law giving migrant workers an automatic prolongation of their working-contract after expiration.
[22] Gould and Kamin (2000) remark that monetary tightening may lead to counter-intuitive result of further currency depreciation, because it
threatens to further weaken the banking system and the economy as a whole. The unstable relationship between interest rate and exchange rate can
reflect market confusion about that issue.
[23] As it is well known, the authorities can maintain only two out of three following things: control over exchange rate, freedom of capital move-
ment and monetary policy independence at the same time.73
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Malaysian authorities argued that the capital control was
only a temporary measure in the crisis recovery plan but
the international reaction was negative. Malaysian securi-
ties were downgraded by rating agencies and the country
lost a lot confidence among investors.
Malaysia modified and eased capital account restrictions
in February 1999 – partly because of the fear of massive
capital outflow after the 12-month moratorium and because
the domestic and external market situation stabilized, but
also  to  prove  that  controls  were  indeed  transitory.  12-
month moratorium period was lifted and replaced with a
system of declining exit tax. The highest levy amounted to
30% and was to be gradually decreased. This step was con-
sidered as an improvement, so in April 1999 Malaysia was
upgraded  by  rating  agencies.  Only  a  small  proportion  of
invested funds were withdrawn in the period following the
relaxation of capital controls [24]. Authorities continued to
relax monetary policy – interest rate further decreased and
fell below 3% in mid-1999.
There is no consensus whether Malaysian capital restric-
tions have been necessary, neither have they been effective.
The main problem is the difficulty to separate the impact of
these  restrictions  from  the  usual  market  developments.
There are arguments that the vast majority of investors who
wanted to withdraw from Malaysia had already withdrawn
before September 1998, so the restrictions might not have
actually been necessary. On the other hand, as Edison and
Reinhart (2000) point out, the absence of speculative pres-
sures  on  the  ringgit,  the  exchange  rate  stability,  sharp
decrease in interest rates, reviving economy, steady inflow
of new FDI's, and absence of any parallel or black exchange
market provide the arguments that restrictions has been
accepted and probably effective.
4.3.4. Financial and Corporate Sector
Restructuring 
The  consolidation  of  the  financial  system  started  in
March 1998 and is continuing. The main components of
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[24] In some countries, e.g. USA, large pension funds are prohibited by law to invest in securities below "investment standard" according to rating
agencies.74
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this process are: setting up the institutions in charge of
cleaning  up  bank's  non-performing  loans  (Danaharta),
injection of capital to undercapitalized banking institutions
(Danamodal),  corporate  debt  restructuring,  company
merger program, and tightening of prudential regulations.
Danaharta  is  a  financial  institution  set  up  by  the
authorities with the mandate to deal with the problem of
non-performing loans, and was expected to push borrow-
ers and banks for fast restructuring. Its staff came mainly
from  the  private  sector.  At  the  first  stage,  Danaharta
acquired from banks at market value bad loans [25] that
could not be restructured by banks themselves, with a
price averaging about 40% of the book value [26]. The
capital essential for the bailout operation was provided by
the Ministry of Finance (1.5 billion MYR), and came from
the issuance of zero-coupon bonds that had explicit gov-
ernment guarantee. Through March 1999 Danaharta pur-
chased 23 billion MYR of non-performing loans, or a quar-
ter of such loans outstanding. 
In  the  second  stage,  Danaharta  started  to  manage,
restructure or/and execute the loans. In order to shorten
maximally the period of financial clean-up and force banks
to give up bad loans at prevailing low market value, the
company  built  up  a  very  strong  system  of  incentives.
Banks selling loans to Danaharta have a right to 80% of
any profit that this company makes out of the loan, they
can also amortize for five years the loss resulting from
selling assets under its book value instead of recognizing it
immediately.  (In  case  of  undercapitalization  caused  by
such a transaction banks are eligible for recapitalization
carried out by the Danamodal). Non-interest earning bad
loans are exchanged with government guarantees, zero
risk interest paying bonds. Danaharta has also special and
unusual  powers  over  the  borrowers,  whose  debt  has
been acquired. Another body set up especially for restruc-
turing large corporate loans is called the Corporate Debt
Restructuring Agency. Through May 1999, the CDRA was
reviewing 57 applications encompassing 31 billion MYR,
out of which 2.5 billion was restructured.
Danamodal is an institution set up by BNM in order to
provide the additional equity to undercapitalized financial
companies. Its capital is funded by BNM (3 billion MYR)
and  by  the  government  zero  coupon  bonds  (8  million
MYR).  It  intervenes  to  restore  adequate  capital  ratio,
however, the effectiveness of each investment has to be
assessed  by  the  independent  international  specialists.
After intervention, Danamodal takes a stake in the institu-
tion proportional to its involvement, and engages in the
management  of  the  company  (it  appoints  at  least  two,
high  rank  board  members).  By  mid-1999,  Danamodal
injected 6.2 billion MYR to 11 banking institutions. 
Another way of restoring adequate capital ratio in the
system is provided by a merger program, which is con-
ducted under the BNM encouragement and supervision.
There  is  some  concern,  however,  that  the  activities  of
Danamodal mean a hidden form of banking system nation-
alization.  On  the  other  hand,  the  authorities  take  into
consideration  (re-)selling  distressed  financial  institutions
to private sector, mainly to foreign banks.
What concerns prudential regulations, from 1998 the
BNM  requires  from  individual  institutions  to  conduct
monthly tests based on parameters given by the BNM. It
has also issued "Minimal Standards on Risk Management
Practices of Derivatives", "Minimum Audit Standards for
Internal  Auditors",  and  other  guidelines  for  bank  man-
agers.  In  addition,  it  requires  incorporating  off-balance
sheet items into loan classifications, and market risks into
the capital adequacy norms. The BNM increased the fre-
quency of on-site inspections, etc. The regulatory frame-
works of capital market have been strengthened as well as
disclosure and transparency rules.
4.4. Conclusions
Generally speaking, Malaysia has avoided all the eco-
nomic  and  social  havoc  characteristic  of  the  crises  in
neighboring Indonesia, Thailand, and Korea. GDP fell tem-
porarily  (-7.5%  in  1998)  and  then  rebounded.  The
exchange rate depreciated around 50% and remained sta-
ble at the level of 3.8 MYR/USD. There was no social
unrest or widespread poverty problem. Malaysian eco-
nomic fundamentals occurred to be much sounder than
those of its neighbors [27]. The external debt remained
manageable,  exposure  to  exchange  rate  risk  limited,
domestic debt low enough to absorb the costs of econo-
my restructuring, and level of moral hazard in financial
institutions not so high. Financial institutions had a lower
ratio  of  non-performing  loans  and  higher  capital,  and
there was a stronger banking culture, with better supervi-
sion  and  prudential  regulation  than  in  other  Asian
economies.
In 1999, the Malaysian economy grew by 5.8%, while
in the first quarter of 2000 real GDP increased by 11.9%,
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[25]  Minimal eligible loan amounted to 5 million of USD.
[26] But excluding one large and extremely faulty loan, the average price jumps to 63% of the face value.
[27] There are some opinions that Malaysia has been hit by the crisis unjustified, or by accident or by contagion only. Other opinions suggest that
even without Asian crisis in 1997 Malaysia would have its own financial crisis in 1998–1999 due to overheating and speculative overinvestment in equi-
ty and asset markets and excessive domestic credit expansion.75
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and in the second quarter by 8.8%. FDI continued to flow
in, inflation moderated to 1.5%, trade surplus remained
on the high level of 7.7 billion USD, and BNM's interna-
tional reserves – at the level of 30 billion USD. The over-
all  risk-weighted  capital  ratio  of  the  banking  system
amounted to 12.6% with non-performing loan propor-
tion equal to 6.4%. The cost of fiscal stimulus amounted
to 5% of GDP , also less than projected. The exchange
rate remains stable, but on somehow undervalued level
[28], which gives good prospects for current account but
might  put  some  inflationary  pressure  on  the  economy.
Asset prices stand at around 60% of their pre-crisis level.
The cost of restructuring of the banking sector totaled to
about 10% of GDP , which was less than expected
Contrary to the macroeconomic "soundness", micro-
economic reforms have been very slow. The consolida-
tion of the financial system has not been completed. Until
August 2000, Danaharta acquired, restructured and dis-
posed a total 31.5 billion MYR of non-performing assets
and CDRA completed 27 restructuring cases, involving
23.6  billion  MYR.  However,  there  are  allegations,  that
some of the "restructuring" that take place is just a reshuf-
fling of debt among subsidiaries in order to avoid insol-
vency. In other cases a debt solution is obstructed by the
political connections of debtors. Although Malaysia is a
leader in restructuring among post-crisis Asian countries,
the failure to clean up the debt overhang can have serious
negative consequences for the country.
The stock market has not yet resumed the role of a
fund-rising institution.
Malaysia is still maintaining a rather restrictive capital
account regime and because of that is probably not going
to fully regain investors' confidence any time soon. 
Appendix: Chronology of the Malaysian
1997–1998 Crisis
1997
March  28,  Malaysia  central  bank  restricts  loans  to
property and stocks to head off a crisis. 
early-May,  Japanese  officials,  concerned  about  the
decline of the yen, hinted that they might raise interest
rate. Investors start gradual withdrawal from South East
Asian markets. 
mid-May, The BNM defends ringgit with few days of
very high interest rates.
July 2, Thai baht collapses and turmoil begins.
July 8, Malaysian central bank, Bank Negara, has to
intervene aggressively to defend the ringgit. The inter-
vention works for a while (the currency slightly appreci-
ates). 
July 14, Malaysia central bank abandons the defense of
the  ringgit  and  engages  in  stabilizing  domestic  money
market with relatively loose monetary policy.
July 24, Ringgit hits 38-month low of 2.65 MYR/USD. 
July 26, Prime Minister Mahathir blames George Soros
and other "rogue speculators" for the attack on the ring-
git. 
September 4, Ringgit breaks through 3 MYR/USD. 
September 20, Mahathir tells the public, that specula-
tion is immoral and should be stopped. 
October 1, Mahathir repeats his call for tighter regu-
lation, or a total ban on forex trading. The ringgit falls 4%
in less than 2 hours to a low of 3.4MYR/USD. 
October 17, Malaysia tightens budget in effort to stop
the economy from sliding into recession. 
December 5, Malaysia finally and radically changes its
policy and imposes tough reforms in order to deal with a
crisis. These include an 18% cut in government spending,
restriction on large-volume import, on bank credit and in
stock market regulations. There were to be "no question
of bailout" for financially ailing companies.
1998 
January-February,  Several  increases  in  BNM's  inter-
vention interest rate were planned to stop the currency
from depreciating and restrict inflationary pressures 
March, The severity of the crisis is gradually recog-
nized and the fiscal policy changes to more expansionary.
The  fiscal  package  of  3  billion  MYR  (1%  of  GDP)  is
announced and a drastic revision of federal budged aims
the deficit of 2.6% of GDP .
July, Another additional fiscal package (7 billion MYR
(2.5%  of  GDP))  announced  in  order  to  stimulate  the
economy.
January-August, Despite the austerity fiscal measures
and firm monetary policy the crisis and the capital outflow
continue.
September  1,  Malaysia  introduces  capital  controls;
financial investment can be repatriated only after a 1-year
period. Rental and profits from sales can be repatriated.
1999 
February 5, Malaysia replaces one year holding period
with exit tax. Repatriation of principal and profits will be
subjected to a maximum levy of 30%. 
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5.1. Overview
5.1.1. Introduction
Indonesia, the biggest archipelago in the world, located in
Southeast Asia, declared its independence from the Dutch and
Japanese in 1945 and has been a republic since then.  The
President, as the head of the state and chief of the cabinet, is
elected every five years. Since 1967 (till 1998) this post was
occupied by Soeharto, who ruled in an authoritarian manner.
The elctoral system has been constructed to always secure
the victory of the (then) ruling party, "Golkar". The power of
President Soeharto and the Golkar has been derived from its
close relationship with the military and administration – the
military officers, under the doctrine of "dual function", have
always served in civilian positions, such as cabinet ministers,
local governors, heads of state corporations, supreme court
judges, etc. In the last elections before the crisis, in May 1997,
Golkar increased its share in the Parliament from 68% to
74%. The activities of the Parliament were merely to ratify
the government's (President's) directives.
The 200-mln population is a complex ethnic and reli-
gious  mixture  (Muslim,  Christian,  and  Buddhists).  The
Indonesian-Chinese, although constituting only 3–4% of the
population and having little political resources in their dis-
posal, are disproportionately important in trade and com-
merce – they control about 80% of total private capital,
ranging from the biggest corporations to small provincial
shops and stores. In the Muslim majority, notably among the
poor, there is a feeling of exploitation by the Chinese minor-
ity. Social and ethnic tensions have been hidden under the
authoritarian grip of the system. In addition, some provinces
of  Indonesia,  namely  Aceh,  Papua  and,  till  recently,  East
Timor  –  possess  strong  independence  movements  and
often take active armed resistance, which is quickly sup-
pressed by the authorities. 
80% of the Indonesian economy is private, but there are
still large state-owned companies – notably in the oil and
mineral extraction sectors. The dominance of politics over
the economy is the key issue when analyzing the Indonesian
economic  system.  Under  Soeharto  regime,  this  system
relied on the partnership between Chinese business and the
military, as well as politically connected civilians (often the
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relatives of senior government officials) in which the latter
took a share in profits in exchange for providing protection
and preferential access to contracts, concessions, licenses,
tax exemptions etc. The same system of concessions and
restrictions prevented others from participating in the most
profitable economic activities. The children of the President
were owners and chiefs of banks, oil firms and other strate-
gic companies – corruption and nepotism were widespread.
Indonesia was notoriously ranked in the last position in the
Transparency International rankings [1].  The economy has
been, to large extent, monopolized – from oil extraction to
clove cigarettes – there was no Western standard competi-
tion law. Imports and distribution of essential food items
were monopolized by state agency Bulog; food, electricity
and other everyday products were subsidized. 
Nevertheless this system, which derived its legitimacy
from sustained improvement in the standard of living of
the mass Indonesians, has been so far successful in achiev-
ing its goal of fast development. As a result of political sta-
bility and the impressive mobilization of country resources
(saving  rates  around  30%,  investment  rates  around
30–35%  of  GDP-  in  the  1990s),  Indonesia  experienced
three decades of permanent growth and transformed itself
from an underdeveloped, impoverished, agricultural and
mineral-exporting country to a rapidly urbanizing industri-
al economy. In the years preceding the crisis, growth aver-
aged around 7% per year. Recent reforms reoriented the
economy so as to reduce its dependence on the oil sector,
encourage the creation of competitive non-oil export-ori-
ented industrial infrastructure and expand the role of the
private  sector.  In  early  1997,  GDP  per  capita  stood  at
around 1140 USD, while total GDP was about 225 bln
USD. The primary sector (agriculture, mining, etc.) had
25% share in total GDP and about 40% of total employ-
ment.  Manufacturing  and  construction  constituted  35%
and employed about 20% of the labor force. Tertiary sec-
tor (services etc.) had around a 40% share in both GDP
and employment.
5.1.2. Monetary Policy and the Financial Sector
The central bank of Indonesia is Bank Indonesia (BI). Its
task is to conduct monetary policy to stabilize macroeco-
nomic environment, issue the national currency, the rupiah
(IDR), handle foreign exchange assets and debt servicing, as
well as exercise control over national banking and financial
system. To this end, BI monitors broad money, credit aggre-
gates and reserve money. In addition, the authorities moni-
tor the real value of the rupiah against an undisclosed basket
of currencies. The main instrument in BI actions are open
market operations involving Bank Indonesia papers (intro-
duced in 1984) and commercial bank papers (from 1985), as
well as reserve requirements and foreign exchange inter-
ventions. In the 1990s, BI has succeeded in limiting inflation
only to rather moderate level of 7–11%, however, in a peri-
od  leading  to  the  crisis  inflation  was  steadily  falling  and
reached about 5% in mid-1997.
Foreign  reserves,  together  with  reserve  money,  have
been rising largely due to capital inflows, while domestic
credit accelerated, triggered by financial liberalization. In the
1990s, BI had permanent problems with rapidly growing
[1] In 1995: 41/41 (41 place out of 41 reviewed countries), 1996: 47/54, 1997: 46/51, 1998 80/95.
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credit  (over  20%  a  year  in  the  period  preceding  crisis).
Because of that, BI has conducted a relatively restrictive pol-
icy of high interest rates. Reserve requirements have been
raised in accordance with BI plan to reduce credit growth to
17% in 1997 [2]. Bank lending rates in the 1990s have been
usually 10% or more above inflation. The exchange rate
policy can be described as real exchange rate targeting –
with the rupiah gradually and predictably depreciating with
respect to the USD about 4% year, i.e. from around 1900
IDR/USD in 1990 to around 2400 IDR/USD in mid-1997.
Such a policy combined with capital account liberalization
created incentives to borrow abroad to take advantage of
interest rate differentials and prepare the ground for large
capital inflows. BI tried to counteract excessive inflows by
widening the rupiah's trading bands from 2% to 3% around
daily mid-rate in 1995, and further to 5% in June 1996, and
to 8% in September 1996, adding therefore some risk to
foreign exchange market.
Before the crisis, the size of the Indonesian financial sec-
tor amounted to some 60% of GDP [3]. The leading finan-
cial  institutions  in  Indonesia  were  commercial  banks,
accounting for 87% of total assets, out of which the biggest
seven state-owned banks accounted for around half of that
figure, the other half being distributed among around 170
private banks (1995). Other financial institutions like insur-
ance companies, pension funds, stock brokerages or other
financial intermediaries played only a minor part in the sys-
tem and had no impact on the overall picture.
The  process  of  liberalization  of  the  banking  system
began in 1983 with interest rates liberalization and the elim-
ination  of  credit  ceilings.  But  ever  since  the  government
opened up the system to new entrants in 1988–89, the sec-
tor started to thrive. In 1988, reserve requirements were
reduced from 15% to 2%, licenses for new private and
joint-venture  banks  issued,  and  state-owned  firms  were
allowed to put 50% of their funds with private banks. The
following year, the requirement of BI license in long-term
loans granting and offshore loans ceiling was removed. The
number of banks soared from 112 to around 240 as anyone
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[2] The plan failed to large extent and eventually credit growth reached 23%.
[3] Data for 1994. Compare Malaysia 100% of GDP and Thailand 110% of GDP .80
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with access to around 3 mln USD minimum capital could set
up shop. So did bank credit that rose by 350% from 1988
till 1995. In 1994, new private banks overtook state banks
with lending activity. Without a proper supervision frame-
work, and in combination with a severe shortage of trained
and experienced bankers, this quickly led to a problem with
prudent asset management and bad debts. To counteract
this  problem,  BI  introduced  a  minimum  capital  adequacy
ratio of 8% and gradually increased minimum capital need-
ed to open a bank to around 30 mln USD. In 1992, state
owned banks were converted into limited liabilities compa-
nies. However, the Ministry of Finance announced in 1994
that it would not permit a state bank to default on its oblig-
ations.
This was not the end of banking fragility and problems.
Financial  scandals  and  bank  failures  were  quite  frequent,
with government intervening to bail out  bankrupt banks
and cover deposits [4]. Noncompliance in lending limits and
off-balance sheet operations were widespread. Strong polit-
ical dependence of state banks, which were used as a source
of  cheap  capital  for  government  affiliates'  enterprises,
explains their permanent inferior performance, in terms of
both return on assets and bad loans.
After liberalization, the 1990s witnessed a rapid devel-
opment of the securities market. In 1988, the market was
opened to foreign investors, in 1994 Bapepam (the state
supervisory  agency)  implemented  new  accounting  stan-
dards, and in 1995 a new computerized automatic trading
system was introduced allowing for much higher trading vol-
ume. Despite these changes, the securities market never
became  a  major  source  of  commercial  finance.  In  1994,
equity market capitalization was only of 30% of GDP [5].
Moreover, its importance is still overestimated because cap-
italization includes shares that have never been sold – 70%
of the shares are held by companies' founders [6], while the
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[4] Examples include looting of Bank Bapindo, or Bank Lippo scandal.
[5] Compared to 280% in Malaysia and 95% in Thailand.
[6] Indonesia has the highest ownership concentration in corporate sector among Southeast Asian countries. As it has been stated above, main
Indonesian companies are characterized by the close connections with the authorities, strong family ties, and are monopolized by the small elite of Chi-
nese businessmen, and senior government officials. 81
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government holds large stakes in privatized and listed for-
mer-state-owned companies. When adjusted for that the
stock  market  has  provided  about  15%  of  total  business
finance. The small size of the market and open access to it
are the reasons why the Indonesian stock exchange was
70% dependent on foreign investors and relatively volatile.
International  investors  complained  about  small  liquidity,
poor audit standards, doubtful fairness and quality of com-
panies' disclosures as well as notorious insider trading.
Capital account liberalization started with a gradual pro-
motion of foreign direct investment in designated sectors
and with efforts to restructure and modernize the economy
from  oil-export  dependence  [7].  Investment  procedures
were simplified, certain restricted fields gradually opened,
equal  treatment  with  domestic  investment  sequentially
granted, etc. In 1989 so called priority list ("in what fields to
invest") was exchanged by so called negative list consisting
of domains in which foreign investment was restricted. The
number of items on the negative list was decreasing. As a
result, foreign direct investment has been steadily pouring
into Indonesia, especially from 1995 (in 1996/97 accounting
year [8] FDI inflow amounted to 6.5 bln USD). In 1988,
Indonesia accepted the obligation of Article VIII [9] – the
foreign  exchange  market  was  developed  and  the  swap
transactions liberalized. The forex market remained rela-
tively shallow with a 10 bln daily turnover in mid-1997. In
1989 and 1996 the authorities liberalized portfolio capital
inflows by eliminating quantitative limits on banks' borrow-
ing from nonresidents, foreigners were permitted to freely
invest in stocks up to 49% of share capital, and the central
bank withdrew from its obligatory intermediation in foreign
exchange transactions.
High  interest  rates,  a  stable  rupiah  exchange  rate,  a
growth-oriented environment and an expanding stock mar-
ket  resulted  in  constant  inflows  of  foreign  portfolio  and
short term capital (7 bln USD in acc. year 1995/96 and 6 bln
USD in acc. year 1996/97). As a result, foreign reserves in
Bank Indonesia have been steadily increasing. BI attempted
to sterilize the resulting increase in base money by sales of
central bank papers and through interventions on foreign
exchange market. Capital inflows mainly took the form of
borrowing of commercial banks, which in turn were con-
verted it into local currency and lent to domestic corporate
sector.
5.1.3. The External Sector
As a result of years of trade protection, Indonesia is not a
particularly open economy in Southeast Asian terms – the
average  trade  [10]  is  about  25–30%  of  GDP .  The  most
important export items are oil and natural gas – their share in
total exports is one-fourth. Indonesia has made an effort to
reduce its dependence on oil, and the export composition
weights towards manufactured goods, such as textiles, wood
products and electrical appliances, and now the share of man-
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[7] In the beginning (mid-1980s) firms were encouraged to export all their production and to invest in remote areas.
[8] In Indonesia the reporting and accounting year starts in April.
[9] Article VIII of the IMF's Articles of Agreement, i.e. general obligations of members.
[10] (import+export)/2/GDP .
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ufactured goods in export is about 30%. Indonesia is also
dependent on oil/gas sector-related imports (that accounts
for 10% of total import) as well as on intermediate and capi-
tal goods imports. There is one major item to be mentioned
with respect to imports – Indonesia was importing food (rice,
wheat, etc.) for about 2–3 bln USD in years before crisis.
Major trade partners are Singapore, US, Japan and the Euro-
pean Union. To meet the WTO criteria Indonesia was gradu-
ally reducing its import tariffs and they averaged 12% in 1997.
Because the authorities were monitoring and targeting
the real exchange rate, the rupiah overvaluation was not a
major issue in Indonesian external position – in 1990s before
crisis it has been fluctuating around 100% (+/- 3.5%). At
the end of 1996, due to an extremely weak Japanese yen,
the CPI-based real effective exchange rate was somehow
overvalued and stood at 105% [11]. But with a tradition of
sluggish and steady rupiah adjustment, there was no threat
of any drastic exchange rate adjustment.
CASE Reports No. 39
[11] It must be noted that there are well known problems in assessing real exchange rate, so estimates differ depending on the source. There is a
consensus, however, that the real exchange rate was in the neighborhood of its parity equilibrium.
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In the 1990s, Indonesia was experiencing moderate cur-
rent account deficits. From some 4% of GDP , the deficit has
been contained to around 1% in mid-1990s and started to
increase in the period leading to the crisis to reach 3–4% of
GDP – it was, however, very reasonable compared to other
Southeast Asian countries and could be interpreted as long
term consumption smoothing. In addition, the trade balance
was  positive.  The  key  items  responsible  for  the  current
account deficit were the 7,6 bln USD capital goods import
induced in large part by foreign investment, permanently
negative service balance (3 bln USD in oil/gas service pay-
ments in 1996/97) and especially net factor income balance
(6 bln USD of investment interest payments). These figures
suggest  that  the  side  effects  of  a  large  long-term  capital
inflow (i.e. interest payment and capital good import) were
the main factors in current account developments. As these
payments were also the most inelastic items in the current
account it can be concluded that this deficit had a rather
structural  character.  Notwithstanding  its  moderate  size,
Indonesian  authorities  have  taken  some  fiscal  actions  to
contain these imbalances.
5.1.4. The Public Sector
The size of the public sector in Indonesia is small. In
1996/97 federal governments raised 16% of GDP and spent
14.6% of GDP . The local finances did not exceed 1–2% of
GDP . Direct taxes provided 56% of revenues, out of which
the most important is a tax levied on oil production (23%
of total budget). 33% came from indirect taxes, remaining
11% were derived from non-tax sources. On the expendi-
ture side, the current (operative) expenditures had a 60%
share, while developmental (plus net lending) – remaining
40% of total expenditures. The authorities provided many
subsidies, notably to food and electricity. The fiscal sector
was far from being transparent. The participation in public
infrastructure projects has been subject to restrictions and
entails  unclear,  noncompetitive  bidding.  Well-connected
companies could count on numerous tax concessions and
exemptions, borrowing on favorable terms, etc. The fiscal
balance was threatened by the possibility of a bailout of
some insolvent financial institutions, part of budget deficits
could be hidden in the balance sheets of state-owned banks.
In the late 1980s, Indonesia came through a process of
fiscal  consolidation,  which  resulted  in  the  very  positive
CASE Reports No. 39





































record of budget surpluses in the 1990s. Rather conserva-
tive fiscal policy was aimed at reducing domestic demand
stemming from rapid credit expansion, as well as containing
the current account deficit. In the accounting year 1996/97,
the  conventionally  measured  government  budget  surplus
stood at 1.4% of GDP .
Prudent fiscal policy, combined with high rates of eco-
nomic growth, led to a declining public debt ratio, which in
1997 equaled some 25% of GDP [12]. 
The government external debt in 1996/97 amounted to
56 bln USD or 23% of GDP – 44% denominated in USD
and 37% in Japanese yen. But the main problem was a pri-
vate sector external debt officially estimated at 57 bln USD.
Given attractive interest rate differentials and a pretty free
capital flow regime, the private sector got heavily indebted
( mostly with short term debts). There is no reliable data on
the extent of the debt or the precise maturity structure [13]
– authorities were obviously interested in underestimating
its share. According to the World Bank, 25% of the debt
was short term, among Bank of International Settlements
members,  controlling  most  of  Indonesian  debt,  this  ratio
was 61%.
Total external debt was officially 113 bln (around 50% of
GDP). Other sources estimate this number to be around
130 bln USD, or even more. The debt required 15 bln USD
debt-service payments in 1996/97. 
5.2. The Crisis
5.2.1. Introduction
The direct cause of the Indonesian financial crisis was
contagion from its Southeast Asian neighbors. After the Thai
baht  was  floated,  the  general  Asian  market  risk  was
reassessed sharply and caused adjustments which Indonesia
couldn't  endure  or  counteract.  The  mechanism  of  crisis
development was more or less similar to other countries
[14]. A gradual (yet fairly visible) deteriorating macroeco-
nomic situation in the country was making international cap-
ital market anxious about the further profitability of capital
investments  in  a  given  country,  and  generally  about  the
future prospect of Asian-style capitalism.  A long period of
constant growth gave domestic firms a false impression of
stability. A highly competitive and poorly regulated banking
sector engaged itself in more risky projects to take advan-
tage of an investment boom. After the economy overheat-
ed, a slowdown was expected, some short-term capital was
withdrawn, and a number of domestic firms hedged against
possible currency depreciation. The downward pressure on
the currency forced the authorities to choose one of the
alternative solutions.
First, if they had sufficient foreign reserves, they could
defend the currency by hiking interest rates, but it would
lead to a contraction of the economy and could be accept-
able only as a temporary measure (longer debt maturities
are usually not affected). This problem becomes more seri-
ous if a large portion of domestic debt is short-term. A pro-
longed period of high short-term interest rates can force
some  cash-short  companies  to  postpone  investments  or
even  default  on  their  obligation.  One  default  can  cause
another default, and suddenly the economy falls into illiquid-
ity  with  serious  contractionary  consequences.  Things  get
even worse if banks and firms invest in assets (like stocks,
real estate) as asset prices usually decrease substantially in a
crisis.
Secondly,  the  authorities  could  let  the  exchange  rate
depreciate. But if the economy has a large stock of external
debt, especially in the private sector, or if companies bor-
row in foreign currency, having receipts in domestic curren-
cy  (and  unhedged)  can  become  overwhelmed  by  the
increase in their debt and get cut from any financing and
eventually fall. There is usually no need for creditors to liq-
uidate pending deposits – when the debt is mainly short
term it is sufficient only to postpone or refuse to roll over.
Illiquidity turns into insolvency – the ratio of bad loans
soars and if the banking system is weak, poorly managed and
undercapitalized, some banks may go bankrupt. If there is
little confidence in the financial system, there could be a run
on other banks and a collapse as well. Authorities then have
to get engaged in an emergency bail-out and massive capital
injection, the monetary base explodes, inflation rises, cur-
rency  plummets,  depreciation  fuels  inflation  (and  vice
verse),  and  external  debt  problems  increase.  Confidence
among foreign investors evaporates. The lack of political will
to stick to harsh anti-crisis measures and social unrest only
makes the problem more serious. 
So if there is both a large stock of short-term debt and a
large stock of unhedged external debt, combined with other
ingredients like a shortage of foreign reserves, a weak finan-
cial system or political instability, the authorities might have
no degree of freedom to maneuver and no power to reas-
sure foreign and domestic investors about the safeness of
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[12] Compared to 55% in 1987.
[13] Bank Indonesia probably lost track of all private sector foreign borrowings. Other estimates suggest 65 bln USD or even 80 bln. There are
also well understood problems with maturity classification of different loan arrangements – the average maturity of foreign debt was in the neighbor-
hood of 18 months.
[14] Japan was the first example, that the times of highly regulated economies whose growth is based on extensive mobilization of national (or for-
eign) resources might come to an end, and that their growth prospects has to be revised.85
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their investment. Such a situation falls under the term "vul-
nerability". When this becomes common knowledge, spec-
ulators join capital outflows and sell the domestic currency
short. At this point, it is virtually impossible to reverse the
crisis without a cost.  In this respect, Indonesia typifies the
worst-case scenario.
5.2.2. Indonesia's Vulnerability Analysis
For  decades,  economists  were  making  an  effort  to
improve crisis predictability and their work is far from being
accomplished. For some time, the occurrence of a curren-
cy and financial crises is explained in terms of "vulnerability".
When certain conditions are satisfied there is an increased
probability of a crisis, but its timing and actual occurrence
are determined by market sentiment and shifts in expecta-
tions.
Usually some macroeconomic indicators (called "leading
crisis indicators") endowed with above average predictive
power exceed their standard values before the crisis and
this is the most frequent way of describing vulnerability. It is
possible  to  construct  a  so-called  "early  warning  system"
(see, for example, Edison (2000)) based on the combination
of these indicators that would issue a signal warning against
a possible crisis. However, the performance of such systems
leaves much to be desired [15]. Many researchers come up
with many proposals for leading indicators but the most
popular include: real exchange rate, foreign reserves, cur-
rent account, the level of short term debt (external and
domestic), rapid credit growth, fiscal and monetary expan-
sion, short-term capital flows as well as other, hardly mea-
surable features like the extent of moral hazard ("the incen-
tive structure of financial system"), exposure to contagion
etc.
From the point of view of a domestic investor borrow-
ing externally, or a short-term international investor holding
the rupiah, the most important point is IDR/USD exchange
rate, at which they exchange their rupiah receipts into hard
currency. They thus count on the authorities that the policy
of assuring exchange rate stability won't be altered. For the
defense of the currency against pressures, there is an essen-
tial need of foreign reserves. Indonesian foreign exchange
reserves stood at about 20 billion USD in mid-1997. Total
external  debt  service  to  foreign  reserves  ratio  gives  an
answer to the question of whether the country can serve its
current obligations. This debt service (interest and amorti-
zation) was about 15 bln USD in 1997, producing a danger-
ously high ratio of around 75%. This means that without
further foreign loans, Indonesia would have had problems
meeting its obligations. Debt can be serviced also by the
export proceeds.  But the ratio of external debt service to
export stood at around 30% – the highest among Southeast
Asian countries. Once all short-term creditors would like to
withdraw their funds at one moment, would the reserves
be sufficient enough to meet their demand? Again, the ratio
of total external short-term debt plus external debt service
to  foreign  reserves,  depending  on  the  estimate,  ranged
from  210%  to  320%.  It  has  been  therefore  absolutely
essential for Indonesia to have its short-term debt rolled
over, otherwise it would have to default on its obligations.
The  country's  external  finances  depended  wholly  on  the
sentiments  of  short-term  foreign  creditors  and  domestic
investors' willingness to hedge foreign debt, as well as their
CASE Reports No. 39
[15] Actually, Indonesia did fairly well in the rankings of crisis probability.






























































































































































beliefs about the future exchange rates and the behavior of
other market participants.
A second indicator of financial solvency is the money to
foreign reserves ratio. In the event of financial panic and
irrational domestic asset selling, the central bank should be
able to cover its liabilities (reserve money) – theoretically all
the rupiah (cash or power-money) can be exchanged into
hard currency if the central bank sticks to its exchange rate.
A ratio below 100% is a good sign for the soundness of the
system. In Indonesia it was 100%. In practice, BI acted as a
lender of last resort, so if it was ultimately determined to
support the banking system in the event of financial panic, all
liquid money assets (M1 or even M2 [16]) could potentially
be converted into foreign currency. Therefore the ratio of
monetary aggregates to foreign reserves is another leading
indicator of possible distress [17]. The ratio of money (M1)
to foreign reserves was 135%, but more commonly used
M2/foreign reserves ratio, as a result of thriving banking sec-
tor activities, was about 700%, which can be regarded as
very dangerous [18]. On the other hand, the informative
content of this indicator is not very clear, as M2/FX ratio is
to  large  extent  country  specific  and  reflects  rather  the
development of domestic banking system.
Although the indicator of the real exchange rate and fis-
cal stance were well below the warning level, the current
account  deficit  needs  to  be  addressed.  Throughout  the
1990s, the balance was negative, while standing at 3% of
GDP in 1996 it was not a big problem in the period leading
to  the  crisis.  Nevertheless,  when  adjustment  had  been
made for usual oil/gas surplus the deficit would have risen to
more than 5% of GDP . The variability of oil prices and ever
increasing foreign debt service payments might have cast
some doubts on its sustainability. 
The  notion  of  sustainability  can  be  implemented  by
introducing non-increasing foreign debt to GDP ratio. The
current account is sustainable if it doesn't cause an excessive
build-up of foreign debt. By taking arbitrary 1% difference
between long-run interest rate and long-run growth rate
Corsetti,  et.al.  (1999)  show  that  a  sustainable  current
account in case of Indonesia equals about 3.3% of GDP ,
which was more or less equal to its actual record. In accor-
dance to that finding, Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1996) argue
that the Indonesian deficit pattern in the 1990s matched the
consumption smoothing theory rather closely, so it should
be nothing wrong with such a deficit. But the consumption
smoothing theory predicts that at some moment in future
there would be a switch into a surplus. So, from a political-
economic point of view, the deficit is sustainable if it can be
reverted into a surplus according to a optimal development
path, without a crisis or drastic policy change. But in fact, in
1996–97,  the  current  account  imbalance  seemed  rather
structural. FDI inflows, the main source of current account
financing,  were  never  sufficient  to  cover  the  deficit,  and
Indonesia had to rely on new foreign loans. This led us to the
issue of sustainability of capital inflows, and thus, sustainabil-
ity of economic growth.
Indonesia grew at average annual rate of about 7% in
the first-half of the 1990s. That was possible thanks to
sizeable  capital  inflow,  and,  vice  versa,  the  capital  was
attracted by anticipated high rates of growth and invest-
ment opportunities. However, the abundance of capital,
high investment rates and rapid credit expansion led to
deterioration of the quality of investment projects. Politi-
cally  connected  monopolies  paid  no  attention  to  cost
reduction, a bulk of government investments was designed
under political or propagandist considerations rather than
out of efficiency reasons. The private corporate and bank-
ing sector, facing increased supplies of capital and a tradi-
tion  of  poor  regulation,  turned  to  more  risky  projects.
Claessens et.al. (1998) remark that the return-on-assets
ratio  has  decreased  in  Indonesia  from  8%  between
1988–1994 to 5.5% in 1995–1996 [19]. 
However, the main vulnerabilities of Indonesia originat-
ed from a building up of short-term external debt, a shaky
domestic banking system and rising political instability.
Aging President Soeharto showed not only no signs of
retiring but had also been very reluctant to even discuss the
issue of his successor and his idea of how the transition of
power might be accomplished without political and social
tension what in presence of Indonesian political strife and
social/ethnical  unrest  has  been  a  matter  of  importance.
There was also a lack of confidence that in an event of a cri-
sis  the  corruption-ridden  government  could  deal  with  it
effectively.
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[16] If banks allow the depositors to break time deposits.
[17] Compare Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995).
[18] It is worth to notice that in November 1994, just before Mexican crisis M2/foreign reserves were 9.1 in Mexico, and 3.6 in Brazil and Argenti-
na. In Malaysia it was 4.8.
[19]  The issue of capital productivity is closely linked to the ongoing and yet unresolved debate about the causes of the Asian miracle, namely
whether the fast growth of Asian countries results just from abundance of capital and labor force or from productivity growth. The first view has been
advanced by Young in the beginning of the 1990s and popularized by Krugman (1994, 1998). They argue that the total factor productivity (TFP) in East
Asia has been significantly lower (sometimes even close to zero) than the rate of GDP growth. There are also studies that contradict this view. Sarel
(1997) finds that TFP growth in Indonesia in 1978–1996 has been quite remarkable and amounted to 1.2% per year. Also the estimates of incremen-
tal capital output ratio (ICOR – a measure of capital productivity) show the decrease form 4.0 in 1987–92 to 3.8 in 1993–96 indicating a some improve-
ment in investment efficiency. But on the other hand (according to World Bank data), ICOR has been rising (weakening efficiency) till 1987 and again
from 1994.87
The Episodes of Currency Crises in Latin...
What  concerns  the  banking  sector,  its  weakness  was
structural. The audit standards, transparency and compli-
ance to prudential principles record was astonishingly poor.
In 1995, half of private banks and 40% of state banks failed
with respect to either capital adequacy ratio, legal lending
limits or loan deposit ratio. 
Another issue was that state banks did not necessarily
make loans on a commercial basis and were subject to polit-
ical pressures. This problem was also present among private
banks often maintaining close connections with their bor-
rowing customers [20] which created incentives for risky or
even  fraudulent  lending  to  these  customers  and  did  not
encourage accurate loan monitoring. Poorly capitalized and
monitored banks competing with other similar small banks
on a segmented market had even more incentives to make
riskier  loans,  especially  if  the  management  expected  to
become bailed-out if things go wrong (moral hazard). 
This quickly led to the problem of bad loans – about
10% of total loans were classified as non-performing [21].
State banks had an especially bad record with this share at
17%, while private national banks had, on average, 5% of
their  loans  non-performing.  Indonesia  also  had  previous
experience with banking scandals, financial sector bankrupt-
cies and even bank runs. Instead of closing insolvent and
bankrupt banks, the authorities arranged bailouts, encour-
aged mergers and provided other forms of support. They
also announced that no state bank would be left alone to
default on its obligations. Such actions were the reason why
bank managers could have an impression of having (implic-
it)  government  guarantees.  The  moral  hazard  problem
became even more serious in the presence of a poor bank-
ruptcy law and inconsistencies in law enforcement.
The combination of a relatively open financial market,
growing eagerness of global investors to put money into
Asia, high Indonesian interest rates and expanding Indone-
sian  corporate  sector  resulted  in  large  capital  inflows  –
indeed larger than banks and companies could wisely invest.
The dangerous side effect of this inflow and market circum-
stance was a mismatch in the balance sheets of banks and
corporation. Maturity mismatch resulted from the use of
short-term debt to finance long-term projects, while cur-
rency mismatch emerged from the use of foreign-currency
denominated loans to credit local currency earning projects.
In the pre-crisis period this mismatch has not created
many problems because of exchange rate stability and a tra-
dition of a smooth rollover of short-term debt. 
The above-mentioned developments (large interest rate
differentials,  open  capital  market,  (false)  impression  of
exchange rate stability, growth environment, smooth debt
rollover)  were  responsible  for  the  key  component  of
Indonesian  vulnerability,  i.e.  the  existence  of  immense
unhedged foreign currency liabilities. In July/August 1997,
one of the major global financial consulting companies sur-
veyed 34 Indonesian chief financial officers. 2/3 of them had
more than 40% of their debt in foreign currencies. Half of
this amount was completely unhedged, and most of the rest
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Table 5-1. Noncompliance to prudential rules (in number of institutions). Capital adequacy ratio (Car), Legal lending limits (Lll), Loan-
deposit ratio (Ldr)
Total in category Car Lll Ldr
State 7 0 2 1
Private national 166 18 56 11
Local development 27 2 3 0
Foreign and joint 40 1 9 6
Total 240 21 70 18
Source: Montgomery (1997), BI, data for 1995
Table 5-2. Banks' performance: Return on assets (Roa) and Car
96/97 97/98 98/99
ROA CAR ROA CAR ROA CAR
Comm. banks 1.17 12.2 0.38 4.3 -22.6 -24.6
State 0.82 13.9 0.34 2.4 -24.9 -28.4
Private forex 1.13 10.3 -0.47 5.3 -29.2 -18.8
Private nonforex 0.31 9.7 0.97 15.9 -0.35 10.4
Joint 2.49 18 1.54 4.8 -9.88 -7.7
Foreign 4.48 13.8 5.18 12.8 -0.77 12.9
Source: BI
[20] Like the ownership of poorly regulated banks by non-financial companies or political connections between bank managers and borrowing firm
management.
[21] Data for 1995. For end-1996 estimates were about 13%.88
Marek D¹browski (ed.)
had well under half of their debt hedged. Borrowing US dol-
lars  was  part  of  life  in  Indonesia  –  "it  was  like  going  to
McDonald's" [22]. Everyone assumed that the money would
always be available, and took advantage of this situation.
After 30 years of steady economic growth, the corporate
sector didn't seem to fear economic downturn.
Some  of  the  loans  were  used  to  finance  speculative
investments  in  such  areas  as  equity  purchases  and  real
estate. Property loans grew at an annual rate of more than
60% during 1992–1995 (compared to 20–25% percent rate
of growth for total credit) and in April 1997 accounted for
19.6% of outstanding bank credits. To restrain the growing
exposure of the banking system to this sector BI restricted
in July 1997 commercial banks from extending new loans for
land purchases and property development (except for low-
cost housing). Total credit growth also continued, in spite of
consecutive statutory reserve requirements increases (from
2% to 3% in January 1996 and an announcement of a rise
to 5% in April 1997) and other attempts by BI to contain it.
The growing uncertainty about the future development
on the exchange rate market was reflected by an increase in
the volume of forward and swap rupiah transactions. Their
average daily turnover rose from around 4.5 bln USD in
early 1997 to about 6.2 bln USD in June/ July 1997. The
increase  in  trading  illustrates  increased  hedging  activities
among externally indebted domestic companies. However,
nobody expected that a sharp downturn and such a severe
crisis would erupt.
5.2.3. Crisis Development
Indonesia's troubles began on July 2, 1997 when the Thai
baht peg to the USD collapsed. Immediately, market confi-
dence in Southeast Asian economies was reassessed. Unex-
pected devaluation of the baht meant that any country with
similar economic and export structure and comparable fun-
damentals is likely to give up its exchange rate policy under
similar circumstances. Such an event is called a "wake up
call", or a focal point for coordinating market expectations -
a "sunspot".
A prolonged period of downward pressure started. The
yield curve inverted dramatically. On July 11, the Philippines
gave up supporting its peso, while the Indonesian authorities
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[22] After The Wall Street Journal 31 XII 1997 quoting one Singapore based Indonesia-investing fund manager.
























1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
total property sector
Source: IMF89
The Episodes of Currency Crises in Latin...
widened the trading bands from 8% to 12% (and inter-
vened when the rate moved outside the band). On July 14,
Malaysia gave up its currency peg. It took one more month
and a 15% depreciation until Bank Indonesia floated the
rupiah and doubled short-term interest rates to over 25%
to  support  its  value  [23].  On  August  29,  BI  introduced
restrictions (up to 5 mln USD per customer) on nonresi-
dents' trading in forward currency contract (i.e. supposed
speculation). Despite this, capital outflows continued and by
October  8,  the  rupiah/dollar  exchange  rate  had  already
depreciated  cumulatively  by  46%.  By  that  day,  matters
went so badly with domestic financial and corporate sector
CASE Reports No. 39
[23] To what extent the rupiah collapse has been caused by speculators or by domestic investors suddenly starting to hedge against exchange risk
is a subject of great debate. Indonesian authorities (Minister of Justice in August) claimed that the speculators were guilty and their activities could be
interpreted as subversive criminal actions (there is a death penalty for subversion), while hedge-fund managers and other participants suggest that this
was not the case. Major funds were fully invested in the rupiah and they even supposedly bet on the rupiah rebound at some moment. But it was the
case that many unhedged domestic companies decided to insure in forward market against the rupiah decline. Of course, speculators joined the mar-
ket when depreciation seemed to be inevitable.





















































































































































































































































































































































































that Indonesia's government decided to request IMF assis-
tance.
The financial and the corporate sector was confronted
with an increase in the rupiah value of their foreign indebt-
edness. Most private companies were able for some time to
cover their foreign exchange losses but they were dramati-
cally running out of cash, unable to refinance their short
term debt and watching it rapidly expanding (banks and for-
eign creditors refused to rollover the existing short term
debt). On the other hand, banks were unable to crack down
on their debtors because of a weak and inefficient bank-
ruptcy law. This, together with tight liquidity and high inter-
est rates, gradually pushed many banks and companies into
technical  bankruptcy.  At  end-October,  rating  agencies
downgraded the ratings of 10 big Indonesian banks from
neutral to negative, further limiting their borrowing abilities.
The already poor confidence in the national banking system
brought about a gradual build-up of runs on some of the pri-
vate banks, reflecting a "flight to quality", as depositor per-
ceived state banks to be safe and were moving deposits
from presumably troubled private banks. As a result of a cri-
sis, the stock market index immediately lost 30%, and then
a further 10%, before November 1997 because investors
lost confidence. The real estate market collapsed as well.
Office, residential and retail property rent and prices (usual-
ly quoted in USD) fell from 30% to 80% between June
1997 and June 1998.
On October 31, 1997, the IMF unveiled the 23 bln USD
aid package for Indonesia and on November 5 approved a
10 bln USD standby loan facility. Apart from a request for
structural  reforms  and  tight  monetary  and  prudent  fiscal
policy, the package included the requirement for the closure
of  the  16  most  insolvent  (bankrupt)  banks.  Authorities,
however, failed to extend appropriate deposit guarantees
and a panic erupted among depositors running the whole
system [24]. A massive and sudden withdrawal of deposits
started, a large number of banks failed to meet their obliga-
tions and had to resort to central bank liquidity support.
One reason for a sudden drop in overall confidence was
that people saw the end of the regime approaching quickly.
They doubted the political capacity of the government to
fulfil its commitments to the IMF. In the beginning of Decem-
ber 1997, Soeharto was ordered to retire to bed and disap-
peared from public life for about a month. The implementa-
tion of IMF packages was already delayed or off-track. The
rupiah collapsed badly to almost 6000 IDR/USD. Soeharto
reemerged in public on January 6, 1998, only to unveil the
1998/1999-draft budget that had virtually nothing to do with
the reforms agreed upon with the IMF . At that moment,
confidence  in  the  Indonesian  government  was  lost  com-
pletely and on black Thursday, January 8th , the rupiah plum-
meted to 10000 IDR/USD – and later even to 14000. The
market  panic  across  the  country  in  anticipation  of  food
shortages  and  overall  social  unrest  and  violence  started.
Food  prices  skyrocketed  indeed  and  through  1998
increased by 100%, compared to 70% of total CPI increase.
Financial panic continued, the surge in liquidity provided by
BI to tumbling banks (about 7% of GDP before end-Janu-
ary) far exceeded the real liquidity needs of the economy
and contributed to sharp rise in inflation and put further
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[24] Authorities guaranteed only deposits up to about 5000 USD. The guarantees covered 90% of depositors but not even 20% of total deposits.
However, the lack of confidence in banking system was so great that there were hardly any awareness of any deposit guarantees (or belief in such guar-
antees) – depositors with deposits less than 5000USD were also running on banks.
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downward pressure on the rupiah – the inflation-devalua-
tion spiral began.  In order to stop the bank runs, on January
26, 1998, the government announced a blanket guarantee
for all deposits as well as the establishment of a banking sec-
tor restructuring institution.
Such a massive depreciation had a devastating effect
on  the  balance  sheets  of  banks  and  companies.  By
December/January, many of them already quietly stopped
paying back loans. The overwhelming majority of banks
became paralyzed with an average of 50–70% share of
non-performing loans. The debt moratorium on corpo-
rate debt payments announced on January 27, 1998 was
the official confirmation of this and was met with mixed
reception, but also with relief that any actions were taken
at all. In the meantime, on January 15, the second agree-
ment  with  the  IMF  was  concluded  –  previous  reform
claims were reiterated but the policy somehow eased as
the seriousness of the crisis has been realized. After these
measures,  the  rupiah  stabilized  and  moved  within
8000–10000  IDR/USD  band  from  end-January  to  the
beginning of May.
Tight financing conditions, heavy burden of debts, cash-
shortages,  negative  wealth  shock  connected  with  rapid
depreciation of asset prices, political instability and uncer-
tainty about the future of the regime, social and ethnic ten-
sion, accelerating inflation and general uncertainty about the
prospects for the economy were the main reasons for the
sharp domestic demand contraction. Individuals, expecting
tough times, postponed consumption and switched to sav-
ings.  The  corporate  sector  halted  or  delayed  investment
plans. Consumption fell by 9% and investment by 45%. A
decline in demand and damage to production and distribu-
tion facilities caused by social unrest contributed to a sharp
contraction of economic activity, the most severe in con-
struction (-37% from 1997 to 1998) and financial, rental and
corporate  services  (-58%).  The  total  output  declined  in
1998 by 14%. Both exports and imports fell but import con-
traction was much more severe (-49.4%) and was a reason
for achieving a current account surplus of 3.8% of GDP in
1998. The surplus (net external demand) however was by
no means sufficient to offset the fall in domestic demand.
The surplus in the capital account was caused by a large
















































































Table 5-3. GDP growth decline components in 1998
Component Growth % in GDP decline
  Domestic demand -17.6 134
Private -2.9 13
   Consumption
Public -14.4 8
        Investment -40.9 96
        Stock changes - 17
  External demand - -34
        Export 10.6 -21
        Import -5.5 -13
Total GDP -13.7 100
Source: BI and Cental Bureau of Statistics92
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inflow of official aid, while the outflow of private capital was
not reversed.  Inflation escalated to the level of 80% in 1998
in response to panic food buying, interrupted production,
social violence and increased prices of import commodities.
Unemployment rose from 5% to 28% at end-1998.
On March 10 1998, Soeharto was reelected to a 7th term
in office. On May 4, the government announced sharp price
increase of gasoline and other utilities. Widespread protests
erupted,  among  them  most  importantly  student-led  anti-
regime demonstrations calling for the President's resignation.
The army cracked down on protesters. Embassies and for-
eign companies evacuated non-essential staff. On May 19, stu-
dents started parliamentary compound occupation. The stu-
dent demonstrations seeking political reforms were accom-
panied by rioting, widespread looting, destruction, crime, as
well  as  religious  and  ethnic  conflicts.  Anti-Chinese  rioting
directed  mainly  at  shopkeepers  in  small  town  resulted  in
complete disruption of supply distribution channels and short-
age of basic products. The general erosion of social order
went out of control. Over 1000 dead were reported in the
May riots. The hard-won relative stability of the rupiah was
immediately lost, runs on banks and massive deposit with-
drawals started again, the currency crisis renewed and the
rupiah plunged to over 16000 IDR/USD. It took five months
to bring it back under 10000 IDR/USD. On May 21, urged by
his affiliates, Soeharto resigned.
Changes  in  key  positions  in  the  administration  con-
tributed  to  delays  in  the  implementation  of  economic
reforms. With reference to that and to harsh economic cir-
cumstances,  the  IMF  rearranged  its  agreements  with
Indonesia towards easier conditionality. The situation start-
ed to stabilize. Food security has been gradually restored
through  emergency  import  and  increased  food  subsidies.
Monetary stability gradually returned around October 1998,
inflationary pressure eased and the rupiah stabilized around
9000 IDR/USD. Price levels also finally stabilized and the
beginning of 1999 saw some deflation. The sluggish process
of financial system and corporate debt restructuring started.
5.3. Response to the Crisis
5.3.1. Introduction
When the crisis unfolded, market confidence in Indonesia
disappeared and domestic conditions started to deteriorate
quickly as economists and market participants came to the
conclusion that the rescheduling of Indonesia's debt and the
rescue of the financial system would require the backing of
western governments and international institutions: "No one
would want to buy Indonesian debt if it was just Indonesian
debt" [25]. The Indonesian authorities also noticed that with-
out additional backing and emergency loans the country would
soon default on its debt. So, the IMF assistance was requested
in October 1997 and the first Letter of Intent, aid package of
23 bln USD and a 10 bln Standby arrangement was announced
in early November. The IMF, not expecting the seriousness of
the crisis, insisted on tough monetary and fiscal policies as well
as economic reforms, including the closure of some bankrupt
banks. These measures, however, only aggravated the bank-
run problem. On the other hand, there was no political will to
implement  the  reforms.  As  result,  confidence  further  col-
lapsed. Indonesia and the IMF signed the second agreement in
mid-January  1998.  The  hardships  with  implementation  of
agreed reforms and civil unrest again threw the program off-
track. The IMF has been several times threatening to postpone
or suspend the aid. From the third letter of intent in April, and
an agreement with the new government after the fall of Soe-
harto, the IMF acknowledged the severe economic conditions
and approved the implementation of less stringent measures.
In July 1998, the Standby agreement was replaced with an
Extended Fund Facility program.
As  of  June  2000,  the  international  aid  commitment  to
Indonesia amounted to 50 bln USD: 12 bln from the IMF , 10 bln
from multilateral financial institutions (like World Bank or Asian
Development Bank) and 15 bln from bilateral agreements and
programs  (like  Japanese  Miyazawa  plan).  About  half  of  this
package, i.e. 22 bln USD, has already been disbursed.
5.3.2. Monetary Policy Response
The government responded to the first run on the rupi-
ah in July/August 1997 with a drastic credit contraction. BI
stopped repurchasing central banks certificates, decreasing
the supply of local currency in an effort to discourage mar-
ket participants from exchanging the rupiah into hard cur-
rency,  interest  rates  rose  from  around  15%  to  30%.
Although official statistics do not show a sharp decline in for-
eign reserves, part of the stock was probably tied down in
forward  contracts,  so  the  usable  reserves  were  actually
lower. From September 1997, the reserves started to shrink
much faster. Facing a deteriorating domestic situation, from
September BI gradually cut yields on its commercial papers.
Monetary policy was being carried out in an environ-
ment of high debt-equity ratios and overall financial system
distress, which made a prudent policy of high interest rates
almost impossible to implement. Eventually, the Indone-
sian authorities had to resort to IMF help. One of the main
goals that the IMF program pursued was to restore market
confidence. Based on the presumption that the Indonesian
economy was suffering from structural weaknesses than
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[25] After The Financial Times 30 I 1998 quoting a regional economist of one major western banks branch in Jakarta.93
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traditional,  temporary  macroeconomic  imbalances  and
might require some real adjustment, there was no specif-
ic  exchange  rate  or  interest  rate  target.  Instead,  the
authorities decided to stick to nominal base money targets
as  a  nominal  anchor  consistent  with  the  free  flow
exchange rate regime. During the first week of Indonesia's
program  (November  1997),  the  authorities  engaged
themselves  in  unsterilized  intervention  and  allowed  for
short term interest rates hike again – the rupiah appreci-
ated and regained some losses. However, within less than
a week – and contrary to the agreement with the IMF – BI
cut the interest rates to their initial level and started to
increase liquidity. The result was a near collapse of the
banking system during November 1997 - January 1998.
After runs on banks started, the authorities completely
abandoned tight policies agreed with the IMF and injected
massive liquidity into the banking sector as people were
withdrawing  their  deposits.  There  were  only  limited
efforts to sterilize this increase in net domestic assets by
open market operations and foreign exchange interven-
tions – base money grew by 126% in six months instead
of 10% as was intended. Cash-in-circulation also increased
as a result of panic withdrawals. The authorities and the
IMF grossly underestimated the negative sentiment and a
drop in confidence of market participants. The BI lost con-
trol over monetary aggregates.
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There were two major waves of bank runs – in Novem-
ber 1997/January1998 and in May 1998. In both cases, liq-
uidity support was extended, base money rapidly increased,
as did the currency in circulation and broad money, thus
fueling inflation. The total liquidity support surged from 9
trillion  rupiah  at  end-1996  to  62  trillion  rupiah  at  end-
December 1997 (equivalence of about 7% of GDP). By June
1998, the figure stood at 168 trillion rupiah. The open mar-
ket operation and selling of hard currency absorbed only 30
trillion rupiah.
In the meantime (February 10, 1998), reflecting a des-
perate attempt to restore market confidence, at the initia-
tive of President Suharto, the Finance Minister announced
that Indonesia was considering establishing a currency board
by fixing the rupiah at around 5,500 IDR/USD. The idea was
that the currency board would discipline the central bank
with respect to reckless money supply, immediately restor-
ing its credibility, quickly breaking the vicious circle of infla-
tion and depreciation. It was technically feasible to imple-
ment, as international reserves far exceeded reserve money.
Indonesian authorities strongly insisted at this idea, but the
overall reception was negative. The IMF ultimately rejected
it as too dangerous for Indonesia for the following reasons:
First, if the currency board is even slightly less than fully
credible (what seemed to be the case judging from unstable
political regime and violent social tensions), it automatically
leads to a contraction of the economy and excessively high
interest rates. Second, an unsustainable currency board at
the appreciated exchange rate (5500 IDR/USD, while on the
day of the proposal the rate stood at 7287 – just down from
14000 and soon up to 10000) would prompt massive capi-
tal outflow and eventual system breakdown. Third, a cur-
rency  board  prevents  the  central  bank  from  acting  as  a
lender of last resort – BI would have to revoke its deposit
guarantees, which would trigger another panic (honoring
these deposits was technically unfeasible).
Despite the efforts to implement tight monetary policy
and prevailing high nominal interest rates, the actual stance
of monetary policy has been loose with (ex post) real inter-
est rates distinctly negative which probably reflected the
expectations of a severe economic downturn.
With a change of the political regime in May 1998, the
appointment of a new government and the EFF agreement
with the IMF in July 1998, the authorities made an effort to
strengthen  the  credibility  of  monetary  policy.  This  time,
base money was to be monitored closely. The monetary
policy through base money restraint was directed toward
maintaining price stability, while the exchange rate was left
to market mechanisms. BI also made an effort to strengthen
the credibility and transparency of policy by making period-
ic announcements of its targets. In achieving the quantitative
target, BI resorted to open market interventions – on July
29, 1998 the central bank certificates auctions system was
improved and changed: emphasis was shifted from interest
rate to quantity target. To prevent a further expansion of liq-
uidity, a high penalty on the discount window facility and
commercial bank's negative balance with Bank Indonesia has
been imposed, together with ceiling on deposit rates and
interbank  rate  for  banks  guaranteed  by  the  government.
The expansion of liquidity ceased. The government took
over from central bank most of the outstanding banks' liq-
uidity support liabilities in exchange for promissory notes
worth 144 trillion rupiah. To control the monetary expan-
sion originating from increased government expenditures,
BI conducted sterilization in the foreign exchange market,
helping  the  same  the  rupiah  to  strengthen.  After  its  July
agreement with the IMF and the introduction of new auc-
tion system, BI tried to stick firmly to its policy. Base money
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started to move within designated bands, monetary condi-
tions stabilized and BI regained much control over the finan-
cial market. The interest rate decline started since Septem-
ber/October 1998 together with monetary stabilization and
inflation  decrease  (CPI  rise  halted  and  then  turned  into
slight deflation in 1999).
5.3.3. Fiscal Policy Response 
The initial November 1997 IMF plan of fiscal tightening
was expected to restore confidence [26], demonstrate the
authorities' eagerness for reforms and make room for pos-
sible bank restructuring costs. Already in September 1997,
about 80 infrastructure projects (including 13 power plants
and 36 toll roads) were suspended. According to the plan,
wide ranging cuts in public spending and the postponement
of about 35 bln USD in infrastructure projects were to be
implemented in order to reduce the current account deficit
and generally improve the soundness of the economy. The
government budget surplus was planned to amount to 1%
of GDP . In the sphere of structural reforms, the dismantling
of state monopolies, trade liberalization and other similar
measures were envisaged. 
However, the authorities ignored their most important
commitments which was revealed in the 1998/1999-budget
proposal in January 1998. The constitutional validity of the
IMF-supported stabilization program was also questioned
on the grounds that it goes against "family values". The dete-
riorating situation forced the government to seek another
agreement with the IMF on January 15, 1998. The macro-
economic assumption of the second program was revised
downward: 0% GDP growth in 1998, 20% inflation and
5000 IDR/USD rate. the fiscal stance was eased to meet a
1%  deficit.  Calls  for  structural  reforms  were  reiterated.
Budgetary support, tax and credit privileges to the new air-
plane and national car projects (owed by Soeharto family)
were to be canceled, cartels in cement, paper and plywood
dissolved, domestic agriculture deregulated, import and dis-
tribution  restrictions  lifted,  fuel  subsidies  gradually
removed, fiscal transparency improved, autonomy for mon-
etary policy granted. Nevertheless, the authorities were still
very reluctant to fulfill these demands, as many of them
were directly targeted at businesses from which govern-
ment officials' relatives and friends profited.
Later in 1998, in accordance with the changing political
and  (worsening)  economic  situation,  the  program  was
revised and included not only accommodation of the shock,
but also some additional fiscal stimulus. Current account
(that actually quickly turned into surplus by itself) and confi-
dence issues ceased to be main problem. The severity of
the recession was not taken adequately into consideration
while designing previous programs. In accordance with the
agreement with the IMF the government raised expendi-
tures that were associated with the social safety net as well
as subsidies of oil-based fuel, electricity, medicine and food-
stuff. Subsidies increased dramatically from 0.3% of GDP in
1996/97 to 3.1% of GDP in 1997/98 and 4.4% of GDP in
1998/99  budget  (however  less  than  planned  6.6%).  The
state budget was planned and estimated to run into deficit
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of about 8.5% of GDP in 1998/99. In the end, however, the
government failed to provide a sufficient boost to the econ-
omy, the realized deficit reached only 2.2% due to lower
government  expenditures  attributed  to  exchange  rate
appreciation and technical constraints in general [27]. As for
deficit financing, foreign borrowing financed 99% of it, while
remaining 1% was financed domestically.
5.3.4. Banking System and Debt Restructuring
The authorities have begun to restructure the banking
system through a mixture of bank closures, mergers and
takeovers. After the closure of 16 banks in November 1997
and the following bank runs, BI guaranteed eventually in Jan-
uary 1998 all deposits at domestic banks. At the same time
the establishment of Indonesia Bank Restructuring Agency
(IBRA) was announced. The task of IBRA was to assume
control over troubled private banks, review them for liqui-
dation or recapitalization and manage non-performing loans.
There were initial problems with the operation of that body,
as bank managers failed to change their behavior in accor-
dance  with  IBRA's  recommendation.  By  April  1998,  it
became apparent that forceful ("hard") intervention [28] was
necessary. Efforts were made to recover the liquidity credit
extended to banks by the central bank, so IBRA focused and
finally  took  over  (effectively  nationalized)  seven  private
banks  responsible  for  75%  of  all  liquidity  support  and
accounting  for  16%  of  total  banking  system  liabilities.
Another seven very small and completely insolvent banks
were closed. The operations of IBRA were subject to rising
uncertainty among a public unaccustomed to the implica-
tions of bank takeovers. Several "IBRA banks" were being
run on for some time. In September and December 1998,
the authorities announced a comprehensive plan of restruc-
turing  of  the  banking  system.  Banks  were  categorized
depending  on  their  capital  adequacy  ratios  (CAR).  Banks
with CAR above 4% would be allowed to continue opera-
tion. Banks with CAR below –25% were given one month
to  recapitalize,  failing  which  they  would  be  merged  or
closed. The rest of the banks were to submit reliable busi-
ness plan, which would be assessed by independent experts.
Banks were required to meet capital adequacy ratio of 4%,
8% and 10% by the end of 1998, 1999 and 2000 respec-
tively. These requirements were strictly executed and dur-
ing the financial year 1998/99 the government closed 48
banks.  State  banks  were  jointly  recapitalized  and  four  of
them merged into new state bank (Bank Mandiri) which
became the largest bank in the system with about 30% of all
deposits.  After mergers and closings, the number of banks
dropped from 238 to 157. As a result there was a dramatic
change in the ownership structure of the banking system –
the government's stake rose from 40% to 70%. Despite
these efforts, the state of the banking system, as of March
2000, still leaves much to be desired with non-performing
loans ratio of 32%.
The recapitalization program has been financed by the
issuance of bonds worth over 50% of GDP [29]. The cost
of the bailout will be a substantial burden for public finances
– the public debt amounts already to over 90% of GDP .
IBRA liquidity credits were to be converted into equity or
subordinate  debt.  Some  of  the  capital  is  planned  to  be
regained by consequent privatization. Restrictions on for-
eign investors to own banks in Indonesia have been accord-
ingly removed. However, the prospects of asset recovery
from bankrupt and restructured banks are very dim – the
market estimate of the IBRA portfolio is 20% of its book
value.
The second urgent problem was corporate and inter-
bank external debt restructuring. Foreign banks were very
reluctant to rollover the debt of falling companies. On Janu-
ary 27 1998, the government had to announce a corporate
debt payment moratorium. Talks with a steering committee
of private bank creditors concerning the restructuring of
interbank and corporate debt began in February 1998 and
were concluded on June 4, 1998, in Frankfurt. Agreement
on interbank debt involved an offer to exchange the debt
maturing  by  end-March  1999  with  the  new  loans.  They
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[27] Similarly the 1999/2000 fiscal deficit was only 1.5% of GDP and fail to reach 5% planned in the budget.
[28] Suspension of shareholders rights, assumption of ownership by IBRA and management replacement.
[29] This cost is significantly higher than the costs other crisis countries had to incur. The cost of the banking sector restructuring in percent of GDP
were: 17% in Korea (1997- ), 29% in Thailand (1997-.), 29% in Chile (1981-87), 19% in Mexico (1994–99).
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were backed by a full dollar guarantee of Bank Indonesia
and of maturities from one year (not more than 15% of the
new loans) to four years (at least 10% of the new loans) at
an interest around 300 basis points above Libor. Foreign
banks committed to maintain trade financing as far as possi-
ble. To eliminate a crunch in international trade payments
and kick-start import/export activities, Bank Indonesia set-
tled the trade arrears of commercial banks amounting to
more than 1 bln USD. Unlike with the banking system, the
Indonesian government was reluctant to extend direct sup-
port to the private sector, but preferred instead to provide
a government-supported umbrella for restructuring private
sector  debt  with  some  tax  concessions  and  preferential
financing rates, but without any formal guarantees [30]. 
This  was  reflected  in  the  scheme  of  corporate  debt
restructuring agreed in Frankfurt. It provided a framework
for voluntary restructuring of external debt through direct
negotiations between debtors and creditors with a support
and  mediation  of  a  new  governmental  body  called  the
Indonesian Debt Restructuring Agency (INDRA) established
in August 1998. Its task was to provide exchange rate guar-
antees under condition that the agreement met certain con-
ditions (a minimum eight years maturity and three years
grace period). INDRA would not guarantee payment, but
only the exchange rate and would supply foreign exchange
using the best 20-day average rate before June 1999, with a
reset  option  if  the  rupiah  appreciate  more.  The  INDRA
scheme was complemented by so called "Jakarta Initiative",
i.e.  the  set  of  guidelines  for  debt  restructuring  workout
based on a London approach [31]. In the meantime the
new, tough bankruptcy law took effect in August 1998, and
the reluctant companies had an additional incentive to join
INDRA-scheme. The market reactions and the experience
with implementation are not too satisfactory. By February
1999, some 120 companies with total debt of 18 bln USD
were registered to Jakarta Initiative. By July 2000, only 5 bln
USD has been rescheduled, i.e. not much more than 1% of
total  eligible  debt.  Numerous  institutional  and  political
obstacles and the failure of the legal system to pose a cred-
ible threat to the debtors obstruct the process. The corpo-
rate debt resolving continues, but its slow pace undermines
the economic recovery and market confidence in Indonesia.
In December 2000, the IMF warned Indonesia of the possi-
ble consequences and urged the authorities to deal with the
problem.
The stock market index hit an all-time low in September
1998 but as soon as monetary and political conditions stabi-
lized  the  market  rebounded  quickly  as  foreign  investors
took advantage of unbelievably cheap equity prices [32].
The bourse reached pre-crisis levels in early 2000 but soon
after that, in the first month of 2000, lost 40% due to a pro-
longed crisis and higher US interest rates. The property
market remains weak with a 35% vacancy rate in office real
estate.
5.3.5. Prospects for the Future
In early 1999, new electoral laws were adopted and in
June  the  country's  first  free  and  honest  elections  were
held. In contrast with the past, there was more than one
candidate for presidential post, which finally was won by
Abdurrahman Wahid, an open-minded and relatively liber-
al leader of the major Muslim organization. GDP grew a
slight 0.1% in 1999 and is estimated to grow between 3%
and 4% in 2000 and 4–5% in 2001. The rupiah gradually
depreciated from 6900 IDR in October 1999, right after
the  new  elections,  to  around  9500–10000  IDR/USD  in
December 2000. Indonesia is still heavily dependent on
international support. Failure to meet the IMF's and for-
eign creditors' expectations can still have serious conse-
quences but pressure from outside strengthens the pro-
reform  faction  in  the  government.  So,  ironically,  the
authorities  (can)  take  advantage  of  the  crisis  to  push
through some important reforms.
5.4. Conclusions
Indonesia is the most hard hit country among the East
Asian crisis' victims. GDP fell 14% in 1998 and only after
two years does it show any sign of recovery – it is going to
take a long time until GDP growth returns to pre-crisis lev-
els of 7%. As a result of the crisis, the political regime col-
lapsed,  social  and  ethnic  tensions  erupted,  the  country's
integrity  has  been  threatened  and  a  poverty  problem
emerged. 
This paper tried to answer why this was the case. The
answer is that Indonesia had probably the worst economic
fundamentals of all the East Asian countries. The economy
was  ridden  by  corruption  and  monopolized.  The  weak
financial system engaged itself in reckless credit expansion,
dangerously risky investments or even quasi-criminal activi-
ties. Overoptimistic corporate sector accustomed to the
abundance of capital ceased completely to insure against
economic risk. Short-term external debt mounted, with a
presumption that it would never have to be paid back and
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[30] This was similar to Mexican corporate debt restructuring framework called "Ficorca".
[31] The London approach to debt resolution is a voluntary, non-binding framework in which creditors agree to keep credit facilities in place, seek
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[32] In USD terms Indonesian shares were 12 times cheaper (!) in September 1998 than in June 1997 – this is what people call "the fire sale FDI".98
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that the exchange rate would be pegged forever. The quali-
ty and efficiency of investment decreased.
The case of Indonesia speaks in favor of a view that there
is a relationship between fundamentals and (the severity of)
a crisis. The course of Indonesia's development was defi-
nitely unsustainable – at some point such a policy would
have  to  fail,  so  investors  withdrew  before  the  moment
came, as in the first generation theoretical crisis models.
On the other hand, had the financial panic not erupted,
first in some other country (Thailand), Indonesia could fur-
ther develop uninterruptedly – would need some econom-
ic reform but, still, there was nothing about the economy
that called for immediate collapse. What eventually brought
Indonesia down was self-fulfilling panic among international
creditors that drove them to cancel loans just because other
investors  were  doing  the  same.  Such  a  situation  is  well
described by the second-generation-self-fulfilling-crisis the-
oretical models.
The case of Indonesia (and more generally of the Asian
financial  crises)  is  neither  unique,  nor  can  it  be  fully
explained by any of the two main theoretical views. Rather
it can be said that for some range of fundamentals, i.e. when
the state of the economy worsens but not up to the point
when the collapse is inevitable – the country becomes vul-
nerable to a crisis caused by self-fulfilling panic.
The Asian crisis calls for the reassessment of the notion
of a "fundamental". It cannot be limited to easily measurable,
"classic" macroeconomic variables such as fiscal deficit, mon-
etary expansion, inadequate reserves or "political" factors
like  unemployment  or  recession.  This  notion  should  be
broadened by such vogue ideas as 'credibility', "moral haz-
ard", or strictly microeconomic factors, i.e. structure of the
corporate sector, strength of a financial system, etc. In the
case of Indonesia, these fundamentals were in a very bad
state.
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Appendix 1: The chronology of the
Indonesian crisis 
1997
May: Thai currency comes under speculative pressure.
July: Thai, Malaysian, Philippine, and Indonesian curren-
cies all depreciate. 
August 14:  Indonesia abolishes its system of a man-
aged exchange rate. The rupiah starts to depreciate
September  16:  15  government  "mega-projects"  are
postponed. 
October 8:  Indonesia  says  it  will  ask  the  IMF  for
financial assistance. 
October 31: Indonesia's IMF package is unveiled. It pro-
vides for more than 23 USD bln in aid. 
November 1: Sixteen banks are closed as first step in
IMF  package,  what  causes  panic  and  bank  runs  among
depositors. 
November  5:  IMF  approves  a  US$10  billion  loan  for
Indonesia as part of the massive international package. 
December 5: Soeharto takes 10 days rest after a 12-day
world tour and misses ASEAN summit. 
December 9-12: Finance Minister fails to negotiate the
debt rollover in Washington.
1998
January  6:  Indonesia  unveils  an  expansionary  1998/99
budget, contrary to IMF demands of a budget surplus. The
rupiah loses half its value over a five-day period. 
January 9: Ratings agency Standard & Poor downgrades
Indonesia's currency to "junk bond" status. 
mid-January: More or less direct calls start to be made
for a change of the regime.
January 15: Soeharto signs a new IMF agreements. 
January till mid-February: Anti-Chinese food riots take
place in at least a dozen places throughout Indonesia.
mid-January: All but 22 of the 286 companies listed on
the Jakarta stock exchange are technically bankrupt. Prop-
erty companies are the worst. 
January 27: Government announces a moratorium on
repaying debts and interest, and promises to guarantee all
deposits of commercial banks. 
February:  Soeharto  proposal  of  a  currency  board  is
announced, criticized and finally turned down.
February : Talks with a steering committee of private
bank  creditors  concerning  the  restructuring  of  interbank
and corporate debt begin
March 10: Soeharto is re-elected to a seventh five-year
term with Habibie as vice president.
May 4: Fuel prices are increased by up to 71 percent.
Three days of riots follow.
May 9: Soeharto leaves for a week-long visit to Egypt. 
May 12: The army troops shoot four students at Jakarta
protest. 
May 13-14: Rioting spreads throughout Jakarta. Estimat-
ed 1,200 people die in two days. When Soeharto returns
from Egypt, he faces a flood of calls to resign. 
May 21: Soeharto resigns and hands power to Habibie. 
June  4:  Agreement  concerning  debt  restructuring  is
reached in Frankfurt.
June 17: The rupiah again hits 17,000 against the dollar. 
July 29: The central bank certificates auctions system
was improved and changed in attempt to regain control
over monetary aggregates.
September  24:  Paris  Club  reschedules  $4.2  billion  of
sovereign debt. Annual inflation rises to 82.4 percent in Sep-
tember. 
September 29: Indonesia strengthens bank recapitaliza-
tion scheme. 
October: Monetary stability gradually returns, inflation-
ary pressure eases and the rupiah stabilizes around 9000
IDR/USD.
November 10: Special session of the Parliament begins
to discuss election and political reforms. 
1999
March 13: Government closes 38 insolvent banks. 
June 7: Indonesia holds first democratic election since
1955.
August 6: Finance Minister admits there were "irregular-
ities" in loan-recovery process. The scandal prompts IMF
and World Bank to threaten loan suspension. 
October  1:  Indonesia  announces  seventh  month  of
deflation, with annual inflation of 1.25 percent. 
October 20: Wahid has been elected President.
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6.1. Was Korea Different?
6.1.1. Introduction
Financial crises' episodes of the 1990's differ from those
of the 1980's in that recently they have occurred in coun-
tries on their way to social and economic development. The
initial  success  in  implementing  reforms,  and  the  evident
prosperity for the future, encouraged foreign investors to
diversify their portfolios towards emerging markets. Addi-
tional capital inflows allows financing economic growth and
speeds up the process of integration with the global market.
On the other hand, the same capital can cause troubles
when it becomes an abrupt and sharp outflow. Why and
when does it happen? 
The group of countries that came under speculative
attack in 1997 in Southeast Asia can be roughly summa-
rized within the above scenario. Yet the roots underlying
the crisis in each country within the same group should be
treated as country-specific.  Of course, there were some
common features among them, but in order to identify
main characteristics for an individual economy, a separate
analysis is required. This is even truer for South Korea
(hereafter referred to as Korea) where strong macroeco-
nomic performance until late 1997 did not let most ana-
lysts foresee the crisis. Even the eruption of crises in coun-
tries from the neighboring region, marked by the July Thai
bath devaluation, did not downgrade the assessment given
by the international rating agencies to Korea.  
This  paper  aims  to  explore  the  major  factors  lying
behind the Korean financial crisis. It further looks at the
sources of the crisis that took its roots in highly leveraged
companies with a weak balance sheet, and a poor func-
tioning  banking  system.  It  shows  that  while  macroeco-
nomic imbalances played a minor role, the close relation-
ship among banks, corporations and the government cre-
ated problems, which resulted in numbers of bankruptcies
and in the end led to the sharp and unexpected economic
downturn.  
6.1.2. Background to the Crisis
The currency crisis, which erupted in Korea in the end
of 1997 hardly fits the first or second-generation conceptu-
al  frameworks,  where  irresponsible  government  policies
and investors' panic play a crucial role.  The sudden collapse
also cannot be solely attributed to the possible contagion
effect across the Asian countries facing similar problems at
that  time.  The  1997  Korean  experience  is  an  example,
which confirms that financial crises occur not only when
macroeconomic but also microeconomic indicators identify
vulnerabilities. Although indicators like GDP growth, infla-
tion or fiscal balances are important measures of economic
soundness, healthy financial and corporate sectors are an
essential prerequisite to a successful financial system dereg-
ulation as well as liberalization of capital account.
In  an  oversimplification  of  the  classification,  the  eco-
nomic fundamentals can be divided into two broad cate-
gories: macro and micro-economic.  Looking solely at the
former, many failed to predict the 1997 Korean crisis. This
is because at the onset of the crisis, macroeconomic funda-
mentals  in  Korea  remained  relatively  sound  and  did  not
show  many  signs  of  vulnerability.  Real  GDP  growth  rate
oscillated around 8 percent between 1994 and 1996. At the
same time, inflation measured by CPI was under control
and averaged at 5.1 percent per annum.  The price stabi-
lization led to a gradual decline in nominal interest rates.
The three-year corporate bond yields, declined from 16.2
percent in 1992 to 11.9 percent in 1996. The consolidated
central government position was balanced or even in sur-
plus and public debt was less than 10 percent of GDP in the
end of 1996 [1].
Part VI.
The South Korean Currency Crisis, 1997–1998
by Monika B³aszkiewicz
[1] This number, however, can be misleading due to substantial quasi-fiscal burden in Korea arising from the governmental support to privately own
banks. In this case large public expenditures did not appear on the general government balance sheet.  Additionally, such a practice posed a moral haz-
ard problem.102
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Before financial liberalization, which started in the early
1990's, Korea was targeting monetary aggregates like M2 or
MCT [2]. This helped the authorities to maintain financial
stability since all other instruments were set to achieve the
growth  rates  of  money,  inflation  and  interest  as  well  as
exchange  rate.  Despite  the  progress  made  towards  the
financial sector opening in the 1990's, this policy was con-
tinued as the government was convinced about its advan-
tages. Two years before the crisis, the annual growth rate of
M2 oscillated around 15 and 16 percent. Although this was
3 percent lower than the early 1990's average, domestic
credit rose at the very rapid pace during 1994–97 achieving
18.5, 14.1 and 20.1 percent, respectively. Additionally, the
broad  money  aggregate  expressed  in  ratio  to  foreign
reserves was around 6, which was high even in comparison
to other crisis economies. In Malaysia this liquidity indicator
was equal 4 and in Thailand 4.9 at that time.  
Nevertheless,  other  macro-indicators  were  accept-
able.  Unemployment  rate  did  not  exceed  2.3  percent
throughout three pre-crisis years, 1994–1996. Until mid-
1995 investment and saving rates were soaring, averaging
approximately at 37 and 35 percent of GDP , respectively.
The only exception was the current account deficit, which
deteriorated to 4.5 percent of GDP at the end of 1996
and was mostly covered by short-term portfolio invest-
ments.  
There were two factors responsible for the perfor-
mance of this indicator. The first related to strong capital
inflows during the whole year (especially in the second
quarter); the second was a terms of trade shock, repre-
senting a 12 percent drop from the previous year (accord-
ing  to  many  empirical  research  shocks  to  this  variable
increase the probability of financial crisis). In particular,
the unit export price of semi-conductors during 1996 fell
by more than 70 percent in the semi-conductor manufac-
turing  industry.  The  magnitude  of  the  current  account
deficit  even  though  large  was  not  tremendous.  Many
countries suffering from the episodes of financial crises



























































































































[2] MCT is composed of M2, certificates of deposits and trust accounts.
Table 6-1. Macroeconomics fundamentals
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Real GDP (percent change) 8.3 8.9 6.8 5.0 -5.8
Inflation (CPI) 6.2 4.5 4.9 4.5 7.5
Fiscal balance* 0.1 0.3 0.0 -1.7 -4.2
Gross national savings* 35.5 35.4 33.5 32.5 33.4
Gross domestic investments* 36.5 37.2 37.9 34.2 20.9
Yield on 3-year corporate bonds 12.9 13.8 11.9 13.4 15.1
Current Account balance* -1.0 -1.7 -4.5 -1.7 10.9
*Percent of GDP
Source: IMF, IFS; own calculation103
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experience more severe imbalances. The same is true for
the behavior of the won/ dollar exchange rate [3].
Considering tight Korean linkages with Japan (widely
fluctuating yen/dollar exchange rate was a key determi-
nant of the Korean competitiveness) and appreciation of
US dollar vis-a-vis Japanese yen at the beginning of 1995,
the won/ dollar exchange rate would be a poor approxi-
mation of the total overvaluation of won (annual percent-
age changes in 1994 and 1995 were 7.5 and 6.1, respec-
tively; in 1996 the real won/ dollar exchange rate was
actually  depreciating,  comparing  with  its  1995  value).
Thus, the real effective exchange rate would be a more
adequate way of measurement. But even then, the over-
all magnitude of appreciation was not excessively unsus-
tainable. From mid-1995, the real effective exchange rate
was appreciating comparing with its 1990 value; from May
1996 on it was steadily depreciating.
6.1.3. Signs of Vulnerability
Korea's rapid growth during the past decades and its
ability to maintain prudent macroeconomic fundamentals
masked important structural weaknesses.  The successful
industrialization process, which transformed the country
from one of the poorest nations of the world into one of
the most promising, was achieved mainly at the expense
of an excessively indebted corporate sector. The 1970's
and 1980's strategy, when Korean companies were small
and were taking advantage of economies of scale, proved
to be wrong in the 1990's. This was mainly due to the
overall  international  environmental  change  towards
tighter linkages among countries that increased an internal
and  external  competition.  The  external  pressure  to
deregulate and open the financial system in Korea was
considerable.
The  fact  that  borrowing  from  abroad  was  half  the
price of borrowing domestically (the three-month interest
rate on corporate bonds in Korea was as high as 11–12
percent, whereas in the United States it was averaging
around 5.5 percent in the second half of the 1990's) com-
pounded the foreign exchange exposure from the domes-
tic side. Between 1990 and 1996, net capital inflows were
equivalent to $69 billion of which $51.8 billion took the
form of portfolio investments. Net foreign direct invest-
ments were actually negative and equal to $7 billion. Yet,
a continuing inflow of short-term foreign capital kept the
overall  balance  of  payment  in  surplus  helping  to  fuel
investments and growth. 
The official foreign reserves accumulated. Neverthe-
less,  in  terms  of  monthly  import  (in  1995  and  1996
reserves were enough to cover just three-month imports'
obligations) and considering the growing stock of short-
term external debt, they were not sufficient to protect
[3] Between 1980 and 1989 Korea followed a policy of the 'Managed Basket Peg' to adjust current account. Due to the large investment boom in
1990–91which shifted current account from surplus into deficit, the government decided to adopt the policy called "Market Average Rate System".
Within this policy the exchange rate was allowed to fluctuate within a band up to 2.25 percent a day.  However, because of still existing capital account
restrictions, the system was more similar to fixed but adjustable peg (see OECD, 1998; Black, 1996). 
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against the liquidity problems. These numbers were even
smaller for gross usable foreign reserves, which are calcu-
lated as the difference between official stocks of foreign
reserves (minus gold) less overseas branches' deposits of
domestic financial institutions. In practice they are hardly
available,  when  the  need  arises.  In  Korea  the  ratio  of
usable reserves to short-term debt in 1996 and 1997 was
equivalent to 0.3 and 0.1, respectively. Due to the above
there is no doubt, the Korean crisis had its roots in near
depletion of foreign currency reserves.
Rushing for additional funds from Korean firms and finan-
cial institutions failed to put priority on cash management
and other forms of provision against the risk. At the same
time, banks and other financial institutions failed to detect
the full picture of individual enterprises before offering loans
to these companies.  Implementation of market principles in
an socio-economic environment characterized by over-reg-
ulation, concentration of resources around business groups
and implicit government intervention in the banking system
resulted in the high exposure of Korea to systemic risk. In
the end, it eroded the asset side of financial intermediaries
when the highly leveraged firms became unable to meet
their obligations.  
A key problem associated with the accelerating stock
of external liabilities in Korea was the high proportion of
short-term debt in total borrowing. Together with low
productivity of investments (the discussion on the invest-
ments' efficiency is carried out in the next section) and the
low stock of foreign reserves it affected the sustainability
of  current  account  deficit,  since  it  mainly  depends
whether the level of external liabilities is consistent with
the country's debt servicing capacity. 
6.2. The Role of Cheabols in the Future
Development of the Crisis
The  role  of  the  state  in  Asia's  development  in  the
1970's and 1980's was substantial. It is often believed that
it was exactly the government's intervention and planifica-
tion that made the "miracle" possible. However, as the
1997 meltdown showed, this common view is question-
able.
For many years, investments in Korea were concen-
trated  around  cheabols,  the  multi-company  business
groups operating in a range of markets under common
supervision and financial control.  Although, each compa-
ny  within  a  group  was  legally  independent,  in  reality
cheabols were fostered by government policies.  It was
the  Presidential  Declaration  on  Heavy  and  Chemical
Industrialization Policy of January 1973, which encouraged
large companies to invest in strategic industries such as
semiconductors,  shipbuilding,  steel  etc.  [IMF,  1999;
OECD, 1998]. The government support, apart from the
implicit risk share for preferential industries, was massive.
For example, the state-owned banks were pressured to
allocate more than half of their loan portfolios to particu-
lar sectors.  By the same token, strategic industries were
provided loans that carried out low interest rates [Nam et
al., 1999]. Even after the financial sector's liberalization
and privatization in the 1980's, the governmental support
for the large firms, affiliates of cheabos, did not vanish.
The  large  economic  concentration  around  business
groups that were subject to special regulations in Korea is
clearly evident in terms of capital stock invested and the
Figure 6-3. Reserves
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number of people employed.  According to the OECD 1998
Survey on Korea, the thirty largest business groups subject
to special regulations accounted for about two-fifths of the
capital  stock  in  mining  and  manufacturing  sectors  and
almost a fifth of employment in 1996. In terms of shipments,
their 1994 market share was 39.6 percent (data for 1995
and 1996 was not available). In 1995 the top thirty cheabols'
value added accounted for 16 percent of GNP and 41 per-
cent of value added in the manufacturing sector [Borenstein
and Lee, 1999].
Capital  concentration  around  business  groups  was
definitely important, but not the only problem of weak
corporate governance in Korea. The other relates to the
corporate concentration of ownership around founding
family, relatives and affiliate firms that created corruption.
Most of the time, cross-guaranteed debt financing led to
the chain reaction, resulting in a collapse of the whole
business group. As the OECD report states, in 1996 there
were three cheabols with a share of founding family high-
er than 20 percent. In 1997 all three were insolvent. Even
considering  the  declining  trend  in  internal  ownership
(between 1983 and 1997 it fell from 57 to 43 percent)
due to capital market development, only about a quarter
of the 669 firms affiliated with the top thirty cheabols
were listed on the stock market in 1995. 
Another feature practiced by cheabols was so called
"empire-building", the term that relates to diversification
of  business  groups  into  the  broad  range  of  industries.
From 1970 to 1996 the number of companies affiliated
with thirty largest cheaboles' increased by 18 from aver-
age 4 to 22 companies investing in almost 19 industries
[OECD,  1998].  Diversification  of  business  into  a  wide
range of different economic activities itself is not a nega-
tive practice since it protects against the possible loss at
one market by gaining profits at another. Nevertheless,
the fact still remains that in Korea, companies felt pro-
tected  not  only  by  the  diversification  of  their  business
portfolio, but also because of the governmental interven-
tion  ensuring  takeover  rather  than  bankruptcy.  Feeling
free of risk, cheabols were engaging themselves in invest-
ments based heavily on debt financing.
6.2.1. Debt Financing 
The  total  corporate  debt  measured  as  the  ratio
between  company's  liabilities  and  its  capital  employed
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Table 6-2. Share of cheabols in mining and manufacturing
1984-89 1991 1992 1993 1994
Top five
Shipments 22.5 23,4 23,8 23,0 24,6
Employment 10.02 10,8 10,8 10,4 11,1
Top thirty
Shipments 38 38,8 39,7 38,1 39,6
Employment 17.95 17,7 17,5 16,6 17,7
Source: Yoo and Lim (1997) and Fair Trade Commission cited in 1998 OECD Survey on Korea
Figure 6-4. Total corporate debt
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was increasing steadily throughout the 1990's, achieving
its peak in 1997. 
There were several remarkable features of this debt,
which explicitly contributed to the collapse of many cor-
porations and implicitly, through the growing number of
non-performing  loans,  to  the  bankruptcy  of  banks  and
non-banking financial institutions (NBFIs). 
First, the increasing trend towards indirect financing of
the  corporate  sector  in  Korea  mirrored  the  relatively
undeveloped bond and equity markets (between the first
half of 1996 and 1997 the exposure of banks and NBFIs to
cheabols almost doubled while direct financing declined
by 20 percent (OECD, 1998)). In 1996, in terms of capi-
talization, the equity market in Korea was equal to 25.4
percent of GDP . This fell far below that of the developed
world (108.7, 67.6, 47.8 for the United States, Japan and
G-10 Europe, respectively) and represented a sharp fall
from  1990,  when  the  equity  market  capitalization  was
equal to 43.6 percent (BIS, 1997 Annual Report). Highly
leveraged cheabols became prone to shocks that cause a
fall in cash flow (i.e. a terms of trade drop) or an increase
in payment obligations (due to an interest rate increase).
The  situation  became  worse  at  the  beginning  of  1997
when an almost 50 percent slide of market equity value
was observed compared to its 1995 high. This affected
not only cheabols, but also banks as cheabols were pur-
chasing equity for loans granted. The similar trend was
observed in terms of the market capitalization of shares of
domestic companies (main and parallel markets, excluding
investment funds). In 1994, the capitalization was equiva-
lent to around 118 percent of GDP . However, by the end
of  1997  it  dropped  together  with  the  stock  market
decline to only 23 percent of GDP . 
Secondly, the corporate sector debt in Korea was, to a
high degree, concentrated in the thirty largest cheabols.
What is more, as the Table 6-3 shows, the exposure of the
thirty largest chaebols to non-bank financial institutions in
Korea was increasing.
Between 1988 and 1992 the share of banks in corpo-
rate debt financing dropped by 6.3 percent, but that of
NBFIs increased by 8.1 percent. Taking into consideration
the minimum supervision imposed on non-banking finan-
cial intermediaries, there was no doubt they were eager
to make loans to the business sector and individuals.
Overall, the high dependence of the Korean corporate
sector on debt as opposed to equity finance was clearly
evident  and  extremely  high  even  by  international  stan-
dards.  Throughout  all  the  1980's  and  1990's  the  debt/
equity ratio averaged from around 400 percent to 500
percent plus [4]. On the other hand, the debt/ equity ratio
for the United States oscillated around 50–100 percent,
for the United Kingdom slightly less at that time. Even
Japan, which expanded beyond 350 percent in 1980, in
1994 was down to around 150 percent.  Enormous debt/
equity imbalances in Korea had their roots in the system
of debt guarantees within cheabols, lax capitalization rules
and low effective tax rates on interest income implement-
ed  to  pursue  the  rapid  growth  of  the  economy  [IMF,
1999].
6.2.2. Investments
Although it is true that investment rates in Korea were
high, the central question remains if they were profitable
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Table 6-3. Share of loans to the 30 largest chaebols in total loans by financial institutions, percent
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Banks* 28.6 26.3 24.2 20.7 19.0 18.9 17.9 15.6 15.0 13.9
NBFIs - - 32.4 36.6 37.8 38.5 40.5 - - -
*Deposit money banks only.
Source: The Bank Supervisory Board, The Korea Investors Service, Inc. Quoted from Nam, et al. (1999)
Table 6-4. Top five largest cheabols (unit: trillion won, %)
Debt/ Equity ratio
1996* 1997 1998
1.Hyundai 440 572.3 449.3
2.Samsung 279 365.5 275.7
3.LG 345 507.8 341.0
4.Daewoo 391 473.6 526.5
5.SK 352 466.2 354.9
*Data for 1996 is from April, otherwise end of the year.
Source: Dongchul Cho and Kiseok Hong (1999), Ministry of Finance and Economy
[4] The debt/ equity ratios for the top thirty cheabols can be found in Appendix 1 of this paper.107
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enough to contract such a high debt?  By comparing the
cumulative investments with changes in GDP , it is almost
certain that some of them were misdirected [5].
Since the late eighties, the value of the capital-output ratio
(ICOR) was increasing, indicating the falling quality of fixed
capital formation. A slight drop was observed between 1991
and 1993. But after then, the ICOR index was systematically
growing. Considering the slow down in GDP growth rates
since 1995, there is no doubt there was not enough capacity
in the corporate sector in Korea to cope with such high rates
of credit. The overheating pressures amplified.
Apart from ICOR, other indices like the rate of return
on assets, the growth rate of ordinary income as well as
the  break-even  point,  showed  the  low  productivity  of
investment and the growing vulnerability of the Korean
corporate sector [6]. The last variable indicates the level
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Figure 6-5. ICOR*
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[5] The incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR) is subject to possible faults as its value can be influenced by factors not solely dependent on the
efficiency of invested capital.  Other factors include structural weaknesses and capital deepening.
[6] Manufacturing ordinary income is calculated as total sales less cost of sales plus selling and general administrative expenses, less net non-oper-
ating cost. 
Figure 6-6. Profitability of the corporate sector
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of cost of production just covered by income (the higher
the value of the break-even points, the higher the cost). 
As the chart shows, from 1995 onwards, all three indi-
cators  –  the  break-even  point,  ordinary  income  and
return on assets – demonstrated  the falling profitability of
the corporate sector.
The high leverage of the corporate sector and its inad-
equate governance was an important, if not the major, fac-
tor  of  Korea's  ensuing  collapse.  The  question  to  be
answered  is  why  it  was  sustainable  in  the  1980's  but
turned into a collapse in the second half of the 1990's?
The  simplest  answer  lies  probably  in  the  unfavorable
behavior of the terms of trade, which significantly con-
strained the cash flow of chaebols, the major exporters in
Korea. But there were other factors like the appreciation
of the US dollar vis-a-vis the Japanese yen at the beginning
of 1995 that weakened the competitive position of firms.
Furthermore, the collapse of Hanbo Steel Co. in January
1997,  the  first  big  bankruptcy  in  decades,  undermined
investors' confidence that Korean firms were 'too big to
fail'. This was followed by Moody's decision to lower the
long-term rating on three Korean banks, which had a sig-
nificant exposure to Hanbo [Park, et. al, 1998]. The com-
mon belief in the government willingness to bail out falling
companies disappeared together with the declining stock
of foreign reserves. 
Low-productivity of investments was mirrored in the
burden  of  non-performing  loans  (NPLs)  in  the  banking
system. In 1995 NPLs (included loans classified as sub-
standard and doubtful) for commercial banks were equal
to 5.1 percent of total loans raised. In 1997 it was already
6 percent, according to the Financial Supervisory Service
(cited by J. Fleming). Soon after the eruption of the crisis
the problem of NPLs in total loans magnified. In 1998 the
percentage number increased to 7.4.  Although, these fig-
ures  are  high,  they  maybe  even  higher  since  regular
reports on NPLs have been available only recently.
6.3. Korean Financial System and its
Liberalization
Before the liberalization of the Korean financial sec-
tor  the  early  1980's,  the  government  had  intervened
heavily to pursue its industrial objectives. As the reforms
progressed,  several  commercial  banks  and  non-bank
financial institutions were added to the system. Never-
theless,  the  attempts  to  liberalize  were  only  partially
successful, still leaving many regulations in force (i.e. low
interest rate ceiling to increase profits and retain earn-
ings  for  selected  firms,  commercial  banks'  lending  to
preferential sectors) [7].
The 1988 plan to deregulate the majority of bank and
non-bank's  lending  rates  as  well  as  interest  rates  on
money market instruments was mostly reversed, because
of pressures arising from earlier beneficiaries of the pref-
erential access to low interest rates credit. On the other
hand, the second attempt to implement the plan in 1992
was suppressed by the stock market slump [IMF, 1999]. 
The next phase of financial system reform took place
in 1993 when the first democratically elected civilian gov-
ernment came to power. The new government under the
President Kim Young Sam was highly committed to finan-
cial liberalization. There were two reasons for speeding
up the process. One of them was the perspective of join-
ing the OECD, the other was the growing ability of pri-
vate  and  already  credible  firms  to  borrow  funds  from
abroad. However, most capital flows attracted by firms
through the stock market were not free from explicit or
implicit quantitative controls, with the exception of trade
related short-term financing [Dooley et al. 1999]. During
that  time,  large  structural  changes  led  to  further  rapid
growth of non-banking financial institutions. As the Bank
of Korea states, the market share of non-banking financial
institutions  in  terms  of  Korean  won  deposits  between
1980 and 1998 increased from about 29 to 72 percent.
The  numbers  for  banking  institutions  (commercial  and
specialized banks) were 71 and 28 percent, respectively
[OECD, 1998]. The trend in loans and discounts was sim-
ilar, increasing for NBFIs and falling for banks. Between
1996 and 1997, the share of funds raised by the business
sector from non-banks to the total funds raised increased
by 10 percentage points, from 13.9 to 23.9 percent. At
the same time borrowing from banks dropped from 14 to
12,9 percent (Bank of Korea). 
6.3.1. Non-banking Financial Institutions
In  Korea,  non-banking  financial  institutions  can  be
roughly classified into five categories according to their
business  activities.    These  are:  development,  savings,
investment,  insurance,  and  other  institutions  (Bank  of
Korea). The role they played in causing future deteriora-
tion in the financial sector balance sheet was significant
since they were allowed greater freedom in their man-
agement of assets and liabilities.  What is more, they were
able to charge higher interest rates on their loans as well
as apply higher interest rates on their deposits.  Regarding
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[7] Commercial banks in Korea were nationalized in the 1960's and since then the government was influencing the sectoral allocation of credit with
smaller or greater intensity [IMF; 1999]. 109
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the troubles Korea faced in 1997, the number of new
licenses issued to merchant banking corporations was an
important  factor.  In  1993  there  were  just  6  merchant
banks.  By 1996 this number increased to 30 as a result of
deregulation on financial transactions. In principle, mer-
chant banks were supervised by the Ministry of Finance
and Economy, but this was minimal as there was no asset
classification,  capital,  or  provisioning  rules  [IMF,  1999].
Besides, most of them were owned by cheabols and were
used to finance activities within a group.  To attract funds,
merchant banks, for example, were offering cash man-
agement  accounts  to  their  customers  (within  these
accounts, apart from getting checkbooks and credit cards,
banks' clients were able to raise loans).  Banks were main-
ly investing in short-term commercial papers and notes. 
The contribution of non-banking financial institutions,
and merchant banks in particular, in financing investments
of corporations was significant.  Lax regulations let banks
provide loans and guarantees of up to 50 percent of their
capital.  Additionally, the practice of cross-guarantees was
common, where affiliates merchant banks were financing
activities of other firms from the same business group.
Conflict of interest between these two resulted in banks'
failure  to  monitor  the  performance  of  their  debtors
[OECD, 1998]. This problem in economic literature is
known  as  an  adverse  selection,  the  situation  where
lenders have an incomplete knowledge of the creditwor-
thiness/ quality of borrowers.
6.3.2. Capital Account Liberalization 
Alongside financial liberalization, the capital account
was also progressively liberalized. Deregulation of foreign
exchange capital account transactions led to the expan-
sion of foreign branches of Korean banks. Between 1994
and 1996, Korean banks opened 28 foreign branches in
addition to 24 financial companies which were allowed to
engage in foreign exchange business upon the conversion
into merchant banks described above. In accordance with
the design program, the short-term capital movements
were liberalized in advance of long-term ones.  Regard-
less of the increasing list of industries open to foreign
direct investments (FDIs), they were still subject to tight
restrictions of unclear form. Very often they were denied
because they could "disrupt the market" in the situation of
surge short-term flows.  In 1993, limits on the long-term
foreign-currency  denominated  loans  were  relaxed,  but
the long-term borrowing remained restricted. This deci-
sion led Korean banks to borrow funds from abroad for
the short-term and lend these funds to domestic compa-
nies for the long-term. It created a serious maturity mis-
match where banks became prone to shocks such as an
increase  in  interest  rates.  In  this  case,  the  burden
imposed in the end of 1997 was a natural consequence of
their net worth reduction. This is because, by definition,
higher interest rates increase value of banks' long-term
assets more than lowering short-term liabilities. 
According to the BIS-IMF-World Bank's statistics, lia-
bilities  to  banks  –  due  within  the  year  –  oscillated
between 63 and 70 percent of total external liabilities in
1994–96. The situation looked even more precarious in
terms of international reserves accumulated. By the end
of 1997, total reserve assets only covered 38% of short-
term external liabilities.
The external financial liberalization, which led to the
accumulation of short-term liabilities, exposed the Kore-
an  banking  sector  to  problems  like  liquidity  tightening,
when some adverse news about the market caused sharp
investor  reactions.  Firstly,  when  in  1997  investors
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Table 6-5. Fund Raising by the Corporate Sector
1996 % 1997 % 1998 %
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stopped believing in the capacity of the government to
bail out falling companies, banks and NBFIs, they rushed
to pull their money out of the country. Secondly, the exist-
ing  currency  mismatch  (Korean  banks'  foreign  liabilities
were excessive to domestic assets) limited the ability to
convert domestic currency into foreign currency. Thirdly,
when the won/ dollar exchange rate started to depreciate,
short-term foreign currency obligations of banks and non-
banking financial institutions as a share of domestic assets
increased  significantly.  The  lack  of  liquidity  of  Korean
banks was also clear by international standards. On aver-
age, between 1995 and 1997, the ratio of liquid assets to
liquid liabilities (a three months period is considered to be
"liquid") was 60 percent in comparison to 100 – an inter-
national standard [Nam et al.1998]. 
It is also important to note that even though the total
external debt as a ratio of GNP increased from 13 to 22
percent between 1990 and 1996, it was not as large as in
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Figure 6-7. External debt
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other Asia and Latin America countries [8]. In 1996 the
ratios for the Philippines and Thailand were 54 and 46
percent, respectively. For Mexico, prior to the 1994 cri-
sis, it was 35 percent [Park et al, 1998]. The same con-
clusion is drawn from other indicators. The percentage
share of foreign liabilities in total liabilities of the banking
system  was  about  13  percent  in  1996–97  for  Korea,
whereas in Indonesia averaged around 25 percent at that
time.  In Argentina on the other hand, it surged up to 20
percent in 1997 (IMF, IFS). There were two facts that
seemed to be more important than the overall magnitude
of external debt. One was its increasing trend since the
early 1990's; another was associated with the high expo-
sure of the banking system to short-term foreign bor-
rowing discussed above. 
Progressive capital account liberalization also covered a
higher ceiling on stock investments for non-residents, with
the aggregate ceiling of 26 percent and individual ceiling of
7 percent by November 1997. Others included borrowing
from international bond markets by Korean companies with
prior  notification,  foreign  purchasing  of  certain  types  of
bonds or non-guaranteed corporate and SME bonds [IMF,
1998]. But despite of liberalization of capital account trans-
actions some restrictions remained (see Appendix 2).
6.3.3. Credit Expansion
The industrialization strategy implemented in Korea
fuelled by the financial system liberalization resulted in
domestic  credit  expansion.  Furthermore,  the  surge  in
banking borrowing was typified by five important charac-
teristics (all key for the future of the banking system):
– Credit, in the most part, was extended to the pri-
vate  sector  to  finance  new  investments;  public  sector
borrowing played a minor role,
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Table 6-5. Liquidity ratio of the 10 largest korean banks
1995 1996 March 1997 September
1997
80-90% 1 3 2 2
70-80% 2 2 1 1
60-70% 4 2 4 5
Below 60% 3 3 3 2
Source: Shin and Hahm (1998) cited in Nam et al. (1998)
Figure 6-9. Currency mismatch*
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Source: *Foreign liabilities over domestic assets, deposit money banks
Source: IMF, IFS; own calculation
[8] This data does not include offshore borrowing of domestic financial institutions, overseas borrowing of foreign branches of domestic financial
institutions and borrowing of overseas branches of domestic enterprises. When these are incorporated, the total external debt jumps from 121 to 170
billion of dollars at the end of 1997 [Park et al, 1998].112
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– Explicitly, it indicated a falling quality of loans and ampli-
fied the probability of accelerating non-performing loans,
– Borrowing, for the most part, was short-term and
foreign currency dominated,
–  Non-banking  financial  institutions  were  the  major
intermediaries of funds,
– Expansion of overseas branches of domestic financial
institution resulted in the situation where 70 percent of
total debt accounted for the banking sector, direct finance
played a minor role [Dooley et al. 1999].
Bank credit grew more than 20 percent per annum in
1996 and 1997. Moreover, the ratio of bank credit to GDP
was also increasing at a very high pace. The fact that loans
were invested in the risky business of low profitability and
declining rates of return (the discussion on efficiency of
investments and profitability of the corporate sector was
carried out in the previous section) led many of them to
become non-performing, putting an extraordinary burden
on the banking sector.
Alongside the domestic credit growth, total claims on
the private sector were also increasing. Between 1994
and the first quarter of 1996, total claims of deposits in
banks as a percentage of GDP was averaging around 55
percent of GDP . From the second quarter on, it was sys-
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tematically growing, reaching 65 percent at the onset of
the crisis.
6.3.4. Risk Assessment in the Banking System
The sharp increase in bank lending – fuelled by very lax
provisioning  rules  and  insufficient  risk  assessment  –  was
mirrored by the growing number of non-performing loans
(NPLs)  in  Korea.  The  fact  that  there  were  no  regular
reports did not permit an adequate assessment of the health
of the banking sector. The depth of the problem is clear
when the data on non-performing loans as a percentage of
total loans from 1996 is compared with the revised data for
the same time period.  The 1996 number for NPLs as a per-
centage of total loans states for 0.8 percent, whereas the
revised  one  for  4.1  percent.  Partially,  this  discrepancy  is
connected  with  the  classification  of  substandard  loans  in
Korea,  partially  with  the  lack  of  regular  reports  already
pointed.  Usually, loans being three months plus in arrears
are considered as substandard. But in the Korean Republic,
this rule was extended to six months plus. Compulsory pro-
visioning imposed on these loans varied from 20 to 75 per-
cent, although this depended on the types of collateral and
guarantees. In many cases, only bad loans (NPLs not cov-
ered by collateral) were reported as non-performing. The
transmission mechanism between the banks, non-banking
financial institutions and Korean corporations led to the pre-
sumption that the real number of compulsory provisioning
was closer to the lower bounder – or was even below it.
Adding to this story the number of corporate and banking
bankruptcies in the end of 1997 and the beginning of 1998,
it is obvious that Korean banks failed to adequately assess
credit risk. 
The economy experienced troubles also in terms of sol-
vency indicators of the banking sector. The capital adequa-
cy ratio based on the Basle Core Principle requires a mini-
mum ratio of eight. Yet, the domestic regulation was looser
and required only four percent. In 1996 the actual capital
adequacy ratio in Korea was just 9.1 percent representing a
2-percentage point drop from the 1993 value  [9]. In Thai-
land and Hong Kong, meanwhile, it was equal to 11.3 and
17.5  percent  respectively.  There  were  other  factors  like
soft accounting rules, which gave the authorities the room
to manipulate the capital adequacy ratio.  The growing mer-
chant  banks'  off-balance  sheet  credit  guarantees  were
alarming prior to the crisis.  In 1996, off-balance sheet cred-
it guarantees were 49.3 percent expressed in ratio to total
assets. It was higher by 12.5 percentage points than the
1993 average. For commercial banks the number was small-
er and equal to 8 percent (the 1.2 percentage points drop
from 1995). This piece of evidence points on the immense
role the merchant banks played in the debt-financed growth
strategy in Korea.  
Of course Koran banks had some prudential regula-
tions to limit the probability of financial difficulties, but
they were not successful in preventing excessive risk tak-
ing. For example, in 1996, in order to prevent excessive
risk-taking, Korean banks had constraints on foreign cur-
rency exposure. The sum of long positions as a percent-
age of total capital was limited to 15; the sum of short
positions to 10 percent. The spot short positions were
limited to 3 percent of bank capital or to 5 million of USD,
whichever was greater. Maximum lending to a single bor-
rower was 15 percent on the total bank capital, the same
number as in United States. Nevertheless, the growing
currency mismatch in Korea suggests that the imposed
limits were relatively flexible and that foreign investors
were mostly responsible for the growth of foreign assets
of Korean banks. 
6.4. The Onset of the Crisis
The overview of the financial and corporate sectors'
situation preceding the crisis showed that microeconom-
ic distortions in Korean economy were accumulating for
quite some time. Even if the crisis was initiated by the
subsequent massive and abrupt capital outflow, the fact
remains that many other factors contributed to the 1997
crash more than a simple herding. Definitely financial lib-
eralization without adequate regulations imposed, long-
lasting governmental control of the financial sector as well
as the weak corporate governance were fundamental to
the crisis. But apart from structural weaknesses sketched
in the previous sections, there were other signs of vul-
nerabilities  building  up  in  the  economy  and  eventually
causing the external liquidity crisis:
– the slow down in the GDP growth rate, 
– the steady decline in stock price levels, lowering the
value of banks and corporate equities and further reduc-
ing the value of their net worth,  
– the sharp drop in the terms of trade affecting not
only  Korean  export,  but  also  disturbing  banks  and
cheabols' balance sheets. According to Cho (1999) cited
in Mishkin, et al (2000), the 20 percent drop in terms of
trade accounted for more than 70 percent loss in aggre-
gate corporate profits,
– depreciation of the Japanese yen against the US dol-
lar additionally weakening the country external position,
– financial crashes in neighboring countries.
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Taking into account risks like currency and maturity as
well as the risk of default on external debt, it appears that
all of these factors, individually and taken together, were
responsible  for  building  up  pressures  in  Korea.  These
pressures finally turned out to be excessive leading the
economy into the deep recession.
But even with the clear financial difficulties Korean cor-
porations  were  facing  at  the  beginning  of  1997,  foreign
investors did not downgrade Korea until the second quarter
of the year when capital began to leave the country. The
behavior of the exchange rate was, however, different since
the won was loosing its value relative to the dollar through-
out the whole 1996 (see section one). The stock market
index was showing a similar trend to that of the exchange
rate. In December 1997 it went down by more than 42 per-
cent on a year-on-year basis. As in Park et al. (1999), foreign
investors were evidently distinguishing between sovereign
and domestic risks as late as October 1997. The same was
true for rating agencies. Although Standard and Poors low-
ered the credit rating of Korea First Bank on April 18, it was
solely based on the fact that this bank was highly exposed to
the two collapsing cheabols, Hanbo Group on January and
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Sammi Steel on March. The sovereign credit rating was still
set at AA- level and did not decline until October. 
As in many other events of financial (banking) crises, it is
extremely difficult to assess which model would be the most
suitable one for Korea. The scenario of speculative attacks
due to expected currency depreciation couldn't facilitate the
run on Korea simply because the existence of tight regula-
tions on currency forwards backed by corresponding cur-
rent  account  transactions  and  the  absence  of  currency
futures market made this framework impossible [Mishkin, et
al, 2000]. It was rather a consequence of creditors' herding
behavior to withdraw their loans. The fact that Korea had a
high level of short-term debt and only moderate interna-
tional reserves favors this scenario. In retrospect however,
and regarding the structural weakness of financial and cor-
porate sectors this panic could be judged as rational. 
The set of macroeconomic indicators developed to mea-
sure the probability of financial crises would blur the true pic-
ture about the health of Korean economy. Here the problem
is deeper and goes back to the early 1990's when the financial
liberalization eased restrictions on short-term capital flows
but left long-term ones in force. Together with the govern-
ment's reluctance to give up its influence in most sectors of
the economy, a series of bankruptcies of corporations under-
mined  investors'  confidence  in  the  quality  of  their  assets.
Thus, the Korean crisis was a result of interactions between
financial and corporate sectors which failed to set prudential
governance rules.  The role the government played in calm-
ing down the market was also of considerable importance
since the policy was misdirected and instead of ceasing, it
fuelled the crisis. The harsh tone and desperate announce-
ments concerning good prospects of the economy gave a
warning sign to investors. The fact that the authorities were
bailing out collapsing corporations and banks raised doubts
about the solvency of the whole economy. When the govern-
ment announced the stock of official reserves at the end of
November, the market confidence about the magnitude of
usable foreign reserves was undermined and caused a further
decline in the stock market index (regarding the course of
events in Korea at the end of the 1997, see the overview of
the chronology of selected news from the financial markets
presented in Appendix 3). 
6.5. The 1998 Recession and 1999
Recovery
6.5.1. The IMF Intervention in Asia
On November 20, 1997 the exchange rate band was
widened from 2.5 to 10 percent. The day after, the gov-
ernment asked the International Monetary Fund to lend
support.    On  December  4,  the  IMF's  Executive  Board
approved a Stand-By Arrangement with Korea of $21 bil-
lion over the next three years based on the assumption of
the GDP growth in 1998 of 2.5 percent. The World Bank
and the Asian Development Bank provided an additional
$14 billion as well as technical assistance.  Individual coun-
tries agreed on another $22 billion as a second line of
defense credit. The total sum granted to Korea was equal
to  $58.4  billion,  but  the  disbursement  of  money  was
based on certain conditions:
1. comprehensive financial sector restructuring with a
clear exit policy, strong market and supervisory discipline,
and  independence  of  the  central  bank.  Nine  merchant
banks were suspended; two commercial banks were cap-
italised by the government; all commercial banks were
required to submit plans for recapitalization,
2. the bases for corporate income and VAT widened in
order to bear the costs of financial restructuring (fiscal
measures were equivalent to about 2 percent of GDP and
were consisted with the balance budget target),
3. an end to close the relationships between govern-
ment, banks and corporations as well as an improvement
in accounting (corporate financial statements had to be
prepared on the consolidated basis), auditing (certification
of external auditor) and disclosure standards,
4. the implementation of trade and capital account lib-
eralization  measures  (liberalization  of  FDIs  flows  and
opening  money,  bond  and  equity  markets  to  capital
inflows),
5. labor market reforms,
6. the publication and dissemination of key economic
and financial data (IMF on line service).
Nevertheless, the announcement of the program did
not  help  to  stabilize  the  exchange  rate  and  the  usable
gross reserves fell to 8.9 billion US dollars at the end of
December 1997. In the last quarter of the 1997, net cap-
ital outflows were observed ($24.9 billion compared to $7
billion of inflows in the corresponding period of 1996).
This was greater than the IMF initially expected (the pro-
gram assumed net outflows of $11.1 billion in December
1997 and net inflows of $3.3 billion in 1998).  Revision of
the program was necessary, but even then it failed to pre-
dict the total net capital outflows of $14.8 billion in 1998. 
The IMF prescriptions for crisis management may be a
source of concern given the long-term adjustment condi-
tions imposed, but the role of the Korean government is
also questionable. As the government was injecting capital
to falling companies, investors did not really believe in its
commitment  to  market  restructuring.  As  a  result,  the
exchange rate dropped by 40 percent between Decem-
ber 7 and 14, the stock market declined by 17 percent
during  December  3–10.  It  was  the  sharpest  reduction
since the beginning of October.  As the crisis accelerated,
the  defense  of  the  won  became  impossible  and  the116
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exchange  rate  band  was  abolished  on  December  16.
Eight days later, the IMF-backed program was adjusted,
assuming further monetary tightening, speeding up the lib-
eralization of capital and money market, financial sector
restructuring  as  well  as  trade  liberalization.  Thanks  to
these interventions, by the time of the second biweekly
review on January 8, some degree of exchange rate stabil-
ity was achieved. On January 28, 1998 international cred-
itors agreed on a plan to officially roll over the short-term
debt  of  approximately  $24  billion.  The  agreement  was
signed in March which reduced Korean short-term debt
by $19 billion from $61 to $42 billion in the end of April
1998, and helped to increase the stock of usable foreign
reserves.
In a Letter of Intent of February 7, 1998, the macro-
economic framework of the plan was revised with the
GDP  growth  forecast  of  1  percent  for  1998.    It  also
included additional measures to target the fiscal deficit to
1 percent of GDP (from a previous surplus of 2 percent)
and further development of financial sector's reforms in
order to stabilize short-term debt payments. Given the
fragility  of  the  exchange  rate,  the  monetary  policy
remained  tight.  Within  this  program  revision,  foreign
investors gained an increased number of financial instru-
ments available. On the other hand, domestic companies
had  easier  access  to  foreign  capital  markets  and  were
expected to introduce a number of measures needed to
improve overall corporate transparency (i.e. introduction
of external audit committee or outside directors). 
On May 2 1998, the Korean authorities updated the
second stage of the program – economic restructuring.
This time the fiscal deficit for 1998 was set at the level of
2 percent of GDP . Other changes included the introduc-
tion of measures to strengthen the social safety net, fur-
ther easing of restrictions on foreign exchange transac-
tions and foreign ownership of certain assets. Once again,
the GDP growth rate forecast for 1998 was changed to
minus  two  percent.  Apart  from  setting  a  new  policy
framework, the review also noticed the successful emis-
sion of sovereign bonds which, together with the current
account surplus and notable capital inflows, increased the
stock of usable foreign reserves to $34.4 billion.  Even
though the vulnerability of the currency market was miti-
gated and the interest rate was lowered, monetary policy
remained cautious about maintaining the exchange rate
stability.
The fact that the won slightly appreciated against the
American  dollar  and  was  relatively  stable  (averaging
around W 1290 per US dollar comparing to 1500–1800 at
the beginning of the year) in the mid-1998, let interest
rates to go back to the pre-crisis level. This decision was
announced in a Letter of Intent from July 24. To support
economic activity and strengthen the social safety net, a
supplementary budget was prepared. This time the fiscal
deficit of 5 percent of GDP was projected. Output was
anticipated to contract to -4 percent. Since the inflation
rate moderated, the average rate for 1998 was expected
to be 9 percent. The huge drop in imports and the export
recovery let the current account to turn into a higher sur-
plus of 10 percent of GDP . In a light of a severe recession,
further  steps  towards  corporate  and  financial  sectors
restructuring  were  inevitable.  According  to  Nam  et  al.
(1999), 94 financial institutions were suspended or closed.
As  the  NPLs  were  growing,  the  government  provided
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support of 41 billion won (10 percent of GDP) for their
disposal as well as for banks' restructuring. In result most
of Korean banks achieved capital adequacy ratio between
10 and 13 percent.
An acceleration of the recession was so abrupt that
the GDP growth rate was once again corrected to -5 per-
cent in August 1998.  A supplementary budget was intro-
duced to increase expenditure needed for restructuring
distressed sectors. However, the exchange market stabil-
ity allowed further reductions in the overnight call rate,
from 25 percent at the beginning of the year to 8.5 per-
cent at the end of September. This help disturbed com-
panies  and  reduced  the  number  of  bankruptcies  from
3000 to 1400 during the same period [Nam et al., 1999]. 
6.5.2.  Macroeconomic  Environment  after  the
Crisis
After the eruption of the crisis, Korea moved into a
severe recession which was not expected even by the
IMF staff. As indicated above, the growth forecasts were
revised  downward,  along  with  almost  all  the  other
restructuring program's elements.  The fiscal deficit was
also adjusted in order to accommodate weaker econom-
ic activity and costs of financial restructuring. High inter-
est rates (reaching 25 percent in January 1998) necessary
to achieve exchange rate stabilization imposed a high bur-
den on the real sector. In the first half of 1998, the gross
domestic product plunged to -5.3 percent comparing to
the year before and declined to 6.7 percent during the
whole  year.    The  reduction  in  output  was  mostly  the
result  of  a  sharp  reduction  in  domestic  demand.  The
annual  percentage  changes  in  private  and  public  con-
sumption were equal to -9.6 and -0.1, respectively. The
gross fixed capital formation dropped by 21 percent, and
was probably the most responsible factor of the total out-
put squeeze. Exports had declined by 13 percent, yet the
slide in import was sharper and equal 22 percent. This
resulted in the current account surplus of 10.9 percent of
GDP in 1998. The unemployment rate jumped to 6.3 per-
cent during the 1st half of the year and reached 6.8 per-
cent at the end of the year (during the pre-crisis period it
did not exceed 3 percent). The consolidated central gov-
ernment budget was in deficit of 4 percent of GDP com-
paring to the pre-crisis surplus (the initial IMF program
assumed 0.2 percent surplus). The annual CPI inflation in
the first quarter of the year reached 8.9 percent, but in
the  last  quarter  was  down  to  3.9  percent,  which  was
lower than before the crisis.
The 1998 recession seemed to be over in 1999 with
some signs of stability visible already in the second-half of
1998 which helped to fuel investments. In the third quar-
ter of 1999, gross fixed capital formation increased by 4.8
percent compared to its 1998 level. GDP growth boomed
and exceeded 10 percent at the end of 1999 – supported
by a monetary and fiscal policy expansion. The fact that
short-term interest rates were cut from 23–25 percent to
5 percent significantly diminished the costs of borrowing.
Low interest rates also helped banks and cheabols to bear
the costs of debt restructuring. The budget deficit was
reduced  to  3  percent  of  GDP .  The  growth  in  imports
reduced the current account surplus to around 6 percent
of GDP . The exchange rate was stable oscillating around
W1200 per US dollar. Nevertheless, there was a couple of
exceptions to this impressive recovery. One of them was
an unemployment rate of 6.3 percent, which despite of
deceleration was still in a sharp contrast to the pre-crisis
average; the other was the collapse of the Daewoo group
in the middle of the year.
6.6. Conclusions
The financial turmoil which erupted in Korea in 1997
did not really fit into any group of theoretical models of
financial crisis existing in the economic literature at that
time. It is just recently when researches tried do develop
so-called third generation models with new sets of funda-
mentals.  Broadly  speaking,  they  aggregate  macro  and
microeconomic indicators of economic soundness. 
The  Korean  case  is  a  good  example  of  the  great
importance  of  complex  reforms  once  the  economy  is
switching  from  the  centralized  to  market  governance.
The healthy macroeconomic background is a prerequi-
site, but the high rates of growth, on their own, are not a
safeguard of the long-lasting economic success.  
In  the  Korean  Republic,  highly  leveraged  cheabols
were vulnerable to shocks like a collapse in investor con-
fidence. Inadequate liberalization instead of hosting long-
term capital welcomed short-term inflows. Additionally,
and even more importantly, cheabols were not efficient
and  facilitated  family  connections.  Tight  relationships
among  cheabols,  banks  and  the  government  made  the
transparency of financial and corporate sectors virtually
impossible. Even if, on average. the prudential rules on
banks in Korea were similar to those in western coun-
tries, existing exceptions created a scope for choosing the
"regain  strategy".  The  number  of  financial  instruments
available increased once the financial sector was liberal-
ized, and made the government attempt to control the
stock of foreign capital ineffective.
In  the  last  Letter  of  Intent  dated  August  13,  2000
which finished the IMF intervention in Korea, the mem-
bers of the IMF Executive Board stressed the impressive
Korean rebound from the 1997 crisis. They said it was
possible due to "supportive macroeconomic policies and
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the competitive exchange rate; a wide range of structural
reforms that addressed the weaknesses that contributed
to  the  1997  crisis  and  increased  market  orientation;  a
favorable external environment; and an improvement in
confidence  resulting  from  both  the  implementation  of
strong economic policies and the recovery and build-up in
foreign exchange reserves". 
Despite the changes however, there is still a lot to be
done especially in the area of structural reforms.  In the
special  joint  report  the  IMF  and  Korean  Government
agreed on major policies regarding further financial and
corporate sectors restructuring in Korea. They identified
at least a few problems, which despite the progress made
in both sectors need to be solved.  Bearing in mind all the
reasons for the financial crisis in Korea, a number of them
are  key.  Ongoing  policy  plans  of  the  financial  sector
include the following measures:
–  while  still  being  the  owner  of  some  commercial
banks the government will let banks to operate on a fully
commercial basis and will not be involved in the day-to-
day management,
– public funds should be only used to the extent nec-
essary to facilitate the liquidation of failed institutions and
restructuring of weak but viable banks,
– financial transactions between affiliated companies
or between institutions and their shareholders are con-
fined  to  transactions  in  assets  for  which  market  price
exist,
–  all  related  party  transactions  will  be  disclosed  in
audited accounts and reported to FSC,
–  exposures  of  commercial  banks,  merchant  banks,
specialized and development banks in excess of the new
20 percent or 25 percent limits will be subject to pro-
gressive reduction.
Further  corporate  sector  restructuring  consists  of
preparation of the consolidated statements assessing the
overall financial structure as well as Daewoo resolution.
Others  encompass  further  improvements  in  financial
transparency  and  accountability  (Financial  Supervisory
Service) [10].
In spite of all this, the latest news from Seoul is not
optimistic.  The  unsuccessful  auction  of  Daewoo  group
undermined  investor  confidence  and  was  immediately
mirrored  in  the  stock  market  decline.  Additionally,  the
scale of corporate indebtedness before the crisis was so
great that two years time after the crisis South Korea's
conglomerates  are  still  uanble  to  overcome  it.  The
progress  towards  reducing  bad  loans  has  not  been
observed  yet;  the  target  of  cutting  the  debt-to-equity
ratio in the end of 1999 to 200 percent was not achieved.
This begs the question about the efficiency and the
speed of reforms carried out in the country. Indeed, one
can  question  the  IMF  restructuring  program  applied  in
Korea, which failed to foresee the deepness of the crisis
and caused the sharp output downturn, but in the light of
current episodes one can also ask if the imposed condi-
tionality was severe enough to bring about 'the second
miracle. 
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1.Hyundai 43.7 (6.94) 440 46
2.Samsung 40.8 (6.48) 279 55
3.LG 31.4 (4.99) 345 48
4.Daewoo 31.3 (4.97) 391 25
5.SK 14.6 (2.32) 352 32
6.Ssangyong 13.9 (2.21) 310 23
7.Hanjin 12.2 (1.94) 559 24
8.Kia 11.4 (1.81) 522 16
9.Hanhwa 9.2 (1.46) 712 31
10.Lotte 7.1 (1.13) 191 28
11.Kumho 6.4 (1.02) 480 27
12.Doosan 5.8 (0.92) 907 26
13.Daelim 5.4 (0.86) 424 18
14.Hanbo 5.1 (0.81) 648 21
15.Dongah 5.1 (0.81) 362 16
16.Halla 4.8 (0.76) 2457 17
17.Hyosung 3.6 (0.57) 362 16
18.Dongkuk 3.4 (0.54) 223 16
19.Jinro 3.3 (0.52) 4836 14
20.Kolon 3.1 (0.49) 340 19
21.Tongyang 3.0 (0.48) 305 22
22.Hansol 3.0 (0.48) 291 19
23.Dongbu 2.9 (0.46) 219 24
24.Kohap 2.9 (0.46) 603 11
25.Haitai 2.9 (0.46) 669 14
26.Sammi 2.5 (0.40) 3333 8
27.Hanil 2.2 (0.35) 581 8
28.Keukdong 2.2 (0.35) 516 11
29.New Core 2.0 (0.32) 1253 18
30.Byucksan 1.9 (0.30) 473 16
Total 286.9 (45.6) 669
*Figures in parentheses are the share of total assets of the corporate sector in Korea (629.8 trillion won as of the end of 1996).
Source: Dongchul Cho and Kiseok Hong (1999).120
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– In January 1997, the 14th largest conglomerate Hanbo
Steel  Co.  went  bankrupt.  The  long-term  rating  of  three
Korean banks with the high exposure to Hanbo was low-
ered. Yet, the sovereign risk for Korea did not deteriorate,
indicated the clear separation of the sovereign rating and
rating related to the private financial institutions' problem, 
– Between March and April there were further defaults
including those of the top thirty chebols including Sammi
Steel on March 19 and Jinro Group on April 21. In spite of
that, there were no signs of broader problems,
– In July the Kia Motors asked its creditors for the work-
out agreement on its debt of $8 billion to avoid receiver-
ship,
– In August, in spite of the intervention, the National
Bank of Korea was not able to defend the exchange rate at
the level of W 900 per US dollar. At the same time the gov-
ernment announced its readiness to guarantee foreign cur-
rency liabilities of Korea's financial institutions. This materi-
alized on the October 14, when the government injected
with money Korea First Bank and some other merchant
banks,
–  At  the  beginning  of  October,  various  credit  rating
agencies  downgraded  Korea  (S&P ,  Euromoney,  Moody),
because  of  the  governmental  decisions  to  rescue  Korea
First Bank and undertake Kia Motors,
– On October 27, Bloomberg said the free fall of Kore-
an won raised the concern the country would need the IMF
assistance, but the government denied it,
– On October 29, to attract foreign investors Korean
newspapers announced the bond market would be opened
from 1998. Nonetheless, it did not prevent the currency
from further depreciation,
– On October 30, the foreign press suspected that the
Bank of Korea official reserves of 30 billion dollars did not
include dollars borrowed through forward market transac-
tions as the Korean government ordered banks to stop sav-
ing dollars, 
– November 8, government accused foreign press of
making unjustified rumours about Korea and asked to stop
to destabilize the market. Ironically, investors seemed not
to believe this statement,
– November 18, Bank of Korea made emergency loans
to 5 major commercial banks worth $1 billion, however still
denied it would need the IMF assistance,
– November 20, the band was widened from 2.5 to 10
percent daily,
– November 21, the Minister of Finance and the Econ-
omy announced it would ask a rescue package from the IMF,
– December 4, IMF Executive Board approved a $21 bil-
lion  stand-by  credit  for  Korea  which  together  with  the
World Bank, ADB and individual government loans consti-
tuted $58 billion. 
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Banking System Restructuring
In the banking sector, a credit crunch resulted from high-
er interest rates that increased the stock of non-performing
loans (net domestic credit of the banking system dropped
by 50 percent on the annual basis). At the end of March
1998, the ratio of loans being three months plus in arrears
to total loans was 16.9 percent for banks and 14.5 percent
for all financial institutions (Sang- Loh Kim; 1998). In order
to deal with this problem, in April 1998 an independent
supervisory authority was established to apply international
prudential standards. Additionally, to help banks resolving
bad  loans  government  committed  W32.5  trillion  to  the
NPLs' Resolution Fund and planned to resolve W100 trillion
of bad loans via auctions, capital increase or subordinated
bond issues.  Five banks were shut down as well as 16 mer-
chant banks in 1998. The Korea First Bank and the Seoul
Bank had been nationalized after they repealed 87.5 percent
of their stock.
The Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) set a mini-
mum target for capital adequacy ratios according with the
BIS standard for banks and merchant banking corporations
to be achieved by the end of 2000.  Together with the Min-
istry  of  Finance  measures  on  improving  the  disclosure,
accounting  and  accounting  standards  were  introduced
(accounting of securities was going to be based on the mar-
ket instead of the book value). Starting from July 1, loans of
at least three months in arrears but less than 6 months were
categorized  as  non-performing.  Prompt  corrective  action
system was introduced imposing recommendations, mea-
sures and orders on the unsound financial institutions (i.e.
banks with the capital adequacy ratio lower than 8 percent
minimum). 
Corporate Restructuring
Corporate restructuring in Korea proceded on two sep-
arate  tracks.  One  was  a  debt  workout  for  the  smaller
cheabols and other large corporations; the other included a
package for the top five cheabols. Reform bills were passed
by the National Assembly in February 1998 and among oth-
ers included:
–  Tax  Exemption  and  Reduction  Control  Act  –  tax
breaks for company restructuring were provided,
– Bank Act – the limit on bank ownership of a corpora-
tion's equity increased from 10 to 15 percent, or higher with
Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) approval,
– Corporation Tax Act – non-deductibility of interest on
"excessive" debt was moved from 2002 to 2000,
– Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Capital Induce-
ment Act – takeovers of non-strategic companies by foreign
investors without government approval were allowed. For-
eign investors could acquire 33 percent of shares without
board approval (23 percent increase compared to the pre-
crisis limit),
– Antitrust and Fair Trade Act – new cross guarantees
were  prohibited.  Elimination  of  existed  cross  guarantees
was planed by March 2000,
– Financial Supervisory Committee maintained relatively
lax rules on accounting for restructured debt in order to
help Korean banks to negotiate substantial rate reductions
and conversions of debt into equity or low-yield convertible
bonds [Mako, 1999].
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The comparison of the four papers on the 1997–1998
financial crises in Asia clearly indicates that Korea, Thailand,
Malaysia  and  Indonesia  fall  in  the  group  of  relatively
homogenous economies.
1. After the Second World War, all these countries were
characterized as under-developed economies. They man-
aged to change this situation due to very high rates of eco-
nomic activity accompanied by very high investment and
saving  rates.  The  civilization  leap  might  not  have  been
achieved without the prominent role of the state. As the
years  passed,  government  interference  in  economic  life
gradually diminished but still remains relatively strong. In a
market economy, the government used to significantly influ-
ence the investment allocation and consequently determine
the  development  of  the  selected  branches  of  economy.
Therefore, it had to target the specific financial instruments
in order to push the private sector into the preferred area
of economic activity. As a result, the Asian economies are
characterized by strong interdependence of the private sec-
tor and government spheres. 
2. The aspiration for high and sustainable rates of eco-
nomic  growth  forced  all  the  countries  to  liberalize  their
domestic financial markets. As a result of financial market
liberalization, accompanied by weak regulation, the newly
established financial intermediaries engaged excessively in
financing projects characterized by high branch and credit
concentration. Then the Asian countries became increasing-
ly aware about the high costs of not participating in global-
ization  of  the  world  economy.  Due  to  very  specific  and
structural reasons, they liberalized short-term capital flows
far before liberalization of FDI and long-term capital flows.
The method of liberalization of both the financial markets
and capital accounts significantly contributed to the scope
and intensity of the Asian crisis.
3.  The  extreme  state  interference  in  economic  life
caused excessive concentration of market power and own-
ership. The powerful, family-owned conglomerates were
characterized  by  unbelievably  high  rates  of  economic
expansion accompanied by insufficient improvement in pro-
ductivity.  The  low  economic  efficiency  was  caused  by  a
number of factors. The most important is the imperfect
organizational structure (e.g. in Korea – the role played by
chairman  office),  weak  corporate  governance,  excessive
output  diversification  (preventing  conglomerates  from
effective competition in a few carefully chosen branches)
and growing domestic and foreign competition. Moreover,
the Asian countries experienced a relatively slow process of
democratization.  With  high  ownership  concentration,
intensive  state  interference  in  economic  life  and  young
democratic institutions, the countries exhibited poor trans-
parency of public finance and government relationships with
private sector.  
4. The strong desire to preserve the existing structure
of  ownership  led  conglomerates  to  finance  their  rapid
expansion  through  credits  from  financial  markets  with  a
negligible role played by capital markets.  In the presence of
weak  financial  regulation  and  high  rates  of  economic
growth, such a practice was responsible for conglomerates'
uncontrolled  indebtedness  on  the  domestic  market  and
excessive credit risk concentration in the financial sector.
Moreover, liberalization of the capital account allowed firms
to incur new debts on international financial markets and
continue  their  economic  expansion.  Many  companies
financed their activity as if they didn't face hard budget con-
straint. As a result, the share of FDI and long-term invest-
ments in total foreign debt was small but the ratio of debt
to equity and ratio of short-term foreign debt to foreign
official reserves reached high and unsustainable levels. 
5. Imperfect and opaque markets emerged as a result of
the state interference in the economy and high concentra-
tion of private ownership. Under such conditions, investors
(especially foreign ones) couldn't obtain all the necessary
information for a correct risk assessment. Moreover, there
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is some evidence that even the conglomerates were unable,
at least to some extent, to assess the total risk of their rapid
expansion. 
6.  The  analysis  of  the  main  features  of  the  Asian
economies leads to the conclusion that ineffective micro-
economic foundations, coupled with opqaue markets, and
the resulting asymmetry of information were responsible for
the 1997–1998 financial crises. That line of reasoning is sup-
ported  by  the  fact  that  Korea,  Malaysia,  Thailand  and
Indonesia  demonstrated  good  economic  performance  in
terms  of  the  GDP  growth,  inflation,  unemployment  and
public finance deficit. The relatively high current account
deficits were the only exception to overall positive macro-
economic picture.
7. However, in the second half of the 1990's, globaliza-
tion and higher openness exposed the Asian economies to
higher  competition,  appreciation  of  local  currencies  and
deterioration  of  terms  of  trade.  Global  markets  severely
verified the microeconomic efficiency of industrial corpora-
tions  and  financial  institutions  and,  to  some  extent,
improved the transparency of particular markets. 
8. The above remarks emphasize the role of structural
factors and microeconomic inefficiencies as the main rea-
sons behind the financial crises in Asia. In general, the situa-
tion should improve, due to deep structural and institution-
al  reforms.  However,  the  positive  effects  of  supply-side
reforms usually require long time. But it is known that the
Asian countries recovered from crisis quickly and since then
their economies have performed surprisingly well. Econo-
mists have explained many aspects of financial crisis, but no
doubt there is still enormous scope for additional research
work. 
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